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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3), Utah Code (1992); Article III, Section 2 of
the Utah Constitution; and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

This case presents the question of whether the

trial court correctly determined that the Act of March 1, 1933,
47 Stat. 1418 (the "1933 Act"), does not pre-empt state taxation
of non-Indian oil and gas lessees on the lands added to the Utah
portion of the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act.

The

applicable standard of review is correction of error.

See

Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah
1990).
B.

If the Court reverses the trial court and

determines that the 1933 Act pre-empts state taxation, the Court
should then remand this case to the trial court for a
determination of whether this ruling requires a refund of those
taxes paid by the appellants under protest since January 1, 1978.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
A.

Act of March 1, 1933. ch. 160, 47 Stat. 1418, is

set out in full in Addendum A.

It provides in pertinent part as

follows:
[Sec. 1.] Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that all vacant,
unreserved, and undisposed of public lands within
the areas in the southern part of the State of
Utah, bounded as follows: . . .be, and same are
hereby permanently withdrawn from all forms of

entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo
and such other Indians as the Secretary of the
Interior may see fit to settle thereon; Provided,
that no further allotments of lands to Indians on
the public domain shall be made in San Juan
County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads
be made in said county under the Act of July 4,
1884 (23 Stat. 96; U.S.C., title 43, Sec. 190).
Should oil or gas be produced in paying quantities
within the lands hereby added to the Navajo
Reservation, 37^ per cent of said royalties shall
be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of
Indian children in white schools and/or in the
building or maintenance of roads across the lands
described in Section 1 hereof, or for the benefit
of the Indians residing therein.
B.

Act of Mav 17, 1968. P.L. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121,

which amended the 1933 Act, is set out in full in Addendum B.

It

provides in pertinent part as follows:
Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1933 (47
Stat. 1418), is amended by deleting all of that
part of the last proviso of said section 1 after
the word "Utah" and inserting in lieu thereof:
"for the health, education, and general welfare of
the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan
County. . . ."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Appellants Texaco, Inc., Exxon Corporation, and Union

Oil Company of California (collectively the "Oil Companies")
appeal from the May 15, 1990, Judgment of the Tax Division of the
Seventh Judicial District Court, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell
presiding, which declared and held that the 1933 Act does not
pre-empt the nondiscriminatory taxation of the Oil Companies by
the State of Utah and its political subdivisions.
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On appeal, the Oil Companies contend that the 1933 Act
created a unique haven free from state and local taxes for nonIndian oil and gas producers within the Aneth Extension portion
of the Navajo Reservation.

To support this contention, they

argue (1) that the silence of the 1933 Act regarding state
taxation of non-Indian oil and gas lessees doing business on the
Aneth Extension, which was added to the Navajo Reservation by the
Act, pre-empts any such taxation in light of what the Oil
Companies believe was the then prevailing constitutional
doctrine; and (2) that the 1933 Act's allocation to the State of
Utah of 37^ percent of any royalties accruing from production on
the 1933 Act lands for the exclusive benefit of San Juan County
Navajos was in lieu of all state taxes that the State could
otherwise assess on the Oil Companies doing business on those
lands.
B.

Course of Proceedings
The complaints were filed in 1979 by ten of the largest

oil and gas producers in the United States, including Mobil
Exploration and Producing North America, Inc. ("Mobil"),
Southland Royalty Company ("Southland"), Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation ("Anadarko"), Wilshire Oil Company of Texas
("Wilshire"), Union Oil Company of California ("Union"), Texaco,
Inc. ("Texaco"), Phillips Petroleum Company ("Phillips"), Chevron
USA, Inc. ("Chevron"), Shell Oil Company ("Shell") and Exxon
Corporation ("Exxon").

Each of these companies had or has oil

and gas leases on the Utah portion (the "Utah Strip") of the
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Navajo Indian Reservation (the "Reservation11).

The complaints

challenged the application of five state and local taxes to the
oil and gas producers1 property and activities within the Utah
Strip.4
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 490 U.S. 163 (1989), a case in
which the plaintiffs had raised issues that were virtually
identical to most of those originally raised by the plaintiffs in
this case.

In Cotton Petroleum, the Court held, inter alia, that

state taxes on non-Indian oil and gas producers must be "upheld
unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress," 490 U.S.
at 173, and that "a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on
private parties with whom . . . an Indian tribe does business."
490 U.S. at 175.

The federal leasing statute at issue in Cotton

Petroleum is the same statute pursuant to which the Oil Companies
obtained their leases in this case.
Following Cotton Petroleum. Phillips, Shell, Chevron,
Southland, Anadarko and Wilshire moved for the dismissal with
prejudice of all of their claims.
Mobil, Union, Exxon and Texaco —

The four other plaintiffs

—

also sought dismissal with

4. The challenged taxes include the Oil and Gas Severance Tax
(formerly the Mining Occupation Tax), imposed by §59-5-101, et
seq.. Utah Code (1989); the Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, imposed
by §40-6-14, Utah Code (1989); the Corporate Franchise Tax,
imposed by §§59-7-101, et seq.. Utah Code (1989); the Sales and
Use Tax, imposed by §§59-12-101, et seq.. and §§11-9-1, et seq..
Utah Code (1989); and the Property Tax, imposed by §§59-2-101, et
seq.. Utah Code (1989) (collectively the "Utah Taxes").
-4-

prejudice of their primary claims.

The District Court granted

the plaintiffs1 motions for dismissal.6
The only issue remaining after the dismissal of the
claims controlled by Cotton Petroleum was the applicability of
the Utah Taxes to the operations of Mobil, Union, Exxon and
Texaco on the Aneth Extension.

On November 13, 1989, defendants

moved for summary judgment against the remaining plaintiffs on
this issue.

The Oil Companies filed a cross-motion.7

After

5. The claims that all of the plaintiffs (including appellants)
successfully moved to dismiss with prejudice included those
alleging that the Utah Taxes (1) were pre-empted by the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938; (2) unlawfully infringed on the
sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe; (3) violated the Indian Commerce
and/or Interstate Commerce Clauses of the U. S. Constitution; and
(4) violated plaintiffs1 rights to due process, equal protection,
and just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution. In seeking their dismissal, the plaintiffs
admitted that these claims were those upon which they had
principally relied throughout this litigation. See, e.g.,
Phillips Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (July 1989)
at 2 ("We are now of the view that Cotton Petroleum materially
undermines the major claims asserted in our pleadings against the
state and local defendants. . . . M ) (R. 5762, 5763).
6. In its Memorandum Decision from which this appeal has been
taken, the District Court characterized the impact of Cotton
Petroleum on plaintiffs' principal claims as follows: "When the
opinion in the Cotton case was handed down in April of 1989, it
did decide most of the claims asserted by plaintiffs and made it
impractical and unreasonable for plaintiffs to continue asserting
those claims." Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary
Judgment ("Mem. Dec") at 7. Judge Bunnell's Memorandum Decision
and his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are set forth at
Addenda C and D, respectively.
7. The cross-motion of the Oil Companies demanded only a partial
summary judgment determining that the 1933 Act pre-empted the
Utah Taxes. It did not ask for a judgment refunding taxes paid
under protest. Defendants have raised several defenses to the
refund claims that have not been addressed by the trial court.
See p. 49, below.
-5-

briefing was complete, Judge Bunnell heard oral argument on
March 13, 1990.
C.

Disposition in the Court Below.
On March 22, 1990, Judge Bunnell issued his Memorandum

Decision (Addendum C) granting defendants1 motion for
judgment and holding that "the 1933 Act did not, and <
preclude the defendants from imposing taxes on the pic
Mem. Dec. at 5.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, ana a

Judgment (Addendum D) were signed by the Court on May 15, 1990,
and entered on May 17, 1990. Texaco, Exxon and Union appealed
the trial court1s decision to this Court; Mobil did not.
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts
A.
This appeal presents a purely legal issue.

All parties

agreed below that there was no dispute as to material facts and
that the case was ripe for summary judgment.
The trial court's Findings of Fact —

See Mem. Dec. at 1.

which the Oil Companies do

not challenge here and did not challenge below8 —

provide a

helpful background for the disposition of this appeal.

We rely

on those findings, and summarize the most pertinent below.

8. For its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial
court adopted the proposed findings and conclusions submitted to
the court by the defendants. With one exception not pertinent to
this appeal, the Oil Companies did not object to the proposed
findings and conclusions. See Defendants1 Joint Reply Regarding
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 (R. 6652,
6653).
-6-

1.

The Oil Companies have leases from the Navajo

Tribe of Indians covering lands within the Utah Strip.

Those

leases were issued to the Oil Companies between 1953 and 1974
pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 347,
25 U.S.C. S 396a, et seq. (the "1938 Indian Mineral Leasing
Act").

Finding of Fact ("Finding") no. 2.
2.

Congress expanded the Utah Strip in 1933 when it

passed the 1933 Act (Addendum A).

The lands added to the

Reservation by the 1933 Act include those commonly referred to as
"the Aneth Extension," which consists of approximately 52,000
acres running North and East of Montezuma Creek, Utah, to the
Utah-Colorado state line.

It is the applicability of the Utah

Taxes to the Oil Companies' operations on the Aneth Extension
that is at issue in this appeal.
3.

Finding no. 4.

Before passage of the 1933 Act, the lands added to

the Reservation by the Act were a part of the public domain. As
such, they were subject to leasing under the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450 (now codified at 30 U.S.C.
§ 181 et seq.).

The Act expressly permitted state taxation of

production from any such leases and also allocated 37^ percent of
the royalties from that production to the states in which the
production occurred.
4.

Finding no. 7.

The Act of May 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 121 (the "1968

Amendment") (Addendum B) amended the 1933 Act to provide that the
37^ percent of the royalties generated on Aneth Extension lands

-7-

could be used for the health, education and welfare of all San
Juan County Navajos.
5.

Finding no. 5.

At the time the 1933 Act was passed, the Indian

Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244 (now codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 398), for "bought and paid for" lands, and the Indian Oil Act
of 1927, 44 Stat. 1347 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. S 398c), for
Executive Order reservations, provided the only congressional
authorization for oil and gas leasing on Indian lands.

Both Acts

explicitly authorized state taxation of production from any such
Indian lands.

Finding no. 9.

6.

The Oil Companies discovered oil and gas within

the Aneth Extension in the mid-1950s.

Most of the Oil Companies1

leases are now in secondary or tertiary recovery.

Finding no.

10.
7.

From the date of first production until 1978, the

Oil Companies paid all of the Utah Taxes without protest.

In

1978, when the Navajo Tribe of Indians began to impose taxes on
property and production on the Utah Strip, the Oil Companies for
the first time began paying their state and local taxes under
protest.

Finding no. 11.
8.

The Oil Companies (and all of the other plaintiffs

below) conceded for the purposes of this litigation that their
exploration, development and production decisions relating to
their properties on the Utah Strip, including the Aneth
Extension, have not been adversely affected by the Utah Taxes.
Finding no. 12.

-8-

9.

Total production from the Utah Strip between

January 1# 1978, and the date of the trial court decision
exceeded $1.5 billion.

Utah Taxes during the same period

approximated $80 million.
10.

Finding nos. 13 and 14.

The Oil Companies continue to produce oil and gas

from the Utah Strip and the Aneth Extension.
11.

None of the Utah Taxes are imposed on Navajo

tribal property or activities.

Finding no. 16.
B.

Before turning to our Argument, we pause briefly to
correct two misimpressions that may result from the Statement of
Relevant Facts in the Oil Companies1 Opening Brief.
Oil Companies' Fact no. 7.

In their Fact no. 7

(Opening Brief at pp. 10-11), the Oil Companies claim that a Utah
Division of Indian Affairs ("UDIA") report written in 1968 by
Bruce G. Parry, former director of UDIA, supports their
contention that the State's acceptance of the royalty monies was
"in lieu of taxes" on the Oil Companies.
the views of Mr. Parry —
passage of the 1933 Act —

We do not believe that

a state employee writing 35 years after
are entitled to any weight in

interpreting an act of Congress.
But even if they were, it is misleading for the Oil
Companies to claim here that Mr. Parry's views are consistent
with their own.

In an uncontested affidavit below, Mr. Parry

averred that the phrase "in lieu of taxes" in the UDIA report he
authored meant "in lieu of taxes on the Indians resident on the
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portion of the Navajo Reservation.11

As the Oil Companies know,

in Mr. Parry's view the phrase had "no application whatever to
non-Indian oil and gas lessees" such as the Oil Companies.

Reply

Affidavit of Bruce G. Parry, R. 6463.
Oil Companies' Fact no. 9.

The linchpin of the Oil

Companies' argument on appeal is set out in what they call "Fact
No. 9" (at p. 12 of their Opening Brief).

"Fact no. 9" asserts

that (1) the 1933 Act "evidenced congressional intent" that the
State would receive royalty monies rather than taxes, and (2)
"Congress recognized that application of the federal
instrumentality doctrine would have required specific
congressional consent [in the 1933 Act] to enable state taxation
of a non-Indian mineral lessee on Indian lands."
First, by no stretch of the imagination may these be
considered "facts."

Instead, they are conclusory statements

regarding precisely the question of law that is before the Court
—

namely, does the 1933 Act pre-empt state taxation of the Oil

Companies' operations on the Aneth Extension.
Second, these conclusory statements of law do not come
from the 1933 Act (or, for that matter, any other act of
Congress) or from any of the Committee reports or legislative
history that led to the 1933 Act.

Rather, these conclusions

emanate from the affidavit and report of Mr. John R. Alley, Jr.,
a "self-employed historian, writer and editor" (Affidavit of
John R. Alley, Jr., R. 6310) who was retained by plaintiffs below
in connection with their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Even

when it stays within the factual realm, we do not believe Mr,
Alley's report is entitled to any weight.

More fundamentally,

when the Report ventures into the realm of legal conclusions (as
it does in the Oil Companies1 "Fact no. 9") it is entitled to no
weight whatever and is, in any event, inadmissible.9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE OIL COMPANIES1 LEASES ISSUED UNDER THE 1938 INDIAN
MINERAL LEASING ACT ARE TAXABLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN COTTON PETROLEUM
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 490 U.S. 163

(1989), is one of three United States Supreme Court decisions
that completely disposes of the Oil Companies1 appeal.

In Cotton

Petroleum, the Court held that state taxes on non-Indian oil and
gas lessees such as the Oil Companies must "be upheld unless
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress."

Id. at 173.

Finding no express prohibition of state taxation in the 1938
Indian Mineral Leasing Act —

the same leasing statute under

which the Oil Companies conduct their operations on the Aneth
Extension —

the Court in Cotton next examined the Act's silence

regarding state taxation to see if it implied immunity.

Finding

a long and uninterrupted history of congressional approval of

9. Defendants moved to strike the Alley affidavit in the trial
court. See Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike the Affidavit and
Study of John R. Alley, Jr. (R. 6548). The District Court did
not rule on defendants' motion, concluding that the "legal
conclusions reached and expressed [in the affidavit and report]
are of very limited value and, as everyone concedes, are not
binding on the Court in any way. The Court can see no value in
going through the Affidavits and attached materials to try to
separate fact from legal conclusion." Mem. Dec. at 2.
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state taxation, the Court held that the silence of the 1938
Indian Mineral Leasing Act manifested Congress's "intent to
permit state taxation of non-member lessees.11

Id. at 183.

The Courtfs holding in Cotton squarely applies to the
Oil Companies1 operations on the Aneth Extension.

The 1933 Act

does not expressly prohibit state taxation and the Actfs silence
does not imply anything different.

Thus, these Oil Companies are

subject to the Utah Taxes just like all other oil and gas lessees
doing business on the Navajo Reservation, including their former
co-plaintiffs.
II.

IF THE OIL COMPANIES HAD HAD LEASES ON THE ANETH
EXTENSION AT THE TIME OF THE 1933 ACT, THEY WOULD HAVE
BEEN SUBJECT TO STATE TAXATION
Attempting to circumvent the unambiguous holding of

Cotton Petroleum, the Oil Companies advance two arguments that,
they say, in combination immunize their operations on the Aneth
Extension from the Utah Taxes.

First, they argue that the

"instrumentality doctrine" was in effect in 1933 and required
that the 1933 Act expressly authorize state taxation in order for
the taxes to be valid.

Critical to this argument is the Oil

Companies1 contention that neither of the leasing statutes in
effect in 1933 applied to the Aneth Extension.
This argument is of no moment.

Regardless of the state

of the instrumentality doctrine in 1933, leasing on the Aneth
Extension at the time the 1933 Act was passed was controlled by
the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924. That Act expressly permitted
state taxation of non-Indians and, under the leading United

-12-

States Supreme Court precedent on the matter, applied to
reservations such as the Aneth Extension that were created by
legislation.

British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of

Equalization, 299 U.S. 159f 161-63 (1936).

Like Cotton

Petroleum, this alone disposes of the Oil Companies' appeal.
In addition, the premise of the Oil Companies1 argument
regarding the applicability of the constitutionally derived
instrumentality doctrine to the 1933 Act has already been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court.

In Oklahoma Tax

Com'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 366 (1949), the Court held that
an immunity from state taxation "formerly said to rest on
constitutional implication cannot now be resurrected in the form
of statutory implication."

This, too, disposes of the Oil

Companies1 appeal.
III. NOTHING IN THE 1933 ACT SUPPORTS THE OIL COMPANIES1
CONTENTION THAT THE ACT ESTABLISHED A TAX-FREE ZONE FOR
NON-INDIAN OIL COMPANIES WITHIN A SMALL PORTION OF THE
NAVAJO RESERVATION
The second prong of the Oil Companies1 argument is
based on their understanding of the purpose of the 1933 Act,
which, they contend, was to provide the State of Utah with a
mutually exclusive choice between taxes and royalties.
two forms of revenue are not mutually exclusive.

But these

Had the Aneth

Extension remained in the public domain the State would receive
both royalties and tax revenues. Moreover, the Oil Companies
paid without protest both royalties and taxes to the State until
initiating these lawsuits and they pay both to the Navajo Nation.
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More fundamentally, neither the 1933 Act nor its
legislative history supports the contention that Congress
intended to create a tax haven for oil companies on the Aneth
Extension.

The "in lieu of taxes" language that the Oil

Companies rely on was introduced in connection with another
statute unrelated to the 1933 Act; the language was never
incorporated into any statute even remotely connected to the 1933
Act; and, in any event, the language was never meant to apply to
non-Indians.
The purpose of the 1933 Act was simply to ensure that
Navajos residing in San Juan County received a portion of oil and
gas revenues generated on the Aneth Extension.
state taxation, the 1933 Act is silent.
Petroleum that silence is not enough.

With regard to

We know from Cotton

This also disposes of the

Oil Companies1 appeal.
IV.

IF THE OIL COMPANIES PREVAIL IN THEIR APPEAL THIS CASE
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Should the Court reverse the trial court, the case

should be remanded for a determination of what, if any, refunds
should be awarded.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE OIL COMPANIES1 LEASES ISSUED UNDER THE 1938 INDIAN
MINERAL LEASING ACT ARE TAXABLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN COTTON PETROLEUM
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cotton

Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), doomed the Oil
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Companies1 primary claims in the trial court.
various motions to dismiss those claims —
appellants —

attest to that.11

Plaintiffs1

including those of the

Cotton Petroleum just as surely

dooms the residual claims that the Oil Companies are pursuing
here.
In Cotton Petroleum. appellants argued —
plaintiffs in this case —

as had the

that the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing

Act pre-empted state taxes imposed on oil and gas companies
operating on Indian reservations.

Like the 1933 Act, however,

the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act was silent on the subject.
The Supreme Court therefore initially confronted appellants'
argument that state taxes on oil and gas companies were "invalid
unless expressly authorized by Congress" (id. at 173). 12
The Court held that with respect to private companies
express congressional authorization to tax was not required.
Rather, state taxes on non-Indian oil and gas companies will be
"upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress."
Id.13
10.

If Congress has not addressed the subject —

if it has

See n.5, supra.

11. Plaintiffs' motions for dismissal of their claims with
prejudice are at R. 5757, 5770, 5781, 5792, 5801 and 5810.
12. That was the rule the Supreme Court had applied to state
taxes on Indian tribes. 490 U.S. at 178-80, 183 n.14. Unless
Congress specifically authorizes such taxes, the Tribe enjoys tax
immunity.
13. The holding in Cotton Petroleum is fully consistent with one
forty years earlier involving one of the companies before the
Court on this appeal. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. The Texas
Company. 336 U.S. 342, 366 (1949) (if Congress has not created
(continued...)
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remained silent —

the states are free to tax such companies

until federal legislation provides otherwise.

Of particular

significance to this case, the Court applied this aspect of its
ruling not only to the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act but also
to other federal statutes concerning Indians that (like the 1933
Act) were also silent on the subject of state taxation.

Id. at

183 n.14.
While congressional silence did not bar state taxes,
the question remained whether, in the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing
Act, Congress had by implication prohibited state taxation.
After reviewing the 1938 Act's legislative history and its
contemporaneous setting, the Court could find no "congressional
purpose to close the door to state taxation" of such companies.
Id. at 182.

Indeed, on Executive Order reservations "state

taxation of non-member oil and gas lessees was the norm from the
very start."

Id.

The Court therefore concluded that, far from

prohibiting state taxes, the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act
manifested Congress1s "intent to permit state taxation of nonmember lessees."

Id. at 183.

While this ruling rejected as a matter of law the
Cotton appellants1 claims under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing
Act, the Supreme Court did not stop there.

Urging a more

expansive reading of the Act than the Court was willing to give
it, appellants had relied upon several of the Courtfs earlier

13. (...continued)
tax "immunity . . . by affirmative action," oil lessees on Indian
Reservations are not exempt).
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decisions. Id. at 183-86.

The Supreme Court answered that

"federal law, even when given" —

not the correct, but —

"the

most generous construction, does not pre-empt" state taxes on
non-Indian oil and gas operations.

Id. at 186. Unlike the

decisions appellants relied upon, Cotton Petroleum was not a case
"in which the State . . . had nothing to do with the onreservation activity"; and it was not a case in which "an
unusually large state tax imposed a substantial burden on the
Tribe."

Any actual financial impact on the Tribe was "simply too

indirect and too insubstantial to support [the oil company's]
claim of pre-emption."

Id. at 185-86.

In the balance of its opinion, the Supreme Court
disposed of appellants' arguments under the Indian and Interstate
Commerce Clauses.

In response to appellants' contention that tax

payments exceeded the value of services provided by the State on
the reservation, the Court held that "there is no constitutional
requirement that the benefits received from a taxing authority by
an ordinary commercial taxpayer —

or by those living in the

community where the taxpayer is located —
of its tax obligations."

must equal the amount

Id. at 190. Moreover, Indian

reservations cannot be treated as if they were separate states
when it comes to taxing authority.

Rather, the "States and

tribes have concurrent jurisdiction" to tax companies operating
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on reservations and those companies cannot escape their
obligations on the basis that this results in a multiple tax
burden on them.

Id. at 192.14

The trial court was thus plainly correct in concluding
that Cotton Petroleum is a complete answer to the Oil Companies'
position.

Mem. Dec. at 2.

The fact that some of their

Reservation leases under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act
happen to be on land added by the 1933 Act is irrelevant.

The

subject of State taxation of oil and gas leases has always been
controlled by the various federal leasing statutes, not the
Executive Orders, treaties or legislation that have created
Reservations.

And, as we shall see (pp. 21-22), not once in

those leasing statutes has Congress ever barred state taxation.
Furthermore, the 1933 Act could be viewed as overriding
the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act if and only if it
affirmatively barred State taxation.

This much follows directly

from Cotton Petroleum, where the Court held that after 1938 "oil
14. If factual differences mattered, every difference between
the facts of Cotton Petroleum and the facts of this case cuts
against the Oil Companies. Utah's regulation of plaintiffs'
activities and provision of services to them are significantly
greater than the regulation and services provided by New Mexico
to appellant Cotton. Statement of Material Facts as to Which No
Genuine Issue Exists in Support of Defendants1 Joint Motion for
Summary Judgment, 5J 4-55 (R. 5950-5964). Services provided
throughout the Utah Strip are more extensive and much more
comparable to revenues from the Utah Strip than was the case in
Cotton Petroleum. Id. at M 73-101 (R. 5967-5976). In this case
there is not just a judicial finding of no impact on exploration,
development and production; plaintiffs have conceded that their
operations are not affected by the Utah Taxes. Finding no. 12.
Finally, the Utah Taxes, at 5-6 percent of production (Finding
no. 11), are significantly less than the New Mexico taxes, which
were 8 percent of production. 490 U.S. at 169.
18-

and gas lessees operating on Indian Reservations were subject to
nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as Congress did not act
affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes.11

Id. at 175 (emphasis

added).15
The short of the matter is that when the Oil Companies
conduct their operations on the Aneth Extension (and everywhere
else on the Reservation, for that matter), they do so under the
authority of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act.

Accordingly,

under the principles plainly enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court just four years ago they remain subject to state
and local taxation until Congress provides otherwise.
II.

IF THE OIL COMPANIES HAD HAD LEASES ON THE ANETH
EXTENSION AT THE TIME OF THE 1933 ACT, THEY WOULD HAVE
BEEN SUBJECT TO STATE TAXATION
We believe that the trial court correctly interpreted

the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum and that the
decision completely disposes of the Oil Companies1 arguments.
Confronted by the insurmountable obstacles presented by Cotton.
however, the Oil Companies are reduced to two arguments.

Each is

untenable.

15. It is impossible to square the clear and unambiguous
language from Cotton Petroleum we have just quoted with the Oil
Companies1 contention that Cotton "only reflects the Courtfs
conclusion that the 1938 Actfs general repealer did not serve to
repeal the taxation provision in the 1927 Act." (Opening Brief
at p. 37 (footnote omitted). That is pure fantasy. In its
opinion in Cotton Petroleum, the Court expressly declined to rest
its decision on the idea that the 1927 Act's tax authorization
continued after 1938. 490 U.S. at 182.
-19-

First, they contend that the "instrumentality doctrine"
was in effect in 1933 and that it barred then and continues to
bar today state taxation in the absence of express congressional
approval (Opening Brief at pp. 22-29).

Second, they contend that

the 1933 Act reflects Congress's intent to provide the State of
Utah a choice between royalties and taxes and that the State
chose the former to the exclusion of the latter (Opening Brief at
pp. 29-33).

We address these contentions in parts II and III,

respectively.
A.

Leases on the Aneth Extension in 1933 Would Have
Been Subject to the Indian Oil Leasing Act of
1924, Which Explicitly Permitted State Taxation
1.
The Oil Companies contend that at the time of the 1933

Act the instrumentality doctrine

required specific

congressional authorization in order for states to tax non-Indian
lessees and that there was no applicable leasing statute
providing any such authorization for the Aneth Extension.

But

the historical fact is that oil and gas lessees were not exempt
from state taxes when the 1933 Act became law.

See generally

Cotton Petroleum. 490 U.S. at 180-82.
Before 1919, Indian reservations were generally created
in two ways: by treaties ratified by Congress and by Executive
Orders setting aside federal lands for Indian use and occupancy.

16. The "instrumentality doctrine" is a subset of the judicially
created intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Its rise and demise
are chronicled in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173-75.
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Executive Order reservations were not necessarily permanent.
Often, Executive Orders creating reservations for the Indians
were revoked and the lands were returned to the public domain.
In 1919, the process of creating Executive Order
reservations came to an end.

The Act of June 30, 1919, 41 Stat.

3, prohibited the Executive Branch from establishing or adding to
Indian reservations through Executive Orders without
congressional approval. After 1919, the Executive Branch,
through the Department of the Interior, followed the practice of
temporarily withdrawing lands from the public domain and then
submitting proposed legislation to Congress to confer reservation
status on the area.

The 1933 Act adding the Aneth Extension to

the Navajo Reservation illustrates the process at work.
Oil and gas leasing on reservations that have been
"bought and paid for"17 has been authorized since the Act of
Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U.S.C. § 397. Although the 1891
Act was silent about state taxation of non-Indian lessees, the
Supreme Court held that such taxation was permitted.
Gay. 169 U.S. 264, 274 (1898).
1891 Act.

Thomas v.

In 1924, Congress amended the

The Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244, 25

U.S.C. § 398, set forth leasing procedures, extended the leasing
terms, and made explicit that the states were free to tax oil and
gas companies operating under such leases.

17. The Aneth Extension is a "bought and paid for" addition to
the Navajo Reservation. See pp. 24-25, below.
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Executive Order reservations were another matter.

As

the Supreme Court describes in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 18082, prior to 1927 oil and gas leasing had not been specifically
authorized on such reservations.

Some contended that such lands

could be leased under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 in
the same manner as other federal lands and that the Indians
residing there had no claim to the minerals.

The Indian Oil Act

of 1927, 44 Stat, (part 2) 1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398c, put an end to
the controversy by authorizing oil and gas leasing on Executive
Order reservations and recognizing the Indians9 interest in the
mineral deposits.

Like the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, the

Indian Oil Act of 1927 specifically authorized state taxation of
oil companies which held leases granted pursuant to its
provisions.

Id. at 182.

Thus, by 1933 when the Aneth Extension was added to the
Navajo Reservation, it was as clear as it could be that oil and
gas companies operating on Indian reservations throughout the
Nation were not immune from state and local taxes.18

As a

result, by making the Aneth Extension part of the Navajo
Reservation Congress necessarily subjected oil and gas leasing on
those 52,000 acres to the same federal laws then applicable
throughout the Reservation's other 14.5 million acres.

18. As the Supreme Court stated in Cotton Petroleum, "[t]here
is, accordingly, simply no history of tribal independence from
state taxation of these lessees to form a 'backdrop1 against
which the" 1933 Act must be read. Id.
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The Oil Companies, however, contend otherwise, arguing
that the Aneth Extension was a "third-type" of reservation,
neither Treaty nor Executive Order but rather the result of
legislative enactment.

The consequence of this, they continue,

is that leasing on the Aneth Extension was not covered by either
the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 or the Indian Oil Act of 1927.
(Opening Brief at p. 26). Thus, they conclude, there was no
explicit authorization for state taxation on the Aneth Extension.
Foremost among the problems with the Oil Companies1
argument that a "legislatively" created reservation is outside
the scope of any leasing statute in 1933, is that it is directly
contrary to the leading Supreme Court decision in the area.

In

British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization. 299
U.S. 159, 161-163 (1936), the Supreme Court specifically held
that the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 applied to reservations
created by legislation enacted by Congress:

"There have been two

related but distinct lines of legislation respecting the leasing
of tribal Indian lands for mining purposes.

The older and more

general line has been regarded uniformly as including lands in
reservations created by legislation, such as a treaty or
congressional enactment . . . .

The Act of February 28, 1891,

and the [Indian Oil Leasing] Act of May 29, 1924 . . . belong of
the first line."

Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).19

19. The "second line," the Court continued, is "confined to
lands in reservations created by Executive Order." Id. at 162.
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As a reservation "created by legislation" (as the Oil
Companies insist), the Aneth Extension at the time of its
addition to the Reservation thus was governed with respect to oil
and gas leasing by the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, which
expressly authorized the states to tax lessees.

In the face of

this history, it is as certain as it can be that the 1933 Act
could not possibly have had the opposite effect of prohibiting
state taxation of oil and gas operations on the Aneth
Extension.20
One further point remains in this regard.

The Oil

Companies explicitly contended below that a careful reading of
British-American Petroleum indicated that the phrase "bought and
paid for" meant lands reserved by treaty but not by legislation
and that therefore the Aneth Extension was not "bought and paid
for" as the phrase has come to be interpreted.

Plaintiffs1

Answer to Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment
("Plaintiffs1 Opposition") at 31 n.53 (R. 6111).
make the same argument here.

They appear to

(Opening Brief at pp. 39-40).

The problem with the argument is that, once again, it
is irreconcilable with the explicit language of British-American
Petroleum:

"by uniform administrative practice and by judicial

20. At page 24 of their Opening Brief, the Oil Companies rely on
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926), and Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), for their contention
that the instrumentality doctrine required explicit congressional
authorization for states to tax. These cases are inapposite,
however, since they involve the lands of the Five Civilized
Tribes and the Osage Tribe in Oklahoma, which were specifically
excluded from the coverage of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
1924.
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decision, ["bought and paid for11] has been construed as not
confined to lands acquired by Indians through payment of a
consideration in money, but equally including lands reserved for
Indians in return for a cession or surrender by them of other
lands, possessions, or rights."

299 U.S. at 164 (emphasis

added); see also Montana v. Blackfoot Tribe. 471 U.S. 759, 765
n.3 (1985) (same).
From the face of the 1933 Act itself, the Navajo quite
clearly ceded "rights" in exchange for the Aneth Extension.

In

return for the lands added to the Reservation, "no further
allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made
in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads be
made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 . . . ." Act
of March 1, 1933, § 1.

The Aneth Extension was thus plainly

"bought and paid for."
2.

In evaluating the Oil Companies1 novel contention that
no leasing statute applied to the 1933 Act lands, it is also
useful to consider what would have occurred between 1933 and the
enactment in 1938 of the comprehensive leasing statute at issue
in Cotton Petroleum.

Consider, for example, what Exxon would

have done in, say, 1935, if it had wanted to undertake oil and
gas operations on the Aneth Extension.

One thing is clear: Exxon

could not have relied on the 1933 Act as authority for granting
it an oil and gas lease in this area.
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The Oil Companies agreed

before the trial court,

as they must, that the 1933 Act was not

a leasing statute and that it did not authorize oil and gas
leases on the Aneth Extension, although it clearly anticipated
that oil operations could be undertaken there.
Therefore, if Exxon had wanted an oil lease on the
Aneth Extension in 1935, it would have had to rely on some other
federal leasing statute.

As the Oil Companies admit (Opening

Brief at 15), at the time Exxon would have had but two choices:
the 1927 Indian Oil Act and the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924.
The 1927 Act, however, would not have applied to the area created
by the 1933 Act; it governed only Reservations created by
Executive Order.

Exxon thus would have had to obtain its lease

under the 1924 Act.
This circumstance places the Oil Companies in a
predicament regarding their arguments about the Aneth Extension.
If they admit that oil leasing on the Aneth Extension was
originally governed by the 1924 Act, they would contradict
themselves because the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 expressly
permitted State taxation of oil and gas lessees.

On the other

hand, if they deny that the 1924 Act applied, which is what they
have done,22 they render their interpretation of the 1933 Act
absurd because their denial leads to the untenable conclusion
that no oil leasing could have occurred between 1933 and 1938.
21. Plaintiffs1 Opposition at 17 (R. 6097) ("Defendants argue
that the 1933 Aneth Act itself was not a leasing statute. . . .
This is correct.11).
22.

Opening Brief at pp. 15, 26.
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Put another way, the Oil Companies1 contention, to be accepted,
requires that this Court conclude that Congress engaged in an
exercise of complete futility in the 1933 Act, carefully dividing
oil and gas royalties between the State and the Tribe in an area
— the Aneth Extension — where there could be no oil and gas
leases and thus no royalties to divide.23
The Oil Companies are also in a predicament if we
assume that Exxon had embarked on its leasing on the Aneth
Extension before 1933, when the land was still in the public
domain.

At that time, there is no question Exxon would have been

required to pay the Utah Taxes (as lessees on public lands do to
this day) and pay the State 37^ percent of the royalties
generated from production on those lands.24

On the Oil

Companies' theory, Exxon's explicit obligation to pay the Utah
Taxes would have been eliminated in 1933 when the land was added
to the Reservation, despite the fact that the 1933 Act has not
one word to suggest any such intention on the part of Congress.

23. The United States Supreme Court has frequently admonished
that statutes should not be construed so as to lead to absurd
results. E.g.. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 575 (1982) ("interpretations of a statute which would
produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
available").
24. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 189, 191. Prior to 1933, the remaining 62^ percent would have
been paid to the United States.
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B.

The 1933 Act Did Not Enshrine the Instrumentality
Doctrine for All Time on the Aneth Extension
Whatever one might think of the status of the

instrumentality doctrine in 1933, it would not have applied to
the lands added to the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act.

Any

leases covering those lands would necessarily have been entered
into pursuant to the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, which
explicitly permitted state taxation of non-Indian oil and gas
lessees such as the Oil Companies.
That in itself disposes of the Oil Companies1 argument
(at pp. 22-29 of their Opening Brief) regarding the effect of the
instrumentality doctrine on the 1933 Act.
Oil Companies what they wish —

But let us grant the

that is, assume for the moment

that the instrumentality doctrine required specific congressional
approval for state taxation at the time of the 1933 Act and that
the doctrine applied to the Aneth Extension.

In other words,

assume (as the Oil Companies do) that the instrumentality
doctrine announced in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922),
was good law until overruled by Helverina v. Mountain Producers
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and that the doctrine attached to any
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legislation passed between 1922 and 1938.

The argument still

leads nowhere.
1.
First, this precise argument was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in a case brought forty-five years ago by
one of the appellants here —
Company.

Texaco, then known as Texas

In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co.. 336 U.S. 342

(1949), the issue before the Court was "whether a lessee of
mineral rights in allotted and restricted Indian lands is
immunized by the Constitution against payment of
nondiscriminatory [state taxes] on petroleum produced from such
lands."

336 U.S. at 343. This is precisely the question that

the Oil Companies raise on appeal.
The Court's unanimous answer to this question could not
have been more clear.

First, the Court directly overruled those

cases that Texas Company argued had survived the Mountain
Producers case and provided an ongoing source of tax immunity

25. The Oil Companies apparently mistakenly believe that prior
to Helverina v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938),
when the Supreme Court finally explicitly overruled the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, oil companies were
completely exempt from state taxes unless Congress affirmatively
said otherwise. (Opening Brief at pp. 23-25.) But even before
1938, the Supreme Court had upheld State taxes on oil lessees
despite the absence of congressional approval. E.g.. Group No. 1
Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1931) (sustaining State
tax on oil lessee on Indian lands); Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S. 325 (1933)(sustaining
State ad valorem tax on lessee's oil taken from restricted Indian
lands); Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 300 U.S.
1 (1937) (sustaining State ad valorem tax on equipment of a nonIndian oil lessee operating on restricted Indian lands).
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26

under the instrumentality doctrine.

336 U.S. at 365.

Next,

and of particular importance here, the Court considered what
effect the demise of the constitutional doctrine has on statutory
interpretation:
We do not imply, by this decision, that
Congress does not have power to immunize
these lessees from the taxes we think the
Constitution permits Oklahoma to impose in
the absence of such action. The question
whether immunity shall be extended in
situations like these is essentially
legislative in character. But Congress has
not created an immunity here bv affirmative
action, and "The immunity formerly said to
rest on constitutional implication cannot now
be resurrected in the form of statutory
implication. . . . [I]f it appears that there
is no ground for implying a constitutional
immunity, there is equally a want of any
ground for assuming any purpose on the part
of Congress to create an immunity."
336 U.S. at 365-66 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
Finally, the Court addressed precisely the issue that
we have here —

whether congressional silence (such as in the

1933 Act) leads to an inference of immunity from state taxation:

26. Specifically, the Court held that ,f[i]n light of the broad
groundings of the Mountain Producers decision and of later
decisions, we cannot say that the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and
Barnsdall Refineries decisions remain immune to the effects of
the Mountain Producers decision and others which have followed
it. They fare out of harmony with correct principle,• and they
should be, and they now are, overruled . . . . Moreover, since
the decisions in Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, supra, and
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra, rest
upon the same foundations as those underlying the Gipsy Oil,
Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, indeed supplied
those foundations, we think they too should be, and they now are,
overruled." 336 U.S. at 365.
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Finally, we refuse to infer from mere
congressional silence approval of the
doctrine of immunity enunciated in the
Choctaw, 0, & G. R. Co,, Indian Territory
Illuminating Oil (240 U.S.C. 522), Gipsy Oil,
Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions,
supra. Congress1 silence prior to the
Mountain Producers decision did not preclude
this Court from curtailing the lessee's
immunity in that case; and Congress seems to
have accepted that decision with equanimity.
336 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added).
While the Court's decision in Texas Co. provides yet
another ground for rejecting the Oil Companies' argument, the
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in that case (which
we have attached hereto as Addendum E) is also instructive.27

In

urging the Supreme Court to conclude that Texas Company enjoyed
no immunity under the instrumentality doctrine, the Solicitor
General argued as follows:
We believe that Congress, by failing to make
specific provision for the taxation of the
lessees here, has not indicated any intention
that they should be exempt from taxation on
their activities. The situation is similar
to the silence of Congress during the time
that the Gillespie decision stood for the
existence of the lessee's immunity against a
state net income tax. The Mountain Producers
case demonstrates that no significance should
be attached to this, for the tax exemption
there, guite properly, fell along with the
constitutional doctrine, unchecked by notions
of legislative intent that could only have
been fabricated out of congressional
inaction. Surely, the failure of the
legislature to mark its disagreement with
constitutional decisions does not signify an
adoption of those opinions as the policy of

27. The views of the United States are accorded particular
deference by the Court in matters involving Indians.
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the lav makers which will persist beyond the
time that they are overruled.
.

.

.

The failure of Congress, either before or
after the Mountain Producers decision, to
assert a tax exempt status for the lessees of
restricted Indian lands, undoubtedly
indicates an intent to permit them to be
taxed by the local authorities to the limit
of constitutional power.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at pp. 34 and 36, in
Oklahoma Tax CQTnm'n v . Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) . 2 8
In short, the argument that the Oil Companies pursue
leads nowhere.

Even if the instrumentality doctrine had applied

to the lands added to the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act (and
we reiterate that it did not), the doctrine died no later than
1938, as the Oil Companies admit (Opening Brief at 25).

It

"cannot now be resurrected in the form of statutory implication."
336 U.S. at 366.
2.
Even without the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Co..
the Oil Companies1 argument regarding the instrumentality
doctrine would fail.

The premise of the argument is that a

constitutional doctrine once announced is incorporated for all
time into statutes that are passed before the doctrine is
explicitly overruled.

28. A copy of the Brief for the United States was provided to
the trial court during oral argument on the cross-motions for
summary judgment. (Tr. at 19, R. 6724).
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But that cannot be the law.

If it were, all of the

legislation formalizing segregation in the South between the time
the Supreme Court decided Plessv v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537
(1896), which first announced the constitutional doctrine of
"separate but equal," and Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S.
483 (1954), which reversed the doctrine, would still be good law.
III. NOTHING IN THE 1933 ACT SUPPORTS THE OIL COMPANIES1
CONTENTION THAT THE ACT ESTABLISHED A TAX-FREE ZONE FOR
NON-INDIAN OIL COMPANIES WITHIN A SMALL PORTION OF THE
NAVAJO RESERVATION
The second prong of the Oil Companies1 attempt to
overcome Cotton Petroleum is their contention that the 1933 Act
culminated a debate resulting in Utah having to make a mutually
exclusive choice between royalties, on the one hand, and taxes,
on the other.

This is nonsense.

First, as the Oil Companies well know, there is no
inherent inconsistency in the State receiving both royalties and
tax revenues.

Indeed, before 1978, the Oil Companies paid both

royalties and taxes to the State without protest for their
operations on the Aneth Extension (Opening Brief at 13), and,
like other lessees, they continue to pay both to the Navajo
Nation.

See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navaio Tribe of Indians. 471

U.S. 195 (1985).29

Moreover, the "debate" regarding the Aneth

Extension that the Oil Companies cling to was in reality no
debate at all, at least as far as the 1933 Act was concerned.
29. Like the Navajos, other tribes also receive both royalties
and receive taxes from the same production. See, e.g., Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).
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A.

The Only Exemption from State Taxes Even
Contemplated by Congress Was for the Navajo Tribe,
and Even It Did Not Become Part of the 1933 Act
The purported factual basis for the Oil Companies'

contention regarding a congressional "debate" over royalties and
taxes is set forth at Jf 4-7 of their Statement of Material Facts
Except for citations to defendants1

(Opening Brief at pp. 8-10).

moving papers below and to the trial court's findings, all of the
record citations in 5J 4-7 are to the report of Mr. Alley, the
Oil Companies' historian.30

The trial court did not accord any

weight to Mr. Alley's report (see p. 11 n.9, supra).
Nevertheless, we address below the substance of the report which
requires digressions into the legislative histories of the Indian
Oil Act of 1927 and the 1933 Act.
In the 1920s, during the controversy surrounding oil
and gas leasing on Executive Order reservations, legislation was
proposed that would have given the states 37^ percent of the
royalties "in lieu of taxes."

This, in its entirety, is the

"debate" regarding royalties and taxes to which the Oil Companies
attach such importance.
As finally enacted, however, the Indian Oil Act of 1927
contained no such provision.

Undeterred, the Oil Companies

contend that the 1933 Act was modeled after the bill that did not
become law.

Therefore, they continue, the phrase "in lieu of

30. In 5 7 the Oil Companies also cite to a UDIA document.
However, the uncontested view of the author of the report is
directly contrary to the Oil Companies' contention. See pp. 9,
10, supra.
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taxes" contained in the unenacted bill should be read into the
1933 Act, although the statute says no such thing.

In this

respect, the Oil Companies assxime that if the phrase "in lieu of
taxes" had been included in the 1933 Act, this would have meant
that the State of Utah was granted a share of the royalties "in
lieu of" taxing them.
We believe this theory is far-fetched.

To make the

argument, the Oil Companies are forced to rely on the purported
intent of the 1926 Congress regarding an unenacted bill to
determine the intent of the 1933 Congress regarding a statute
that dealt with a different subject31 and omitted the very
language the Oil Companies deem critical to their case.

"Going

behind the plain language of a statute in search of a possibly
contrary congressional intent is a step to be taken cautiously
even under the best of circumstances."

United States v. Locke,

471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).

Here,

plaintiffs urge the Court to undertake this search in the worst
of circumstances.
The first link in the Oil Companies' tenuous chain of
reasoning is a bill proposed and drafted by the Department of the
Interior in January 1926 and introduced one month later as H.R.
9133 by Representative Hayden (hereinafter the "Hayden bill").
See H.R. Rep. No. 763, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926); S. Rep.

31.
The unenacted bill dealt with oil and gas leasing on
Executive Order reservations while the 1933 Act dealt with
additions to the Navajo Indian Reservation.
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No. 768, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1926).

As proposed, the

Hayden bill provided among other things that on Executive Order
reservations, the states would receive 37^ percent of the
royalties —
crucial —

and this is the language the Oil Companies consider

"in lieu of taxes to the State."

S. Rep. No. 768,

supra. at 3.
As we have noted, the bill never passed in the form
proposed.

All of the language upon which the Oil Companies rely

was deleted in committee (H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra, at 1, 9) or
not adopted (S. Rep. No. 768, supra, at 4), and none of it is
contained in the statute Congress ultimately enacted as the
Indian Oil Act of 1927.
In order to show that the 1933 Act had the same purpose
and effect as the unenacted 1926 bill, the Oil Companies rely not
on any House or Senate committee reports, or on anything said by
any members of Congress, but on a statement in 1931 by Herbert
James Hagerman, a former federal commissioner to the Navajo
Tribe.

According to Hagerman, Utah congressional representatives

were insisting that legislation adding the Paiute Strip to the
Reservation contain a provision granting 37^ percent of the
royalties to the State of Utah —

a provision, as Hagerman put

it, "similar" to that in the bill proposed five years before with
respect to Executive Order reservations.

Survey of Conditions of

the Indians in the United States. Part 11: Hearings Before a

32. The Senate and House Reports are set out at Addendum F and
G, respectively.
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Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs. 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 4562 (1931).
We pause here to make several observations.

If, as the

United States Supreme Court has held, the views of a single
Senator are entitled to little or no weight in statutory
construction (United States v. Wells Farao Bank. 485 U.S. 351,
358 (1988)), the views of Mr. Hagerman are entitled to even less.
This is especially so in Mr. Hagerman*s case in light of the fact
that he was thoroughly discredited and discharged from office.33
Moreover, Hagerman was speaking in 1931 and it was
therefore impossible for him to state what the Congress of 1933
intended when it enacted the legislation in question.

As the

United States Supreme Court has warned on many occasions, it "is
the intent of the Congress that enacted [the legislation] . . .
that controls."

Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 354

n.39 (1977).
Furthermore, Hagerman said only that the proposals
regarding Reservation expansion in Utah were "similar" to — not
the same as —

the unenacted bill from the 1920s.

But on the

subject the Oil Companies consider important, the proposals were
dissimilar.

The 1933 Act did not provide that sharing royalties

with the state was "in lieu of" taxes.
similarities in other respects.

To be sure, there were

Both the Utah proposal and the

33. See L. Kelly, The Navaio Indians and Federal Indian Policy,
152 n.6 (1968) (hereafter "Kelly"). A copy of Kelly was lodged
with the trial court along with Defendants1 Joint Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 6015 n.19).
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unenacted bill provided that 37^ percent of the royalties would
go to the State.

But in that respect, the Utah proposal was also

"similar11 to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, which
designated the same percentage as the states1 royalty share
and —

more importantly —

expressly provided that the states

could tax the lessees, such as the Oil Companies in this case.
But, once again, let us suppose that it would be proper
to grant the Oil Companies all that they argue.

In other words,

assume that Hagerman's statement in 1931 proved that in 1933
Congress modeled the Act creating the Aneth Extension after the
Hayden bill and assume further that the "in lieu of" language
should therefore be added by judicial amendment to the actual
language of the 1933 legislation.

Even then the Oil Companies

could not prevail.
The fundamental premise of their entire line of
reasoning is that the "in lieu of" language in the Hayden bill
would have meant (if only it had been enacted) that the states
would be receiving the 37^ percent of the royalties in lieu of
taxing the oil and gas producers.

That premise is flatly wrong.

The Interior Department, which drafted this proposed legislation
in 1926, informed both the House and the Senate that the language
in question meant in lieu of taxing the Indians, and was not
intended to prevent the states from imposing "taxes against the

-3S-

white man, lessees or otherwise."

S. Rep. No. 768, supra at 4

(Addendum F); H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra at 3 (Addendum G ) . 3 4
The Interior Department proposed clarifying this
possible ambiguity (id.)r which proved unnecessary when the bill
failed to garner support.

During the same Congress, however, in

legislation concerning several Oklahoma tribes, the Interior
Department's proposed clarification became law.

In this

legislation, Congress allocated 37^ percent of the royalties from
certain Indian land in Oklahoma to the state "in lieu of all
state and local taxes upon said tribal funds."35

34.
The Interior Department drafted the bill and sent it to
the House and Senate in January 1926. After confusion arose
regarding the meaning of the "in lieu of" language, the Interior
Secretary, in March 1926, sent a letter to the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs, explaining (S. Rep. No. 768, supra at 4
(Addendum F)):
As construed and understood by this department at
the time the report of January 28, 1926, was made, this
language "in lieu of taxes to the State" means that 37^
per cent of the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or
bonuses of oil and gas leases upon lands within
Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be paid to the State, for designated purposes, in
lieu of any and all taxes against the Indians, but does
not include taxes against others. . . .
The Interior Secretary sent a nearly identical letter to the
House Committee on Indian Affairs, stating that the "in lieu of
taxes to the State" language "does not include taxes against the
white man, lessees or otherwise." H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra at 3
(Addendum G).
35. Joint Resolution Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior
to Establish a Trust Fund for the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache
Indians in Oklahoma, 43 Stat. 740 (1926). This legislation is
analogous to the 1933 Act. It involved an area formerly part of
the public domain, but to which the Indians held an equitable
claim. S. Rep. No. 492, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1926).
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Thus, even the language the Oil Companies wish Congress
had put into the 1933 Act would not have granted them a tax
exemption.

Even if it had been adopted —

and it was not —

it

merely would have provided an exemption to the Navajo Tribe from
state and local taxes, an exemption the Tribe currently enjoys
but the Oil Companies do not.

The thread the Oil Companies

pursue to gain tax immunity therefore leads to nothing but a dead
end.
B.

The 1933 Act Ensured that a
Revenues Would Be Spent for
Tribal Members in Utah, but
Royalty Payments bv Private

Portion of the Royalty
the Benefit of Navajo
Did Not Affect Tax or
Oil and Gas Producers

We turn next to the history of the 1933 Act and its
1968 amendment.

On their face, neither the Act nor its amendment

supports the Oil Companies1 position.

Indeed, there is not even

a word in the Act or its amendment about state taxation of oil
and gas companies.

Still less is there anything in the statutory

language to indicate that Congress was ordaining this relatively
tiny area in Utah a tax haven for oil and gas companies.
score there is simply silence and nothing more.

On that

Cotton Petroleum

tells us that this is not enough.
1.
Prior to 1933, the Paiute Strip and the Aneth Extension
were federal lands and part of the public domain.36

In the early

36.
The status of the Paiute Strip had vacillated over the
years. First set aside for Indians in 1884, the Paiute Strip was
withdrawn from the Reservation by Executive Order in 1892, set
aside for Indians again in 1908 by departmental order, withdrawn
(continued...)
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1930s the Department of the Interior proposed taking these tracts
from the public domain and adding them to the Navajo Reservation.
Apparently there was no oil or gas production there but future
discoveries were considered possible.
The State of Utah and its citizens objected to the
Interior Department's proposal.

See Memorandum from the

Commissioner on Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior,
Jan. 7, 1933, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 1883, 72d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-4 (1933).37

In order to resolve the dispute, the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs met with a "Committee of Nine"
citizens representing San Juan County in 1932. The meeting,
which took place in Blanding, resulted in a memorandum of
agreement dated July 15, 1932 (reprinted in H.R. No. 1883, supraf
at 3-4). Among other things, the Committee of Nine and the
Commissioner agreed that after the land passed into Reservation
36. (...continued)
again by departmental order in 1922 and temporarily set aside
again "in aid of legislation" in 1929. In 1927, the Department
of the Interior began studying whether the area should be
permanently added to the Navajo Reservation. Navaio Indian
Reservation. Report of H. J. Haaerman Special Commissioner to
Negotiate with Indians on the Status of Navaio Indian Reservation
Land Acquisitions. S. Doc. No. 64, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. at 38-39
(1932) (hereinafter "Haaerman Report").
Senate bill No. 3782 was introduced in 1930 to add the
Paiute Strip to the Reservation. That bill did not pass.
Congressman Don Colton of Utah introduced H.R. 16464 on January
22, 1931, again proposing the addition of the Paiute Strip to the
Reservation. H.R. 16464 did not make it out of committee.
Governor Dern of Utah adamantly opposed expanding the Navajo
Reservation if it meant the 37.5 percent of the royalty dedicated
to the states under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 would be
lost. Haaerman Report at 39.
37.

The House Report is set out at Addendum H.
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status, the State would receive 37^ percent of the royalties
collected from any future oil and gas lessees in these areas, but
would expend such funds for the benefit of the Indians living
there.

Id.
2.
Several points emerge from this history, each of which

refutes the Oil Companies1 contention that the 1933 Act's
royalty-sharing provision somehow conferred tax immunity on them
by implication.

First, it is clear that there is no inherent

inconsistency between granting a state a percentage of the
royalties and permitting the state to tax the oil and gas
producers.

Existing federal law so provided with respect to

federal lands in general.

If the Paiute Strip and the Aneth

Extension had remained part of the public domain, oil and gas
operations there would have been governed by the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920.

The Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 41 Stat.

450, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et sea., not only authorized the States to
impose taxes on federal oil and gas lessees (30 U.S.C. § 189),
but also granted the states 37% percent of the royalties
collected by the federal government.38

See Mid-Northern Oil Co.

v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45, 48-50 (1925); Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-33 (1981).

The states thus share in

the federal government's royalties and, at the same time, impose
taxes on the producers.

38. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act was subsequently amended so
that the states now receive 50 percent of the royalties collected
from oil and gas lessees on federal land. 30 U.S.C. § 191.
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Second, there can be no contention that the 1933 Act's
royalty-sharing provision imposed some added burden on oil
companies that Congress would have sought to offset through a tax
exemption.

From the point of view of any oil company that later

engaged in operations on the Aneth Extension the division of
royalties between the State and the Tribe had absolutely no
financial consequences.

Such companies would still pay a full

royalty on productipn; the 1933 Act concerned only how those
royalties would be distributed.

In short, the Oil Companies are

not under any special financial burden on the Aneth Extension and
there is no reason why Congress would have intended —
not without saying so —

certainly

to give them a special tax break there.

Furthermore, the evident purpose of the 1933 Actfs
royalty-sharing provision is entirely unrelated to the Oil
Companies' tax status.

From the point of view of the State, the

Tribe and particularly the tribal members living on the Utah
Strip, the 1933 Act made a significant difference.

If these

52,000 acres had remained part of the public domain, the State
would have received 37^ percent of royalties from oil and gas
operations conducted there.

When the land passed into

Reservation status, the 1933 Act had the effect of maintaining
the State's percentage at the same level, but with one important
difference.

After 1933, if oil and gas were produced on the

Aneth Extension, the State of Utah was required to expend its
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share of the royalties for the benefit of the tribal members
living in the newly-added area.39
On the other hand, if Congress had not included the
royalty provision in the 1933 Act, all of the royalties collected
on the Aneth Extension would have gone to the Tribe.

Geography

explains why Congress required the Tribe to share its royalties
with the State of Utah.

The unusual feature of the Navajo

Reservation is that it is not wholly within any one State.

The

Utah portion of the Reservation is the smallest and the tribal
members residing there make up a distinct minority within the
Tribe.

In the absence of a division-of-royalty provision in the

1933 Act, there was no assurance that the Tribe would expend any
of the royalty proceeds for the benefit of the tribal members
living on the Aneth Extension or anywhere else in Utah.

That is,

the Tribe would have been free to spend the Utah royalties in
Arizona or New Mexico.

Yet the language of the 1933 Act shows

that Congress was concerned about the welfare of the Utah
Navajos.
The wisdom of Congress in setting aside specific funds
for the benefit of the Navajos residing in San Juan County cannot
really be in doubt.

In a case that specifically addressed the

1933 Act, the Federal District Court for Utah found that while
generally "the situation of the Navajo Indians is a sad and

39. The royalty funds generated on the Aneth Extension "do not
belong to the State of Utah nor are they public funds." Sakezzie
v. Utah State Indian Affairs Commission. 215 F. Supp. 12, 21 (D.
Ut. 1963).
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difficult one . . ., [t]he Navajos living on the Aneth Extension
particularly live in abject poverty.11

Sakezzie v. Utah State

Indian Affairs Commission. 215 F. Supp. 12, 22 (D. Ut. 1963); see
also United States v. Jim. 409 U.S. 80, 84 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (Aneth Extension Navajos "live in a remote and
relatively inaccessible area11).

Moreover, as the District Court

also found, there are good reasons why Congress decided not to
rely solely on the largesse of the Navajo Nation to distribute
any such funds to San Juan County Navajos.

"[T]he interest of

the tribe as a whole in some respects has been in conflict with
those of the Indians residing upon the Aneth Extension."
Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Commission. 198 F. Supp. 218, 221
(D. Ut. 1961).

Or, as Justice Douglas put it, "there are

tensions and conflicts between these primitive Navajos who live
on the Aneth Extension and other members of the tribe who live
elsewhere."

United States v. Jim. 409 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J.,

dissenting).
3.
One other point of critical importance remains
regarding the 1933 Act.

Thus far we have focused only on the

legislation as enacted in 1933.
1968,

But the Act was amended in

a fact which the trial court rightly held "demonstrates

conclusively congressional approval of the receipt by Utah of
both tax and royalty income from the Aneth Extension."

40.

P.L. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121 (1968) (Addendum B).
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Conclusion of Law no. 8.

The Oil Companies, of course,

disagree.41
Congress's action in 1968 is significant for several
reasons.

The legislative history of the 1968 amendment confirms

the holding of the trial court that the royalty-sharing provision
of the 1933 Act was not designed for the benefit of oil and gas
companies.

It was instead intended to protect the few Indians

living in the then newly-designated Reservation areas. As we
have discussed, without the royalty-sharing provision those Utah
Navajos would have had no assurance that any of the royalty
proceeds would be spent for their benefit since such funds would
have been paid to the Tribe in Window Rock, Arizona.
The legislative history of the 1968 amendment fully
supports this conclusion.

In considering whether to continue the

royalty-sharing provision in 1968 and extend the class of
beneficiaries, Congress adopted the proposal of John S. Boyden,
then Chairman of the Utah Indian Affairs Commission.

Chairman

Boyden's testimony before Congress about the purpose of the 1933
Act confirms each of the points we have stressed and is therefore
worth quoting at length:
[Then Utah] Governor Dern took the
position [regarding the Aneth Extension] that
if they were going to include this land in
the Navajo Reservation that special
protection ought to be given to these Indians
in this particular area because they were at
that time regarded as sort of an isolated
people.

41.

Opening Brief at pp. 42-43.
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They were far away from both the Navajo
headquarters and from the State and
Government and were very isolated and I know
that Governor Dern was very interested in
seeing that these people had the benefits.
So that, as you know, there were certain
reservations with respect to oil even on
Federal lands that work to the benefit of the
schools of the State. I think that is where
this percentage came from.
So there was an endeavor at this time to
say, "Well what would ordinarily go if this
were public lands to the school? We will
give it to these Indians that need it so
badly and we will go along with it."
I think that is about the history [of
the 1933 Act] as near as I can tell.
Furthermore, when Congress amended the Act in 1968 it
did so against the backdrop of the Supreme Court1s decision in
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), which set
forth the controlling principles in this area.
held in Texas Co. —
Petroleum —

The Supreme Court

as it did again forty years later in Cotton

that the question whether tax immunity should be

extended to oil and gas lessees operating on Indian lands "is
essentially legislative in character" and if Congress has not
created "an immunity . . . by affirmative action," the Court will
not imply one.

Id. at 365-66.

By no stretch of the imagination did either the 1933
Act or its 1968 amendment grant tax immunity to oil lessees
42. Hearings on S.391 Before the Subcom. on Indian Affairs of
the Senate Com, on Interior and Insular Affairs. 89th Cong. 2d
Sess. 10 (1967) (Statement of John S. Boyden). The full text of
Chairman Boydenfs statement was attached to Defendants' Joint
Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
before the trial court. R. 6469.
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through "affirmative action11 by Congress.

The point of Texas

Co.. which continues to elude the Oil Companies, is that if the
statute does not affirmatively grant tax immunity to them they
remain subject to state and local taxation.

Silence is not

enough.43
In short, whether any Indian Reservation, in whole or
in part, ought to be transformed into a unique tax-free zone for
the benefit of oil and gas companies is a legislative question,
not a judicial one.

It is a question that Congress has without

exception resolved against oil and gas companies by refusing to
bestow tax immunity on their reservation operations anywhere in
the United States.
IV.

IF THE OIL COMPANIES PREVAIL IN THEIR APPEAL THIS CASE
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
In their Opening Brief the Oil Companies do not comply

with Rule 24(a)(10) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which requires that they state the precise relief they seek on
appeal.

In the trial court, the Oil Companies sought only a

partial summary judgment determining that they are exempt from
the Utah Taxes.

In their complaints, the Oil Companies have also

asserted claims for tax refunds, to which the defendants have

43. If, however, congressional silence is to be given some
meaning, what meaning can be given its silence as to State
taxation in the 1968 amendment? Faced with the situation that
for 10 years the State had been both taxing the oil companies and
collecting a royalty for the benefit of the Navajos residing in
the affected area, Congress, far from correcting what in the Oil
Companies1 view is an unintended windfall for the State of Utah,
expanded the beneficiary class under the royalty.
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raised defenses.44

Should the Court determine that the 1933 Act

does pre-empt the Utah Taxes, this case should be remanded for a
trial court determination of what, if any, refunds should be
awarded.45

44. These defenses include (1) refunds should not be awarded
because of the failure of the Oil Companies to pursue diligently
their claims; (2) the decision would represent an unexpected
change in the law and work a hardship; and (3) the Oil Companies
failed to perfect their refund claims. Defendants expressly
reserve all of their defenses.
45. See Rio Alaom v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 197 (Utah
1984) .
-49-

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh
Judicial District Court of San Juan County should be affirmed.
DATED the 23rd day of March, 1993.
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72d CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHS. 159,160.

MARCH l 1933.

[CHAPTEH 160.]
March 1,1033.
(H. R. 11733.)
[Public No. 403.]

AN ACT
To permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the Navajo
Indian Reservation, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
erSS^uSS111 ResMt" uUnited
States of America in Congress assembled. That all vacant,
nreserve
Midfi^Sftion »
d> and undisposed of public lands within the areas in the
Description,
southern part of the State of Utah, bounded as follows: Beginning
at a point where the San Juan River intersects the one hundred
and tenth degree of west longitude; thence down said river to its
confluence with the Colorado River; thence down the Colorado River
to a point where said river crosses the boundary line between Utah
and Arizona; thence east along said boundary line to the one hundred
and tenth degree of west longitude; thence north to the place of
beginning; also beginning at a point where the west rim of Montezuma Creek or wash intersects the north boundary line of the Navajo
Indian Reservation in Utah; thence northerly along the western nm
of said creek or wash to a point where it intersects the section line
running east and west between sections 23 and 26, township 39 south,
range 24 east, Salt Lake base and meridian in Utah; thence eastward
along said section line to the northeast section corner of section JG,
township 39 south, range 25 east; thence south one mile along the
section line between sections 25 and 2G to the southeast section corner
of section 26, township 39 south, range 25 east; thence eastward
along the section line between sections 25 and 36, township 39 south,
range 25 east, extending through township 39 south, range 26 east.
to its intersection with the boundary line between Utah and Colorado; thence south along said boundary line to its intersection with
the north boundary line of the Navajo Indian Reservation; thence
in a westerly direction along the north boundary line of said reservation to the point of beginning be, and the same are herebv. permanently withdrawn from all iorms of entry or disposal for the
benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as the Secretary of
the
Interior may see fit to settle thereon: Provided, That no further
Rdtnetkm on fur
allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made
tberiUotmtats.
Vol. 23, p. 96
in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads
U. 8. C, p. 1338.
be made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. 96;
£^t?b!%*M ^- S. C, title 43,sec. 190). Should oil or gas be produced in paying
suu.
quantities within the lands hereby added to the Navajo Reservation,
Uatot
37% per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived
from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided. That
said 37% per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the

72d CONGRESS.

SESS. II. CHS. 160-162.
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State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools
and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands
described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing
therein.
SEC. 2. That the State of Utah may relinquish such tracts of T ^hh°?^.m;ntKb^
school land within the areas added to the Navajo Reservation by tracts to Indians.
section 1 of this Act as it mav see fit in favor of the said Indians,
and shall have the right to select other unreserved and nonmineral j ^ ! * ^ ^ of otner
public lands contiguously or noncontiguously located within the State
of Utah, equal in area and approximately of the same value to that
relinquished, said lieu selections to be made in the same manner as
is provided for in the Enabling Act of July 10. 1SD4 (25 Stat. L. J - ^ ^ 0 9 107), except as to the payment of fees or commissions which are
hereby waived.
Approved, March 1, 1933.

ADDENDUM B
ACT OF MAY 17, 1968

INDIANS—NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATIONUSE OF FUNDS
PUBLIC LAW 90-306; 82 STAT. 121
[S. 391]
An Act to amend the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1418), entitled "An Act
to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the
Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other purposes".

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That:
Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1418), is amended
by deleting all of that part of the last proviso of said section 1 after
the word "Utah" and inserting in lieu thereof: "for the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San
Juan County. Planning for such expenditures shall be done in cooperation with the appropriate departments, bureaus, commissions, divisions, and agencies of the United States, the State of Utah, the
county of San Juan in Utah, and the Navajo Tribe, insofar as it is
reasonably practicable, to accomplish the objects and purposes of
this Act. Contribution may be made to projects and facilities within
said area that are not exclusively for the benefits of the beneficiaries
hereunder in proportion to the benefits to be received therefrom by
said beneficiaries, as may be determined by the State of Utah through
its duly authorized officers, commissions, or agencies. An annual
report of its accounts, operations, and recommendations concerning
the funds received hereunder shall be made by the State of Utah,
through its duly authorized officers, commissions, or agencies, to
the Secretary of the Interior and to the Area Director of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs for the information of said beneficiaries."
Approved May 17, 1968.

ADDENDUM C
MEMORANDUM DECISION

IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TEXACO, INC., a Delaware,
Corporation, et al.,

>
|
I

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

vs.
SAN JUAN COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants,
and

(

;

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SAN JUAN
j
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., ;
Defendants in ]
Intervention. ;

Consolidated Cases
Civil NOS. 4152-4153,
4156-4157, 4973-4977
(No. C79-4060
Third District)

The plaintiffs and the defendants have each
respectively submitted motions for summary judgment and have
both conceded that there is no dispute as to the material
facts and that the case is in a position to be determined by
summary judgment.

The parties have submitted their legal

memorandums and authorities together with affidavits and
exhibits that the Court has considered, and the parties
appeared before the Court on the 13th day of March, 1990,
and the Court heard oral arguments relative to the Motions.
The Court took the Motions under advisement and rules as
here and after stated.

Challenges have been made to the admissibiltiy of
certain matters submitted by way of affidavit and Motions to
Strike and responses thereto have been filed.

The Court has

reviewed those Motions and responses, and at this time
declines to act on the Motions since the Court has concluded
that, although some of the factual material stated is helpful
in putting the issue before the Court in its proper
perspective, the legal conclusions reached and expressed are
of very limited value and, as everyone concedes, are not
binding on the Court in any way.

The Court can see no value

in going through the Affidavits and attached materials to try
to separate fact from legal conclusion.
The recent cases ot the United States Supreme Court
have pretty well put to rest any question relative to the
right of state and local governments to tax non-Indians and
non-Indian activity on Indian reservations.

The Court will

not cite those cases since all of the parties are aware of
them and have cited them in their Memorandums.
The parties here are in agreement that the issue in
this case is "whether the act of March 1, 1933, 47 Stat. 14 18,
which added the 'Aneth Extension' to the Navajo reservation
preempts the state and local taxes at issue in this
litigation".
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Both parties also agree that the Act is completely
silent with regard to taxation of oil and gas lessees.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the
instrumentality doctrine, which the plaintiffs contend was in
affect in 1933, required express congressional authorization
to permit state taxation on federal Indian lessees; defendants
contend that express congressional prohibition was necessary.
After reviewing the material and cases submitted,
the Court has concluded that the 1933 Act setting asidrj the
Aneth Extension was not a leasing statute and was never
intended to address or cover the issue of oil and gas leases
to non-Indians or the allowance or disallowance of the
imposition of taxes by states on non-Indians lesseesThe Act took land from the public domain and added
it to the reservation, and then provided that the state would
receive the thirty seven and one-half percent of the royalties
of any oil and gas that might be found, and to use such funds
for the benefit of the Utah Navajos.
Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act, the State
was entitled to receive the thirty seven and one-half percent
royalty as its share of any oil and gas production on the
public domain.

The Act changed nothing as far as oil and gas

lessees were concerned except to bring them under the
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provisions of the then existing minerals leasings acts that
applied to Indian reservations.

Such acts allowed state

taxation of non-Indian lessees.

The royalty was the same

before and after the Act, and the only change relative to oil
and gas production was the fact that the funds received from
royalties would go to the state of Utah for the benefit and
use of the Utah Navajos.
In order for the Court to add words to an act of the
legislative body, there has to be some ambiguity or difficulty
in determining the meaning of the Act that would require a
search for legislative intent.
difficult to understand.

This Act is not ambiguous or

When an act is silent on a subject

matter, the Court has to assume, and rightly so, that the
legislative body did not desire to address the unexpressed
matter at this particular time.

To reach the conclusion

urged by the plaintiffs, the Court would not only have to
insert in the Act the words Min lieu of taxes", but would
also have to add "in lieu of taxes on non-Indian oil and gas
lessees".

To do so would change the entire subject matter

covered by the Act and would go way beyond the mere interpretation of some ambiguity.
One of the very compelling reasons why the Court *-*•>
concluded that it was never Congresses7 intent to cover
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taxation or non-taxation in the 1933 Act of non-Indian
lessees, is the fact that the Act was amended in 1968 and the
royalty payments have been made and taxes have been imposed
both before and after the amendment, and there has been no
effort by Congress to change this long accepted procedure as
it applies to the Aneth addition.
Therefore, the Court has concluded that the 193 3 Act
did not, and does not, preclude the defendants from imposing
taxes on the plaintiffs, and the Court o r a n t s defendants
Motions for Summary Judgment as prayed for.
There is still one additional issue that must be
determined before these cases can be put to rest in this
court.
When the plaintiffs abandoned some of their causes
of action either by Motions to Dismiss or by Motions to Amend
the Complaint so as to eliminate causes of action, the
defendants moved the Court to award them reasonable attorney's
fees incurred because of plaintiff's asserted claims that were
later voluntarily dropped.

The parties previously submitted

their Memorandums of Legal Points and Authorities that the
Court has considered.

The Court, at that time, reserved

ruling on the Motions relative to attorney's fees until the
final conclusion of these cases.

page 5

This Court has concluded from a review of this
Authorities submitted that under ordinary circumstances when
a plainitff abandons a cause of action, the other party who
has incurred legal fees in defense of the now abandoned suit
would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees to help
offset the out of pocket expense incurred in the defense of
what amounts to a non-existing claim.

However, the general

statement must be tempered by the facts peculiar to each case,
At the time the plaintiffs filed their Complaint,
the claims by plaintiffs presented litigimate legal issues
that needed to be determined by a court, and the Complaints
presented issues that had not been previously settled by any
authoritative source that was binding upon the parties.

In

other words, there were gray areas surrounding the rights and
procedures of the taxing authority that needed a judicial
determination.
Some years after the filing of the original
Complaints, the U. S. Supreme Court accepted for
consideration the case of Cotton Petroleum Corporation.
et al, v. New Mexico, et al., now reported in 109 Sup. Crt.
Rep. 1698.

Pursuant to a formal order issued in these

matters, further proceedings in these cases were stayed
pending ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Cotton Case,
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since it appeared that many of the previously undetermined
issues involved in these cases were before the Supreme Court
in that case.
When the opinion in the Cotton case was handed down
in April of 1989, it did decide most of the claims asserted
by plaintiffs and made it impractical and unreasonable for
plaintiffs to continue asserting those claims and thus, the
Motions to Dismiss or Amend were made and granted.
It is indicative of the fact that issues presented
in plaintiff's original Complaints were litigimate and viable
claims when presented is demonstrated when we note that there
was a dissenting opinion in Cotton written by Justice
Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
Under these circumstances, the Court is of the
opinion that attorney's fees should not be allowed and,
therefore, the Motion to Award Attorney's Fees is denied.
The defendants, as the prevailing party in these
actions, are entitled to their reasonable costs.
The Court directs that the attorneys for the
defendants prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this
opinion.
DATED this ^^^-

day of March, 1990.
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TEXACO, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, ££ frj.,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
SAN JUAN COUNTY,fi£fll-#
Defendants,
and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SAN
JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
§1 &!• ,

Consolidated Cases
Civil Nos. 4152-4153,
4156-4157, 4973-4977

Defendants in
Intervention.

This matter came before the Court, Honorable Boyd
Bunnell presiding, on March 13, 1990, in the courtroom at the San
Juan County Public Safety Building in Monticello, Utah, for

hearing on Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
November 13, 1989 ("Defendants' Motion"), and Plaintiffs' Joint
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 20, 1989
("Plaintiffs' Cross Motion").

The parties had submitted various

motions in connection with their Motion and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, but these ancillary motions were not argued at
the hearing.
The following counsel appeared at the hearing
representing the parties indicated:

Counsel

Parti?? Rgpre?ents<3

A. Raymond Randolph
Bruce R. Stewart
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEET2
Special Assistant Attorneys
General

State of Utah; Utah State Tax
Commission; and related State
Defendants

Lyle R. Anderson
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C

San Juan County; Board of
Education of San Juan County
School District; and related
Local Defendants

Bruce D, Black
CAMPBELL & BLACK

Texaco, Inc.

Kevin N. Anderson

Exxon Corporation

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Exxon counsel Kevin N. Anderson stated that Mr. John
K. Mangum of Nielson & Senior, counsel for Mobil Exploration and
Producing North America, Inc. ("Mobil") and Union Oil Company of
California ("Union"), had authorized him to state that Mobil and
Union joined in the arguments presented by the other plaintiffs
at the hearing.
The Court heard the arguments of the parties and
considered the memoranda and other documents submitted by each
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party in support of its position.

The Court finds that the

following relevant facts are undisputed:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1*

Plaintiffs are corporations authorized to do

business in the State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiffs have leases from the Navajo Tribe of

Indians covering lands within the Utah portion of the Navajo
Indian Reservation (the "Utah Strip")•

Those leases were issued

to plaintiffs between 1953 and 1974 pursuant to the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938; 52 Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. § 396a ££
sea, (the "1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act").
3.

The first lands in Utah were added by Executive

Order to the Navajo Reservation in 1884.

Additional lands were

added by Executive Order in 1905 and a portion of the lands that
had been added in 1884 were withdrawn in 1892 by Executive Order.
4.

Certain of the lands within the Utah Strip in

which plaintiffs have oil and gas leases from the Navajo Tribe
were added to the Navajo Reservation by the Act of March 1, 1933,
47 Stat. 1418 (the "1933 Act").

Those lands, which consist cf

approximately 52,000 acres, run North and East of Montezuma
Creek, Utah to the Utah-Colorado state line.

This tract is

commonly referred to as the Aneth Extension.
5.

The 1933 Act, as amended by the Act of May 17,

1968, 82 Stat. 121, allocates 37.5% of all royalties on
production from the Aneth Extension to the State of Utah, to it
used for the health, education and welfare of Navajos living in
San Juan County, Utah.
-3-

6.

The great majority of plaintiffs' leases in the

Aneth Extension carry royalties of one-eighth of production-

A

few carry royalties of one-sixth of production.
7.

Prior to passage of the 1933 Act, the lands in

what became the Aneth Extension had been part of the public
domain and subject to leasing under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920, 41 Stat. 450 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 §£ seq.)
(the "1920 Act*).

The 1920 Act expressly permitted state

taxation of production from any such leases, and also allocated
37.5% of royalties on that production to the states in which the
production occurred.
8.

Prior to passage of the 1933 Act, there were

negotiations between the State of Utah, local citizens, and the
federal government, concerning the specific language of the 1933
Act.

As a result of those negotiations, the 1933 Act included a

provision allocating 37.5% of royalties to the State of Utah for
the benefit of the Utah Navajos resident on the Aneth Extension.
Also as a result of the negotiations, the Act barred any
additional applications for homesteads or allotments by the
Indians living on the Aneth Extension.
9.

At the time the 1933 Act was passed, the Indian

Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244 (now codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 398) (the "1924 Act"), for "bought and paid for" lands, and the
Indian Oil Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1347 (now codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 398c) (the "1927 Act"), for executive order reservations,
provided the only congressional authorization for oil and gas
leasing on Indian lands.

Both the 1924 Act and the 1927 Act
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explicitly authorized state taxation of production from any such
Indian lands.
10.

Plaintiffs (or their predecessors) discovered oil

within the Aneth Extension in the mid-1950's.

They have

developed those discoveries and formed units for secondary and
tertiary recovery.

Plaintiffs continue to produce oil and gas

from the Aneth Extension at the present time.
11.

Plaintiffs (or their predecessors) have paid taxes

to defendants on their property and operations within the Utah
Strip since the mid-1950's.

The Navajo Tribe began to tax

plaintiffs' property and operations in 1978.

Beginning in 1978,

plaintiffs paid some or all of their taxes to defendants under
protest.

They filed these lawsuits in 1979, challenging the Oil

and Gas Severance Tax (formerly the Mining Occupation Tax),
imposed by § 59-5-101, s£ sea.. Utah Code (1989); the Oil and
Gas Conservation Tax, imposed by § 40-6-14, Utah Code (1989); the
Corporate Franchise Tax, imposed by §§ 59-7-101, si seq. Utah
Code (1989); the Sales and Use Tax, imposed by §§ 59-12-101, et
sea,, and §§ 11-9-1, si seq, Utah Code (1989); and the Property
Tax, imposed by §§ 59-2-101, si sea., Utah Code (1989)
(collectively the "Utah Taxes").

The Utah Taxes as applied to

plaintiffs' operations average 5-6% of production.
12.

All plaintiffs have conceded for the purpose of

this litigation that their exploration, development and
production decisions relating to their properties on the Utah
Strip, including the Aneth Extension, have not been adversely
affected by the Utah Taxes.

See Memorandum Decision on Motion
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for Order to Compel and Motions for Protective Order (dated
November 9, 1987), as modified by Order Modifying Prior
Memorandum Decision of November 9, 1987, and Setting Trial
Schedule (dated December 22, 1987).
13.

Since January 1, 1978, plaintiffs have produced

over $1.5 billion of oil and gas from the Utah Strip.
14.

During the same time period, plaintiffs have paid

approximately $80 million in the Utah Taxes at issue in this
litigation.
15.

Plaintiffs have paid more in taxes to the Navajo

Tribe since January 1, 1978, than in the Utah Taxes at issue.
16.

None of the Utah Taxes at issue in this litigation

have been assessed with respect to the Navajo Tribe's share of
production.
17.

Defendants have necessarily incurred reasonable

costs in the amount of $6,000.00 in defending against the claims
of plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes
the following conclusions of law:
1.

Under the United States Supreme Court's decision

in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989), state
taxes on non-Indian oil and gas lessees will be "upheld unless
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress."
1706.

109 S. Ct, at

Nothing in the legislative history of the 1938 Indian

Mineral Leasing Act or its contemporaneous setting suggests any
such intent to prohibit state taxes on the part of Congress,

6-

li.

at 1710.

Indeed, the Act manifests Congress' "intent to permit

state taxation of non-[Indian] lessees."
2.

Id. at 17U.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton

Petroleum, all ten of the original plaintiffs moved to dismiss
with prejudice those claims controlled by Cotton Petrolg^.

six

of those plaintiffs also moved to dismiss with prejudice all of
their remaining claims, removing them entirely from this
litigation.
Union —

The remaining plaintiffs —

Texaco, Exxon, Mobil and

have continued to pursue only those claims under the

1933 Act (and certain state statutory, constitutional and
Enabling Act claims that plaintiffs contend provide background to
their 1933 Act claims).
3.

The 1933 Act is silent on the question of state

4.

The language, history and contemporaneous setting

taxation.

of the 1933 Act show that Congress did not intend to address in
the Act the issue of the taxability of non-Indian oil and gas
lessees on the Aneth Extension.
5.

The 1933 Act was not a leasing statue.

If the

leasing of lands in the Aneth Extension had been intended when
the 1933 Act was passed, any such leasing would have had to have
taken place under either the 1924 Act or the 1927 Act, both of
which authorized taxation by states of non-Indian producers of
oil and gas.
6.

The 1933 Act changed neither the taxability of

non-Indians within the Aneth Extension nor the allocation of
royalties from production from the Aneth Extension.
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It only

removed lands from the public domain, set them aside for Indians,
and imposed greater restrictions on the use of the 37.5% of the
royalty allocated to the State of Utah.
7.

The Court finds no ambiguity in the 1933 Act.

To

read the 1933 Act as plaintiffs suggest, the Court would have to
insert in the Act the words "in lieu of taxes on non-Indian oil
and gas lessees.*

To do so would change the very subject matter

of the Act and go beyond the mere interpretation of an ambiguity
which, in any event, does not exist.
8.

The amendment of the 1933 Act supports the Court's

conclusion that the 1933 Act does not preclude defendants from
imposing the Utah Taxes on plaintiffs.

When Congress amended the

Act in 1968, these plaintiffs and other producers had been paying
to the State of Utah both royalties and taxes on production from
the Aneth Extension for over ten years.

Congress' decision in

1968 not to interfere in this scheme demonstrates conclusively
congressional approval of the receipt by Utah of both tax and
royalty income from the Aneth Extension.
9.

Plaintiffs have either abandoned all their other

theories for invalidation of the Utah Taxes, or failed seriously
to assert them here.

The Court finds all such other theories to

be without merit.
10.

Because the claims initially presented to this

Court by plaintiffs, although later abandoned, involved
legitimate legal issues that needed to be determined, the Court
will award no attorneys' fees to defendants.

8

11.

Defendants are, however, the prevailing parties in

this litigation and are entitled to recover their reasonable
costs in the amount of $6,000.00.
DATED this / 3 day of May, 1990.

„Distf:ict Jud^e" -
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Supreme Court of tfje Winitth States
OCTOBER TEUM, 1948.

No. 40
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION,

Petitioner

v.
T11 K TEXAS COM I»AN Y

No. 41
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION,

Petitioner

v.
MAMXOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY

On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
State of Oklahoma

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS
AMICUS CURIAE
OPINIONS BELOW

In No. 40, the District Court of Oklahoma
County did not lile an opinion, and the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (No. 40, R. 36-39}
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mission did not file an opinion and the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (No. 41, R. 30-31)
is not reported.
JURISDICTION

In both eases the judgments of the Supreme
(•oui1 of Oklahoma were entered on Septcml>er
23, 11)47 (No. 40, R. 3G-39; NO. 41, R. 30-31). and
petitions for rehearing were denied on January 27,
1948 (No. 40, R. 42; No. 41, R. 34). Appeals wenhied in this Court on February 18 and 19, 1948.
(No. 40, R. 4G-49; No. 41, R. 3G-38.)
On April 19, 1948, the appeals in these cases were
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the
papers whereon the appeals were allowed as |K»titions for writs of certiorari, the Court granted the
petit ions, the cases were consolidated for argument,
and the Solicitor (Scncral was requested to tile a
brief as auucits curiae. (No. 40, R. 60; No. 41, R.
1(>3). Tin* jurisdiction of this Court rests ou Section 237(b) of the Judicial Code, as amended.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, under the Constitution of the
l/nited States, a lessee of restricted allotted Indian
lauds is immune from Oklahoma taxes on his gross
income and on his portion of the gross production
derived from such lands.
2. Whether, if such constitutional immunity

3
created an immunity for the lessee against the imposition of these taxes.
STATUTES INVOLVED

The applicable portions of the statutes involved
are set forth in the Appendix, infra, pp. 41-51.
STATEMENT

In No. 40, the taxpayer, the Texas Company,
brought suit in the District Court for Oklahoma
County against the Oklahoma Tax Commission to
recover certain taxes asserted to have been illegally
collected. The taxpayer's petition (No. 40, R.
3-10) and amended petition (No. 40, R. 29-30)
stated that it was the owner of oil and gas leases
to certain specified properties which were restricted lands of members of the Kiowa and Apache
Indian Tribes, title to which was held in trust by
the United States pursuant to the General Allotment Act, as amended, and that the Indian lessors,
in making the leases, were subject to the supervision and control of the United States Government. Asserting that the imposition of the Oklahoma gross production and petroleum excise taxes
on the oil produced from these leases would constitute a burden and restriction on an instrumentality and agency of the Federal Government and
would violate the Constitution of the United States,
the petition claimed that the taxes so imposed were
illegal and void. The taxpayer sought recovery of
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the gross production and petroleum excise taxes
which it had paid with respect to its working interest in the production from these leases during the
months of September, October and November, 1!M2.
The lower court sustained a demurrer filed by the
Oklahoma Tax Commission. (No. 40, It. 31.) The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer. (No. 40, K. :MI.)
No. 41 involved consolidated proceedings before
the Oklahoma Tax Commission with respect to additional assessments proposed against the tax
payer, Magnolia Petroleum Company, for gms?
product ion and petroleum excise taxes on its in
terest in the production from certain specifm
leases tor the period June 1,1!M2 to March «H, 1JMI
together with penalties. (No. 41, R. 47-50, 5t-.Vi
5*M»0, <»r>-(>7.) The stipulations of facts before tin
Oklahoma Tax Commission (No. 41, R. (MS
showed that the leases in question in which lh<
taxpayer possessed a working interest were exc
ruled by allottees, or heirs and devisees of allotteeof members of the Citizen Pottawatomie, Apache
Comanche, and Otoe and Missouria Indian Tribe.*
that the allotted lands were held under land cer
titicates or trust deeds, that the leases were aji
proved by the United States Department of In
terior, and that, in some instances, all or part o
the lessor's interest was owned by non-Indians dm
ing the taxable periods. The Oklahoma Tax (\mi
mission ordered the proposed assessments approve
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(No. 41, li. 26-28), but the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the order, with directions that the
assessments be vacated (No. 41, R. 31).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. The Oklahoma gross production and petroleum excise taxes may be validly imposed on a lessee of restricted allotted Indian lands so as to reach
his interest in the oil and gas produced. Earlier
decisions of this Court holding that taxes of this
nature may not be asserted against the lessee because of an implied constitutional immunity
(Jloirard v. Gipsy OH Co., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil
Co. v. J/oirard, 248 U. 8. 549) are basically inconsistent with subsequent rulings, and ought to be
direct I v overruled. It is now well established that
contractors or lessees of the United States are not
immune from non-discriminatory taxes of this
kind, the validity of the tax not being affected by
the possible economic effects on the Federal Government. Moreover, the taxation of the lessees
hen; has no direct economic consequences to the
(iovernment.
The present line of decisions denying the existence of an implied constitutional immunity for
Federal lessees or contractors against local taxation has not drawn any distinction between taxes
measured by net income, gross income or physical
production. Accordingly, when it became settled
that the State could impose a tax measured by the
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net income of the lessees of restricted Indian lands,
it similarly meant that the State could impose a
non-discriminatory tax measured by their gross income or gross physical production.
The gross production tax in issue here, moreover, is imposed in lieu of other ad valorem taxes
on the property and equipment of the lessee used in
connection with his operations. Since the State
may tax the value of such property directly by an
ad valorem tax, there is no reason to deny it the
right to lax the same property interests by another
type of tax, especially since, though measured by
gross production in the first instance, the amount
of the exaction is ultimately measured by what the
ad ralorcm taxes would have been.
I>. Congress has not acted to establish a statutory immunity for lessees of restricted Indian
lands, and none is to be implied from its legislative
silence. While Congress has, on prior occasions,
subjected the mineral production from certain
lands to local taxation (thereby also causing the
lessees to be taxed under the then prevailing constitutional doctrine), this cannot be construed as
an assertion of immunity for other lessees. Differences in Congressional policy respecting the taxable status of Indian lands do not, by implication,
create similar differences with respect to the private lessees. When the doctrine of implied constitutional immunity for private lessees was overturned by this Court, Congress was entitled to as-
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sume that every lessee would be subject to all local,
non-discriminatory taxes, unaffected bv whether
the royalties of their Indian lessors were or were
not immune from taxation. There is no compelling
reason why Congress should have acted to create an
immunity for the lessees here, and there is no reason why any should be implied in the absence of a
direct expression of Congressional policy in favor
of the creation of siu-h an immunity.
ARGUMENT
of Restricted Allotted Indian Lands Are Not Immune From the Oklahoma Gross Production and Petroleum Excise Taxes

LMIIII

A. No Constitutional Immunity Exists

1. Introductory. These cases involve the validity of the Oklahoma gross production tax (68 0. S.
11)41, Sections 821-840, as amended by Article 1,
Section 2, Laws, 1947, p. 495 (68 O. S. 1947 Supp.,
Section 827)), and of the Oklahoma petroleum excise tax (68 O. S. 1941, Sections 12181-1218q; Scss.
Laws 1943, title 68, c. 26, p. 189) as applied to operators of oil and gas leases on restricted allotted
lands of Indians, the leases having been approved
by the Secretary of the Interior as required by law.
The lands involved are restricted against alienation and, for the most part, are held in trust by the
United States, pursuant to allotments under the
(leneral Allotment Acl,' for various members of
1

Act of February 8, 1887, c. 11!). 24 Stat. 388, as amended.
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the Pottawatomie, Kiowa, Apache, Comanche, Otoe
and Missouri Indian tribes.2 In both cases the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, one Justice dissenting,
held that the lessees or the leases were federal instrumentalities, and that, in the absence of permissive action by Congress or appropriate waiver of
immunity, the lessees were not constitutionally subjeet to tax with respect to the production of oil and
the oil produced.
We believe that the court below erred in holding
that the lessees possess any immunity with respect
to these taxes. It is our view that the State of Oklahoma has full authority to require the lessees to
pay non-discriminatory taxes measured by the
value or amount of oil and gas produced—oil and
gas in which the lessees, and they alone, have any
interest. The lessees, absent any express Congrcs>i«>nal action to exempt them from local exactions,
- Allotments were made under the General Allotment Act
to members of flic Citizen R«ud of Pottawatomie Indians in
conformity with the agreement of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat.
1016. Allotments were made to members of the Kiowa,
Comanche and Apache tribes pursuant to the agreement approved June 6, 1000, 31 Stat. 676, the land being held in
trust by the United States in the same manner as provided
for in the General Allotment Act. Allotments were made
to the Otoe or Missouri Indians under the General Allotment Aet without any special agreement. See Mills, Oklahoma Indian Land Laws (192i), Section 438. Lands allotted under the General Allotment Act were to be. held in
trust by the United States for a period of twenty-five year*,
and the trust periods here involved have been extended from
lini»* to time.
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do not possess any immunity from these Oklahoma
taxes merely because they are engaged in the business of producing oil and gas from restricted lands,
and because they are operating under leases which
have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
These cases do not involve any taxes levied on
or measured by the royalty oil or its proceeds and,
hence, do not present any question respecting the
tax immunity of the Indians whose restricted lands
have been leased. Accordingly, we express no views
whether these taxes would be valid if imposed on or
measured by the royalty oil. See Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363.
2. The nature of the taxes. The Oklahoma gross
production tax which is involved here is equal to 5
per centum of the gross value of the production in
the case of petroleum, crude oil or other mineral
oil, and natural gas and casinghead gas. The tax is
required to be paid by every person engaged in the
production of these mineral products. The tax is
also levied on the royalty interests, and is made a
lien on such interests. It is provided, however, that
where the royalty is claimed to be exempt from taxation by law, the facts on which the exemption is
claimed are to be reported. C8 0. S. 1941, Section
821.
The statute levying the tax states that it is in lieu
of all taxes by the State and its political subdivisions on any property rights with respect to the
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minerals, producing leases, mineral rights or privileges, machinery and equipment used in and
around any well producing oil and gas, the oil and
gas during the tax year in which produced, and
any investment in any of the leases, rights, privileges, minerals, or other property mentioned. The
State Hoard of equalization is given power to raise
or lower the gross production tax where, if imposed, it is greater or less than would he the general ml ralorcw tax for all purposes on the property of the produeer suhjeet to taxation in the distriet or districts where situated, Revision of the
amount of tax is suhjeet to review by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma. (>8 O. S. 1941, Section 821.
A gross production tax on oil, gas and other minerals (the levy being in addition to any ad rnlornn
taxes) was instituted by Oklahoma in 1908. Sess.
Laws, 1!MIK, e. 71, Art ide 11, Section 0, p. 642. This
was the statute before this Court in Choctaw d(,'nlf /.*.//. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, where, as
applied to a lessee of restricted Indian coal lands,
it was construed to be an occupational tax and an
unconstitutional burden on a federal instrumentality. This interpretation was contrary to that
adopted in MeAlestcr-Edwards Coal Co. v. Trapp,
4*.> Okl. 310, in which the court considered the 1910
re-enaetmeut of the statute (Sess. Laws, 1910, c. 44,
Section (». p. 07) (where an additional provision
was inserted permitted the producer to deduct the
amount of royalties paid for the benefit of an In-
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diau tribe), and in which it was held that, the tax
being on the value of the product, less the royalties
to Indians, the levy was a property tax which could
be validly imposed on a lessee of restricted Indian
lands.
The gross production tax was extensively revised
in 1915 (Sess. Laws, 1915, c. 107, Article 2, Subdivision A, p. 151 ) t and again in .191(5 (Sess. Laws,
191(i, <\ IJ9, p. U)2),:t one of the primary changes
being to impose the tax in lieu of all other ad
valorem taxes.4
3

The basic sections of the present statute are derived from
these provisions. Further amendments were made by Sess.
Laws, 11)33, e. 103, p. 198, and by Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 66,
Article 4, p. 271.
4

The Oklahoma Supreme Court at first expressed the view
that the 1915 amendments did not alter the essential structure of the statute and, following the Clwctaw d Gulf R. R.
decision, ruled that the tax was not a property but an occupation tax. In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co.,
53 Okl. 24. It, however, was quick to recede from this position. In Large Oil Co. v. Iloward, 63 Okl. 143, reversed per
curiamf 248 U. S. 54!), it construed the tax, as amended by
Sess. Laws, 1916, c. 39, p. 102, to be a tax on property, and
considered tbat it could be validly levied on a lessee of restricted lands; the Wolverine case, supra, was distinguished
because of changes made in the 1916 legislation. See also
Whitehall v. Howard, 63 Okl. 176. The holding of the Wolverine case, so far as it denied that the tax was a property
tax, was later specifically overruled in In re Skelton Lead &
Zinc Co.'* Gross Production Tax, 1019, 81 Okl. 134, and this
was reiterated in lieryhb Oil d' Gu* Co. v. Howard, 82 Okl.
176. Following the Skclton ease, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has consistently held for all purposes that the tax is
a property tax which is in lieu of other ad valorem taxes.

V

The new tax, however, was held unconstitutional
as applied to a lessee of restricted Indian lands in
the per curiam decisions in La rye Oil Co. V. llotrtint, 24s l". S. 54!), and Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co.,
217 l \ S. 51M. The fact that, unlike the statute
considered in the Choctaw d- Gulf li.lt. ease, the
gross production tax was imposed in lieu of ad
valorem taxes was not commented on by this Court
in those decisions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,
nevertheless, perservered for a time. In In re SUelton Lead «('• Zinc Co.'s Gross Production Tax, 191V,
SI Okl. i:>4, the court refused to accept the Laryc
Oil Co. and Gipsy Oil Co. decisions as studied evaluations of the changes in the statutory provisions.*
A Iter Gilh spie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 504-505,
where, in holding invalid an Oklahoma net income
tax on a leasee's income from restricted lauds, Justire Holmes expressed the view that the Howard
and Gipsy Oil cases had not been inadvertent decisions and that the statutory differences from
those prc.-ciricd in the Choctaw <0 Gulf K.lt. cast
had not been of any moment, the Supreme Court ot
In IT Protest of liimlehni, Ayrnt. 82 Okl. 97; In re Protnn
of V. S. Smelting, Refining A Mining Co., 82 Okl. 106; In r
Protisl of St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 82 Okl. 12fi
See al*o: Mniieithir v. Lovett, 16(> Okl. 73; American (h
tt Refining Co. v. Cornish, 173 Okl. 470; State v. India
Rogaltg Co., 177 Okl. 238; I'elat v. (Umuivkarl, 1!)1 Okl. 5!K
6

The same view was expressed in In re Protest of Bcndclar
Agtnt, 82 Okl. 07, and was followed in In re Protest of U. I
Smelting. Rt fining d- Mining Co., 82 Okl. 106.
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Oklahoma accepted the proposition that the gross
production tax, even though in lieu of other ad
valorem taxes, could not be levied on the lessee. See
AtchiHon, 1\ <<; S.FM. Co. v. McCurdy, 86 Okl. 148.
The remaining provisions of the taxes involved
may be briefly reviewed. Seventy-eight percent of
the gross production tax is paid into the State
Treasury, and is available for the general expenses
of the state government. One-tenth of the sum is
payable to the County Treasurer of the county
whore the oil or gas is produced, and is available
for the construction and maintenance of county
highways. Ten percent is also payable to the
County Treasurer for distribution among the various school districts in the county. The remaining
two percent is placed to the credit of the Oklahoma
Tax Commission, and is available for collection and
enforcement activities. 0*8 O. S. 1941, Section 827,
as amended by Article 1, Section 2, Laws, 1947, p.
495 (<>8 0. S. Supp. 1947, Section 827).
The gross production tax becomes due on the
first day of each calendar month with respect to
production during the preceding monthly period.
On oil or gas sold at the time of production, the tax
is to be paid by the purchaser who, in making settlement with the producer and royalty owner, is
authorized to deduct the amount of the tax paid.
Where the fax is due before the oil is sold, and
where the oil has been retained by the producer, he
is required to pay the tax including that due on the
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royalty oil not sold, and he is authorized, in settling
with the royalty owner, to deduct the amount of tax
paid on the royally oil, or to deduct royalty oil
equivalent in value to the amount of the tax paid.
CS (). S. 1!U1, Section 833. The tax is made a first
and paramount lien against the purchaser's or producer's property, as the case may he. 68 O. S. 1941,
Section 81)6.
The petroleum excise tax dates from 15>3*5 when
Oklahoma adopted a proration law to prevent the
waste of crude petroleum and natural gas (Sess.
Laws, 1933, c. 1**1, p. 278) and enacted an excise tax
which was to he used ,to defray the expenses of administering the provisions of the proration law
(Sess. Laws, 1933, c. 132, p. 301). Since that time
a new excise tax has heen enacted at each succeeding session of the legislature.6
The Oklahoma petroleum excise tax is one-eighth
of a cent (one mill after July 1, 1943—See 1943
statute, footnote (>) per harrel on each and every
harrel of petroleum oil produced in the State
<»f Oklahoma. The tax is to be collected in the same
manner as that provided for the gross production
tax. As in the case of the gross production tax,
the petroleum excise tax is paid by the purchaser,
« Sess. Laws. l!i:r», c. 59, Article 2, p. 236; Sess. Laws, 1937
v. 59. Article 2, p. 396; SONS. I^IWS, 193!), c. 59, Article 2, j>
412; Ness, fiiiws, 1911, Title (18. «. 26, p. 380; HttM. LMWI
1943, Title 08, e. 20, p. ISO; Sess. Laws, 1945, Title 68, c
26. p. 273; Sess. Lows, 1947, Title 68, c. 26, p. 461.
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who is authorized to deduct the payment in settling
with the producer and royalty owner and, where
the oil is not sold hut is retained by the producer,
the tax is payable by him, but he is authorized to
make a similar deduction when settling with the
loyalty owner. 68 O. S. 1941, Section 12181. The
monies collected are deposited to the credit of the
"Conservation Fund" and the "Interstate Oil
Compact Fund of Oklahoma." 68 0. S. 1941, Section 1218m. The excise taxes due in the present
cases have since expired, but have been replaced by
similar taxes. See 08 O. S. Supp. 1947, Sections
1220.1-1220.7. Unlike the gross production tax
which, as previously referred to, is regarded by
Oklahoma as a property tax, the petroleum excise
lax is construed to be an excise tax on the production of oil. Harvsdall Itcfineries v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 171 Old. 145, affirmed, 296 U. S. 521.
3. The taxes are constitutional. The decisions
below are erroneous in resting on the proposition
that Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522;
Lanje Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549; Howard v.
(tipsif Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503; and, presumably,
Choctaw <f- (Half ll.lt. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292, require that a lessee be held immune from the Oklahoma gioss production and petroleum excise taxes
on his share of the oil and gas derived from restricted allotted Indian lands. Those decisions,
based as they were on a doctrine of implied constitutional immunity for ageucies or instrumental-
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ties of ihe United States, are so thoroughly inconsistent with the subsequent course of decisions of
this Court that they may no longer be regarded as
possessing any authority as precedents. While
these eases have not been expressly overruled, they
have in effect been rejected by the decisions which
overturned the doctrinal basis on which they had
rested.
The inmiunitv from local taxation of allotted
lands held in trust by the United States under the
(Jcneral Allotment Act did not arise from an express assertion of such immunity by Congress, but
was held to exist because legal title to the lands was
held in trust bv the United States and because the
subjection of the lands to local taxation would
thwart the governmental policy of protecting the
allottees dining the period in which they wen* to
prepare for the assumption of "the habits of civilized life, and ultimately the privileges of citizenship. " I 'nitvd States v. Uickert, 188 U. S. 432, 4:;7,
4-V.). See also I 'irited States v. Board of Com V.s of
Fremont County, Wyo., 145 P. 2d 329 (C. C. A.
10th), certiorari denied, 323 U. S. 804.7
7

As previously stated (supra, p. 7), there is no issue
in this ease rejjardinjr the application of the taxes to the
royalty oil. the taxpayers having paid or been assessed only
with respect to production less the royalties. While the Oklahoma Ktiitute docs not explicitly provide how the producer is
to 1M» taxed where the royalty oil is immune from taxation,
it. would seem that he has no liability for the taxes on the
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The immunity of these lands from taxation was
further extended to non-Indian lessees of the land
and to their income derived from the land. See
the remarks of Justice Black in Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, 603-604.
Thus, in invalidating the original Oklahoma gross
production tax as applied to a lessee of restricted
Indian lands in Choctaw <fc Gulf R.R. v. Harrison,
supra, the lessee was regarded as the *4 instrumentality'' employed by the Federal Government, and
was ruled to be exempt from the tax which the
Court considered as being tantamount to an occupational tax. In Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240
U. S. 522, it was the lease itself which was regarded
as the federal instrumentality and immune from a
direct property tax, it being reasoned that (p.
530)—
royalties where they arc non-taxable. See American Oil ift
Refining Co. v. Cornish, 173 Okl. 470, where the lease was
from a municipality and it was assumed that the lessee had
no responsibility for paying the gross production tax on the
royalty oil, although he was held liable for the tax on his
share of the oil produced. Accordingly, there is no present
need to consider the taxable status of the royalty oil. See
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, holding that oil royalties
received from allotted lands, lands which were expressly declared by statute to be non-taxable, were not subject to the
gross production tax, it being ruled that the tax was not on
the severed oil but on the lessor's interest in the property.
Cf. Chateau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691; Superintendent v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418, and Leahy v. State Treasurer, 297
U. S. 420, holding that such royalty income may be taxed
under federal and state income tax statutes.
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A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power
to make them, and could be used to destroy the
power to make them.
The Choctaw cO Gulf R.H. and Indian Oil Co. eases,
supra, were the only authorities relied on in the
pvr curiam dispositions of Larye Oil Co. v. Howard
and Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., supra, where the later
enactments of the gross production tax were held
invalid with respect to lessees of restricted lands.
The theory of an implied constitutional immunity as extended to such lessees roughly paralleled
that accorded to private contractors of the (Jovernmeiit where the rationale was also in terms of "instrumentality" and "the power to destroy." Sec
Williams v. Talladeya, 22(> U. S. 404. It reached
its culmination in Gillvspiv v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.
5<H, which denied the State of Oklahoma the power
to impose a net income tax on the non-Tndian les>ce\s income derived from restricted Indian lands.
The Court there arrived at its decision by relying
on the previous rulings invalidating the gross production tax and the ad valorem tax on the lease itself, stating (p. 506):
The same considerations that invalidate a tax
upon the leases invalidate a tax upon the
protits of the leases, and, stopping short of
theoretical possibilities, a tax upon such profits
is a direct hamper upon the effort of the
United States to make the best terms that it
can for its wards.
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The Gillespie case, as was true of Indian Oil Co. v.
Oklahoma and Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison,
supra, was decided on the ground that the lessee or
the lease was an instrumentality selected by the
Federal Government to effectuate its policy toward
the restricted lands of the Indians. The same doctrine was applied and the Gillespie decision was
followed in Burnet v. Coronado Oil dc Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393," where it was held that the federal income tax could not be applied to a lessee of oil lands
of the State of Oklahoma, it being said (pp. 400401):

To tax the income of the lessee * * * would
amount to an imposition upon the lease itself.
The infirmity of the grounds on which this constitutional immunity rested had become fully apparent (See James v. Drnvo Contracting Co., 302
U. S. 134, and the cases cited supra, in. 8) when
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S.
376, again raised the question of the authority of
the Federal Government to impose a net income tax
on a lessee of state-owned oil lands. Upon a reexamination of the matter, it was there held that
8

Decisions subsequent to the Gillespie case had already
made g^eat inroads in the doctrine of implied immunity.
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514; Willcuts v. Jtunn,
282 U. 8. 216; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509; Group No. 1
Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279. These decisions, and others,
convinced the four Justices who dissented in the Coronado
case thut the Gillespie decision ought to be overrule
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no constitutional barrier stood to deny Congress
the power to impose the tax;* after determining
that 11 nnut v. Coronado Oil tf- Gas Co., supra, and
Gillespie v. Oklahoma were incorrectly decided,
both cases were expressly overruled.
The direct, repudiation of those eases meant more
than a reversal of decisions respecting the imposition of a net income tax on private lessees. It, together with the consistent course of decisions since
James v. Draco Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134,
marks the complete destruction of the principles
on which these lessees were once held immune from
iiou-disrritiiiiiatory taxation on their property or
income. This conclusion seems to have been shared
h\ boih the majority and dissenting opinions in
Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Vnited States, 319 U. S.
5!)KjMKM)04,(iir>.
If nothing more, the fact that the Gillespie case
had strictly followed the reasoning of the Clioetair
<l*- Gulf 11.11. and Indian Oil Co. opinions, and had
also strongly relied on the Gipsy Oil Co. and Lanje
Oil ('o. decisions, would be most persuasive that all
those authorities fell along with Gillespie, even
though it was not necessary to the decision in Moantain Producers that they be expressly overruled at
that time.
The verv basis of the decision in the Mountain
Producers case was to deny the proposition that
• Aivoiil: lUhvrimj v. Hankline Oil Co., 803 IJ. S. 362.
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a non-discriminatory tax on a Government contractor or lessee imposed a burden which caused an
unconstitutional interference with the Government; the opinion stated (303 U. S. at 386-387) :
* * * that immunity from non-discriminatory
taxation sought hy a private person for his
property or gains because he is engaged in operations under a government contract or lease
cannot be supported by merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the functions of
government. Regard must be had to substance
and direct effects. And where it merely appears that one operating under a government
contract or least; is subjected to a tax with respect to his profits on the same basis as others
who are engaged in similar businesses, there is
no sufficient ground for holding that the effect
upon the Government is other than indirect
and remote.
The decisions which invalidated the gross production and property taxes for the reason that the taxation of the lessee would burden the tax exempt
Indian lands and hamper the policy of the Government toward its Indian wards were as clearlv "out
of harmony with correct principle" (303 U. S. 376,
387) as was Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra, in applying the same erroneous concepts.
The lessees here can derive no comfort in their
assertion of immunity on the ground that Mountain Producers, by overruling Gillespie, has only
authorized the State to tax their net income from

*>2

operations under tbe leases, and that the taxes here
are measured by gross income from production
and by the amount of production. The difference
between a tax on gross receipts and net earnings
lias been recognized as not being "controlling"
{J a men v. Draro Contracting Co., 302 U. S. at 158),
for once the "burden" theory had been discarded
such a distinction was no longer valid (see Ilelreriiifi v. (ierhardt, 304 IT. 8. 405, 420-422, and Graves
v. A*. >\ cr ret O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 480, 487).
The decisions actually demonstrate that no difference is to be drawn between a tax measured by gross
receipts, gross production, or net income; so long
as the tax is non-discriminatory and the legal incidence is placed on the Government contractor or
on his property, no constitutional immunity may be
successfully asserted. James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., supra, and Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302
U. S. 186 (state gross receipts tax on contractor
with Federal Government) ; Atkinson v. Tax Commission, 303 U. S. 20 (state net income tax on contractor with Federal Government); Alabama v.
King <(• Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (state sales tax on sales
to cost-plus contractor with Federal Government);
Curry v. Vnited States, 314 U. S. 14 (state "use"
tax on materials used by cost-plus contractor with
Federal Government); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S.
474 (ntntv severance tax imposed on contractor who
severed and purchased timber from United States
lands). See also Powell, The Waning of Intergov-
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ernmcntal Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 633,
640-641, 657-659 (1945).
The other, but closely related foundation of the
Choctaw «fc Guff R.1L, Indian Oil Co., Gipsy Oil
Co. and Large Oil Co. decisions, namely, that the
lessee or lease is an "instrumentality" of the Government which enjoys a constitutional immunity
from nou-di8crimiiiatory taxation, is also discarded
doctrine. Such is the plain teaching of the cases.
Met calf cD Eddy v. Mitchell, supra; James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., supra; Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, supra; Atkinson v. Tax. Commission, supra;
llelvering v. Bankline Oil Co., supra; llelvering
v. Mountain Producers Corp., supra; Buckstaff Co.
v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358; Alabama v. King dc
Boozer, supra; Curry v. United States, supra;
Wilson v. Cook, supra. See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 186.
If there were even the slightest doubt as to what
the Mountain Producers decision meant with respect to the kind of taxes involved in these cases,
their validity would be authoritatively established
by Wilson v. Cook, supra. There the State of Arkansas imposed a severance tax which was measured by the amount of timber severed. It was held
that tiie taxpayer, who, under contract with the
Federal Government, was engaged in cutting and
purchasing timber from national forest reserves,
was not immune from the tax, the Court saying
(327 U. S. at 482-483) :
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Our decision in James v. Bravo Contracting
Co., supra, and in Alabama v. King tt- Boozer.
supra, and the cases cited in those opinions, can
leave no doubt that the Supreme Court of
Arkansas correctly held that plaintiffs, who
are taxed by the state on their activities in severing lumber from Government lands under
contract with the Government, cannot claim
the benefit of the implied constitutional iniiiiunitv of the Federal Government from taxation
bv the state.
The taxes involved in the present cases cannot be
successfully distinguished from those imposed in
Wilson v. Cook, supra. The taxpayers here are
engaged in taking natural resources from restricted
Indians lands and the taxpayer in Wilson v. Conk,
supra, was so engaged with respect to lands 1H»Jonging to the United States. In both situations
the tax is levied in direct proportion to the amount
of the natural resources which has been severed.
The effect of the taxes on the United States here,
where the beneficial ownership of the lands and the
royalties is in the Indians, is even more remote than
that considered in Wilson v. Cook, supra, so that
the present eases arc a fortiori situations for the
denial of any immunity to the private lessees.
In the final analysis, the question is whethei
these taxpayers, who are engaged in the business
of exploiting the resources from restricted lanch
for their own individual profit, and who enjoy tin
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benefits of state and local government, are to be excused from contributing through the gross production tax to the costs of such government, and from
paying through the petroleum excise tax their fair
share of the costs of a conservation program in
which they derive a direct and immediate benefit.
Since the Constitution does not require that such
an extraordinary, preferred status be accorded to
lessees or contractors of the United States, there
is even less reason to suppose that a different result is to obtain where the Government's financial
interest is not directly involved. See Helve ring v.
Mountain Producers, supra.
It is sulxmitted, accordingly, that Choctaw d'
Gulf Ji.R. v. Harrison, supra; Howard v. Gipsy Oil
Co., supra, and Large Oil Co. v. Howard, supra, are
directly contrary to the more recent decisions of
this Court and should be expressly overruled.
While the foregoing considerations sufficiently
demonstrate the constitutional validitv of these
taxes, it may be appropriate to observe that there
are added reasons for sustaining the gross production tax. This tax, so far as the lessees are concerned, is in lieu of any other ad valorem taxes on
their property rights and investment in the minerals, mineral rights, producing leases, and machinery and equipment used in and around any
well. Also, by appropriate proceedings, the gross
production tax may be raised or lowered to make it
conform to what the ad valorem taxes would have
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been if imposed on such property in the first instance. See supra, pp. 9-13.
The decisions in Howard v. Gipsy Oil (Jo., supra,
and La rye Oil Go. v. Howard, supra, as previously
indirnicd. considered that it made no difference
whether tile gross production tax was in lieu of
other ad valorem taxes, or was in addition to such
taxes (as had been true of the statute involved in
the Clint law <('• Half KM. case). See Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U. S. at 504-505. The Gipsy Oil and
La rye Oil eases, however, are contrary to the later
derision in Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, where
a state gross receipts tax levied in lieu of ad valorem taxes was sustained, even though a portion of
the taxpayer's gross receipts was derived from a
contract with the Post Office Department to transport the I'idled States mail.
The lessees here, as was true of the taxpayer in
the Alward ease, own property used in carrying
on a business for profit. That property could lie
taxed through a direct property tax. Taber v. /»dian Territory Co., )UK) U. S. 1 (sustaining the Oklahoma ad valorem tax on the property and equipment of a lessee of restricted Indian lands) ; Indian
Territory Oil Co. v. Hoard, 288 U. S. 325 (upholding the Oklahoma ad valorem tax on the lessee's
share of oil produced under a lease of restricted
lands); Carry v. Vuitcd States, supra (holding
valid a "use" tax on materials purchased by a con-
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tractor to cany out a construction contract for the
United States).
Since Oklahoma could undoubtedly exact from
these lessees their fair share of support for the cost
of state and local government by means of a nondiscriminatory tax on their property used in producing the oil and gas under the leases, it seems reasonable that the same essential obligations can be
required from them even though the tax, in the first
instance, is measured by their share of the gross
production. While the State of Oklahoma has
found it more feasible to tax the property used in
this industry through the means of a gross production tax, which is subject to revision in accordance
with ad valorem standards, the effect on the United
States or on its Indian wards is not any different
than would be true if a simple ad valorem tax were
employed. Alward v. Johnson, supra, established
the validity of this kind of tax even before the
Dravo decision and the cases following it denied
any constitutional iimnunity to private contractors
and lessees. Its authority today is beyond question.
The court below, however, believed that Indian
Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, which had held
that a lease of restricted Indian lands was an "instrumentality" of the Federal Government whose
value; could not be reached by a state ad valorem
tax, was a binding precedent which compelled the
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conclusion that the lessees here were immune from
the gross production and petroleum excise taxes.10
Kven if the actual decision in the Indian Oil Co.
rase eniihl still he regarded as controlling with respect to the taxation of the lease itself, a proposition with which we cannot agree, it could not stand
for the conclusion that the lessees are "instrumentalities" who are exempt from the taxes here involved, as must ho apparent from the previous discussion. Further, the gross production taxes in
these cast's present no issue concerning the validity
of taxing the value of the lease, for no question has
hcen raised, through the appropriate statutory procedure, to test the amount of the gross production
tax in comparison to what the ad valorem taxes
would have heen on the taxpayer's property exclusive of the lease.11
However, if this is deemed to he an appropriate
opportunity, we believe that Indian Oil Co. v. OUUt'" Tin* Indian Oil Co. ease was also relied on in the per
curiam decisions in Howard v. (tipsy Oil Co. and in Large Oil
Co. v. Howard, supra.
n

Seeking to conform to the Indian Oil Co. decision, and
while still attempting to uphold the gross production tax on
ihc lessee of restricted lands, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in In re Skclton Lead <0 Zinc Co., 81 Okl. 134, 149, intimated
that in making the comparison between the amount of the
gross production tax and the ad valorem tax, it would not be
proper to include the value of the lease in the property subject to tax. Since there is nothing in the Oklahoma statute
compelling such a result, the express overruling of the Indian
Oil Co. case would leave the question open to Oklahoma for
decision, unembarrassed by an infirm precedent of this Court.
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homa, supra, ought also to be overruled. Since the
State can validly tax the value of physical property
used by such a lessee or by a Government contractor (Tuber v. Indian Territory Co., supra; Indian
Territory Oil (Jo. v. Board, supra; Curry v. United
States, supra), and may even tax the value of an
outstanding claim against the United States due on
an open account (Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. I l l ) ,
no firm reason can exist why the State should not
be able to impose a non-discriminatory tax with
respect to the value of the lease or of the contract
itself, either through a direct tax or by a gross production tax which is in lieu of other property taxes.
The effect which such a non-discriminatorv tax
would have on the United States, where it is the
immediate party in interest, or on its Indian wards,
where leases to restricted lands are involved, is
certainly no more direct or burdensome than that
resulting from a tax on the lessee's physical property, or on his gross income, or on the value of his
claim against the United States. We believe that
Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra, was wrong in
holding that the value of such a lease could not be
taxed the same as other property, and should no
longer be regarded as an authoritative precedent.
B. No Statutory Immunity Hat Baan Craaiad

Since the lessees do not possess a constitutional
immunity which, itself, would exempt them from
non-discriminatory taxes measured bjr their gross
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receipts or gross production, it remains to be considered whether Congress lias cloaked them with
an immunity which they would not otherwise enjoy. If it believed that this would have a beneficial
effect on the affairs of its Indian wards, and if it
saw Jit to pursue such a policy, Congress could undoubtedly exempt these lessees against the taxes
which are here in issue. See James v. Dravo Contract in y Co., supra, pp. 160-161; Pittman v. Home
Owners' Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 32-33; Maricopa
County v. Valley Bank, 318 U. S. 357, 361; Board
of Comm 'is V. Seher, 318 U. S. 705, 715-719; Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598;
Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 446; Smith
y. Davis, supra, pp. 116-119. The question is
whether Congress has actually done so.
The court below, noting that in certain instances
Congress had acted to withdraw immunity and to
subjert certain designated restricted lands to the
Oklahoma gross production tax, concluded that
the lessees here were not subject to tax because Congress (No. 40, R. 37)—
has acted on the theory that such immunity
exists in the case of leases of this character unless waived.
We disagree with this reasoning and firmly believe
that no conclusions can be drawn to the effect that
Congress has acted so as to create an immunity for
these private lessees. "The immunity formerly
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said to rest on constitutional implication cannot
now be resurrected in the form of statutory implication." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States,
supra, 319 U. S. at 604.
A brief summary of the legislative action in this
field will show that there is no basis for holding
that Congress presently considers that any immunity is to be accorded to these oil and gas well operators. Despite the tax-exempt character of the
land, there have been instances where Congress has
acted to permit taxation in some respect of the mineral production and to authorize the payment of
the taxes due on account of the Indians* royalty interests. This was done in the case of the Osages,12
the Kansas or Kaws," the Quapaws,14 and the Five
"Section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1921, c. 120, 41 Stat.
124!), authorized Oklahoma to levy its gross production tax
on all oil and jras produced in Osage County and directed the
Secretary of the Interior to pay the tax on the royalty interests out of the royalties received by the Osage Tribe. See
II. Hep. No. 1377, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1278, 66th
Cong., 3d Sess.; S. Itep. No. 704, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.
In Oklahoma v. Bamsdall Corp., 296 U. S. 521, it was held
that this statute was not a consent to the imposition of the
petroleum excise tax and, following the then prevailing immunity doctrine, that the lessee was exempt from the imposition of this tax.
18

The Act of May 27, 1924, c. 200, 43 Stat. 176, consented
to the imposition of Oklahoma taxes on the production of oil
and gas from the restricted allotted lands of the Kansas or
14

Section 26 of the Aet of March 3, 1921, c. 119, 41 Stat.
1225, as amended by the Act of April 17,1937, c. 108, 50 Stat.
68, consented to the levy of the Oklahoma gross production

:J2
('ivili/.ed Trihes.1"' Congressional action in this respect was prompted primarily by considerations
arising from the favorable economic position of the
particular Indians and by the desirability of their
making a direct contribution through the specified
taxes to the support of local government. See the
legislative materials cited in footnotes 12-15, supra.
The result of this Congressional action, under the
then prevailing decisions, was similarly to withdraw the existing immunity of the lessees.
Congress, significantly, has never taken any positive or direct action to assert an immunity for any
Footnote lit (('out.)

Kaw Indians uiul authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
pay the taxes assessed against the royalties out of the funds
of tlit* particular Indians. See II. Rep. No. 269, 68th Cong.,
1st S.'ss.; S. Hep. No. 433, tJHth ('ong., 1st Sess., and the letter
from thf Secretary oT the Interior dated February 16, 1924,
set forth in 1he Committee Reports.
Footnote 14 (font.)
tax on lead and zinc produced from the restricted lands of
the Quapaws and directed the Secretary of the Interior to
pay the taxes assessed ajrainst the royalty interests out of the
funds of the individual Indian royalty owners. See II. Rep.
No. 431, 75th Coup., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 234, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess.
,a

Section 3 of the Act of May 10, 1928, c. 517, 45 Stat. 495,
provided that all minerals produced from restricted allotted
lauds of the members of the Five Civilized Tribes should be
hubjeet to taxation the Mime as minerals produced from other
lands. See 11. Rep. No. 1193, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep.
No. 982, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., and the letter from the Secretary of the Interior dated March 7, 1928, set forth in the
Committee Reports.

• »•»

lessees of tax-exempt Indian lands. The legislative
measures have been in the reverse direction,
namely, to withdraw immunity from the Oklahoma
gross production tax with respect to the restricted
lands of certain Indian tribes. These enactments,
moreover, all took place under a different climate
of judicial decision, namely, when it appeared that
the immunity would exist for the Indian lessors as
well as for the private lessees unless Congress acted
affirmatively to remove the exemption against taxation.
In this limited respect, it is true, Congress formerly acted on the assumption that the immunity of
the lessee existed until waived by legislative action.
This was so, however, only because such was the
constitutional situation under the prevailing decisions. It does not follow, however, that Congress,
ignoring the subsequent decisions of this Court, has
tacitly made the same assumption during the past
10 years. Once it became clear that the cases extending constitutional immunity against taxation
to private persons were no longer to be followed,
Congress was not required to take affirmative action to remove an immunity from the lessees of Indian lands when that immunity no longer existed,
nor was it necessary for it to consent to the imposition of particular taxes against such lessees once
the previously existing constitutional barrier was
removed. Its silence during this period must be interpreted in the setting of the contemporaneous
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judicial decisions. Mayo v. United States, sn/mt.
::i!) lT. S. at 447-448.
\\V believe that < 'oiigress, by failing to make specilii'"*j»i#MVi>io!i for the taxation of the lessees here,
I MI* not indicated imv intention that thev shouhl be
exempt Tn in taxation on their activities. The situation is similar to the silence of Congress during
the time that the Gilt ex pic decision stood for the
• wistHire of the lessee's immunity against a state
net incline tax. The Mountain Producers cast*
demonstrates that no significance should he attached i«. this, for the tax exemption there, quite
properly. Tell along with the constitutional doc
nine, unchecked by notions of legislative intent
ill..! r\*u\\\ milv have been fabricated out of (\>nyregional inaction. Nurelv, the failure of the lei*islatiire to mark its disagreement with constitutional decisions does not signify an adoption of
those ..pinions as the policy of the law makers
which will persist bevond the time that thev are
overruled.
Nor i.; the existence of a statutory exemption
from taxation to be interred from the fact that
('••!!:• res* has seen fit to consent to taxation of the
iiiiifral production from the lands of certain Indi.ms but has not done so in the case of others. Differeic«> in legislative policy respecting the taxation «.t the various Indian tribes do not add up to
similar di(Terences in policy towards their private
lessees. The retention of whatever immunity at-
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taches to the royalty interests of the lands involved
in this case is not at all inconsistent with the lessees* being taxed on their income or on their share
of production. The situation is parallel to that
where the express retention of the tax immunity of
the United States does not spell out an exemption
for private persons who may have a direct association with the (Government.
If the non-sequitur of the reasoning of the lower
court were not. otherwise apparent, it would become
so by a consideration of the incongruous intentions
imputed by it to Congress. Thus, it has never been
intimated that the action of Congress outlined
above or its silence in other respects gave any lessees a statutory immunity against ad valorem taxes
on their property and equipmeut, or on their share
of the oil. Taber v. Indian Territory Co., supra;
Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, supra. Actually, Congress has acted on the supposition that
such legislative immunity does not exist.10 Also,
10

The Act of February 14, 1931, c. 179, 46 Stat. 1108,
amended the Aet of May 10, 1928, supra, to provide against
any double taxation and to provide that where the machinery
and equipment was taxed on an ad valorem basis for the fiseal
year ended June 30, 1931, the gross production tax should
not be imposed prior to July I, 1931. The legislative history
recognized that even when the land itself was tax-exempt because of the restrictions, the lessees were liable for an ad
valorem tax on their property. II. Rep. No. 2327, 71st Cong.,
3d Scss., and H. Rep. No. 1399, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.. containing a letter from the Commissioner on Indian Affairs
dated January 15, 1931.
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the history of Congressional action and inaction
was in it considered to he an assertion of immunity
for lessees against a state or federal net income
tax. 1/flrrriny v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
stt/tni. It would he surprising, accordingly, if Congress should have had no objection to the imposition uf an ml valorem tax but should have objected
to the collection of the identical amounts from the
leasee when accomplished by a gross production
tax which is used in the place of the more cutnber>oine ml ralorcm levy, it would also be strange if
Congress believed it proper that the lessee should
pav a net income tax but not a tax measured bv
gross income or gross production.
Actually, when Mountain Producers had settled
ihe conclusion that such lessees stand in no more
favori-d position to invoke a constitutional immunity against a net income tax than any other private
< Jo\ erumeiit contractor, Congress was certainly ent it led to believe that these lessees would be required to pay the same kind of non-discriminatory
local taxes as other contractors are required to
bear. The failure of Congress, either before or
after the Mountain Producers decision, to assert a
tax exempt status for the lessees of restricted Indian lands, undoubtedly indicates an intent to permit them to be taxed by the local authorities to the
limit of constitutional power.
Oner the constitutional doctrine was resolved
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plausible reason for creating an implied legislative
one. Except as it may be reflected in an increased
income to the Indians, Congress would have no discernible purpose in exempting the lessees from the
taxes which are under consideration. However,
whether such an exemption would result in an increased return to the Indian wards is only theoretic. The observations in the Mountain Producers case, supra, pp. 38G-387, that a tax on the lessee's net income lias only a remote or indirect eiTect
on the (lovernnient is supported by the fact that
the leases approved by the Department of Interior
provided for the same rental and royalty payments
both before and after the overruling of Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, supra." Further, the royalty and rental payments provided for by the Department of
Interior in the case of leases of lands allotted under
17

Under Regulations Ciovcrning the Leasing of Restricted
Allotted Indian Lauds for Mining Purposes, approved October 8, 1937 (25 C. F. R., Sections 189.1-189.33) (issued prior
to the Mountain Producers decision but still in effect), leases
are offered to the bidder offering the highest bonus, in addition to the stipulated rentals and royalties which are a rental
of $1.25 per acre per year and royalties of 12% percent, the
rental to be credited on the royalties due. The same royalties
(without a minimum rental) were provided for in the predecessor regulations approved July 7, 1925.
Because differences in the value of different tracts of land
would '>e reflected in the bonus which the lessor is willing to
pay, an exact comparison is impossible. The fuct that the
royalties have remained the same does, however, tend to show
that the lessors have not been significantly affected by the
Mountain Producers decision.

as
tlit* General Allotment Act are exactly the same a>
those in tlit' ease of lands of members of the Five
Civilian! Tribes, where the lessees liave been subjei-j i.i the gross production tax since ]i)28.'" It
senilis a safe conclusion that the lessee's tax status
has liltle, if anv, effect on the Indian rovaltv ownei s. At least, if the taxation of the lessee is deemed
!•» have an adverse effect on the governmental p«li«\ inward the Indian lessors, it is a matter whieh
should rail for a positive indication by Congress.'*
The rejeelioii of the "economic burden" arguiin'iil as a ground for implying a constitutional ta\
iuiiiiiiiiily is equally persuasive for rejecting ihc
(•••iiiciitioii that Congress has created one bv inferenre. Ol.hthonut Ta.r ('onnn'ii v. United States,
*>• >>)tt, :\\\) V. S. at «>04. The statement in (1tares v.
.V. )*. /•.*• iv/. O'Krrfr, s,i/»a, .'50(> U. S. at 480, is
similarly apt here—
il it appears that there is no ground for implying a constitutional immunity, there is
eijually a want of any ground for assuming any
,s

N«'f K<'pul;iti<iii> (loverning the Leasing of Restricted
I.HIMU of .Members of Pive Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma, for
.Mining, approved April L'7, V.m C2."» C. P. R., Sections 18:1.1KM')).
,!

* since the lessees, as previously indicated, are liable lor
ml riilon nt taxes, it is difficult to see why the gross production ta\. ulfii levied in lien ol' stteh tuxes, would have Kiteh
on effect mi T!••* royalty owners as to impel Congress to invoke an immunity lor the levees against this tax, but not
:f.-;inst I be ml valorem tax.
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purpose on the part of Congre&s to create an
imnmnit}'.
In the absence of a dear expression of a legislative
purpose to immunize a private lessee or contractor
from non-discriminatory local taxation, doubtful
indications of Congressional intent ought to be interpreted against the existence of such immunity.
Smith v. Davis, supra, o23 IT. 8. at 117; Oklahoma
Tax Comm'it v. Vnitvd States, supra; Buchstaff
Co. v. McK inlet/, :>>08 U. 8. 358; draws v. A\ Y. c.r
rel. O'Ktrfe, supra, :UK5 U. S. at 479-480. Here,
where Congress has never expressed a purpose to
place the private lessee in a tax immune status, the
conclusion is clear. A cautious approach in interpreting the silence of Congress will not only avoid
the casting of an unnecessary burden on it to disavow an immunity which it does not desire, hut
will also prevent an unwarranted temporary interference with the taxing authority of the State.2"
30

Where the immunity of the United States itself or of its
property is asserted, the silence, of Congress must be given an
opposite meaning for it is not incumbent on Congress to make
an express declaration of the immunity. See United States v.
Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 177, 180; Mayo v. United
States, 310 U. S. 441, 447-448. Whether Congressional silence,
where the taxable status of the property of Indians is in
question, should be weighed for or agaiust the existence of
the immunity (compare Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United
States, supra, and Superintendent v. Commissioner, supra,
wilh Carpenter v. Shaw, supra, and United States V. Iiickcrt,
supra) need not be resolved here, for the tax immunity of n

•10
These matters plainly indicate the conclusion that
no tax innniinity exists lor the taxpayers in these
cases.
CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, the decisions helow
should he reversed and the validity of the imposition of the taxes should he sustained.
Respect fully submitted,
PHILIP B. PKHLMAN,

Solicitor General.
TUKKOX LAM Ait CAUDLE,

Assistant Attorney General
ARNOLD RAUM,
(JKOKCK A. STINSON,

HiLBfiirr P. ZAUKY,
Special Assistants to the
Attorney General.
August, 1948
private lessee <ir contractor stands on an altogether different
basis and no sound reason can be suggested for a "liberal"
interpretation in favor of its existence.
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No. 768

TO AUTHORIZE OIL AND GAS MINING LEASKS UPON UNALLOTTED LANDS WITHIN EXECUTIVE OIIDER INDIAN RESERVATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MAY 6 (calendar day, MAY 7), 1926.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. CAMERON, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, submitted the
following

REPORT
[To accompany S. 4152)

The Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the bill
(S. 4152), to authorize oil and gas mining leases upon unallotted lands
within Executive order Indian reservations, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorablv thereon witn the
recommendation that the bill do pass with the following amendments:
Page 1, line 8, beginning with the word "and," strike out all that
follows down to and including the word "act" in line 10.
Page 2, line 13, after the word "Indians" insert the following:
Provided further, That production of oil and gas and other minerals on such
lands may be taxed by the State in which such lands are located in all respects
the same as the production on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the
Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid out of the royalty
income derived by said Indian owner or owners the ratable proportion of the
total production tax assessed against such royalties, but the royalty share of any
tax by a State herein authorized shall not become a lien or charge of any kind
or character against the land or property of the Indian owner or owners, but
shall only become a lien against the royalty income of said Indian owner or
owners: Provided further, That until the State of New Mexico enacts a law
placing a production tax upon royalty, bonus, or other income of Indians or
Indian tribes, under the terms of this act and an act entitled •'An act to authorize the leasing for oil and gas mining purposes of unallotted lands on Indian
reservations affected by the proviso to section 3 of the act of February 26, 1891,"
approved May 29, 1924 (Forty-third Statutes 244), the Secretary of "the Interior
i& authorized and directed to pay said State, out of the proceeds of such royalty,
bonus, or other income, such sum as shall be equivalent to the tax levied by
such State upon an equal quantity of such oil, gas, and other minerals produced
upon unrestricted lands.

Page 2, line 20, strike out the words ll the President or."
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Page 3, line 8, after the word "built," insert " a " and change the
word "loads" to "road."
Page 3, line 10, after the word "of," insert the word "the" and
after the word " which," in the same line, insert the word "such."
Page 5, line 1, after the word "Secretary," insert the words "of
the Interior."
Page f>, line 2, aflor the word "Secretary," insert the words "of
the Interior."
Page ">. line 11. after the word "built," insert " a " ami rhange the
word " r o a d s " to "road."
Page f>. line 12. after the word "of" insert the word 4i the."
Tin4 history of this legislation is as follows: On December Hi, 1925,
a bill was introduced. S. 1722, providing for the leasing of Executive
order reservations for oil and gas mining purposes. This bill was referred to the Secretary of the Interior, who submitted a report thereon,
recommending, instead of the proposed S. 1722, that a bill be passed
along lines suggested in a draft of a bill which the Secretary of the
Interior attached to his report. Several bills were introduced and
considered by the committee, which, after exhaustive hearings,
adopted S. 4152, as amended and reported herein.
The proposed measure is supported by the Interior Department
and has the indorsement of the different organizations for the protection of Indian rights.
The reports of the Secretary of the Interior and the bill suggested
by him are as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Washington, January 2X9 1926.
Hon.

J.

\V.

HARREI-D,

Chairman Committee on Indian Affairs,
United States Senate.
MY DUAR SENATOR HARRELD: Further response is made to your letter, without date, requesting an opinion on 8. 1722, " A bill to provide for the disposition
of bonuses, rentals, and royalties received under the provisions of the act of
Congress entitled 'An act to promote the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil
shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain/ approved February 25, 1920, from
unallotted lands in Executive order Indian reservations, and for other purposes."
Instead of enacting legislation which would authorize the leasing of unallotted
land on Executive order Indian reservations subject to the general leasing act, I
believe that authority should be granted for leasing such land under terms and
conditions similar to those governing the leasing of unallotted land on Indian
reservations created by treaty as provided in the act of May 29, 1924 (43 Stat.
244). I therefore have cause to be prepared and submit herewith a draft of a
bill to that effect, and suggest that it be enacted in lieu of Senate bill 1722.
Indian reservations, however created, are under the jurisdiction of the Indian
Service, and it is believed that it would be much more satisfactory to have the
mineral resources of tribal Indian land developed as nearly as possible under the
same laws, rules, and regulations, subject to the same local jurisdiction, and thus
enable the officer in charge of the reservation to enforce the laws of the United
States relative to Indian reservations and trade and intercourse with the Indians.
This is especially true of the Navajo Indian Reservation, which was originally
created by treaty with the Indians, additions thereto being subsequently made
by Executive order. Oil of a very high grade is now being produced on the treaty
part of the reservation, under leases negotiated under authority contained in the
act of February 2S, 1891, and there has been some development work on the
Executive order part of the reservation under permits issued by this department
during the period it was held that such land was subject to the general leasing
act of February 25, 1920.
The Attorney General, on May 27, 1924, held that the general leasing act does
not apply to Executive order Indian reservations. Following that holding this
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Indian Reservation in Utah and 4 in Arizona. It is understood that some of the
permittees have expended considerable sums of money in attempting to develop
the land. Provision is made in the bill to allow the permittees to continue
prospecting for oil and gas on the land covered by their permits and to grant
them leases in the event valuable oil or gas deposits are found. In addition to
the applications upon which permits were granted, there were filed approximately 400 for which no permits were granted. Undoubtedly many of these
applications were purely speculative and nothing expended by the applicants in
attempted development, and it is not believed that they should be recognized
or given any preference right to a leave covering the land for which they applied.
Provision is made that 37?>£ per rent of the rentals, royalties, and bonuses
received will be turned over to the State wherein the land is located, to be expended for construction and maintenance of public roads within the respective
reservations where the leased lands arc located and public roads contributory
thereto and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the support of
public schools attended by Indian children, the remainder of the money to be
used for the expenses of administration and for the benefit of the Indians. The
provision as to roads will be of advantage not only to the Indians and the lessees,
but to the public generally. The requirement that any of the money used for
educational purposes be expended for support of public schools or other educational institutions attended by Indian children is believed to be fair and just
alike to the State and the Indians.
A part, at least, of any funds which may be deposited in the Treasurv to the
credit of the Indians will be available for appropriation by Congress for pavment
of cost of administration of their affairs and thus avoid the appropriation of public money for that purpose. Moreover, any remainder may be used, as authorized
bv Congress, from time to time, for the benefit of the Indians in the development
of water on their grazing ranges or other needful purposes without incurring the
appropriation of public money. It is not therefore believed that any of the funds
arising from leases should be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
Early and favorable consideration of the draft is respectfully recommended.
Very truly yours,
HUBERT WORK.

A BILL To authorize oil and gas mining leases upon uoallot ed lands within Eiecutive ord<*r Indian
reservations

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled 9 That unallotted lands within the limits of any
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order for Indian purposes or
for the use or occupancy of any Indiaus or tribe may be leased for oil and gad
mining purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in the act of May
29, 1924 (Forty-third Statutes, 244).
SEC. 2. That the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas
leases upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be distributed as follows: 37H per centum shall be paid in lieu of taxes to
the State within the boundaries of which the leased lands or deposits are located,
upon the condition that the same are to be used by such State, or subdivisions
thereof, for the construction and maintenance of public roads within the respective reservations in which the leased lands are situated and public roads
contributory thereto and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the
support of public schools or other public educational institutions attended by
Indian children; 6 2 ^ per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States to the credit of the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was created, and shall draw interest at the rate of 4 per
centum per annum and be available for appropriation by Congress for the expense
of administration and for the use and benefit of such Indians.
SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to allow any applicant to whom a j>crmit to prospect for oil and gas upon lands within an Indian reservation created
by Executive order has heretofore been issued iir accordance with the provisions
of the act of February 25, 1920 (Forty-first Statutes, 437), to continue prospecting for period not exceeding two years from the date of the passage of this act
on the land described in his permit, under the terms and ronHifinnc <Wni.. — *-
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land embraced in any permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease of onefourth of the land embraced in the prospecting permit: Provided, That the permittee shall be granted a lease for as much as one hundred and sixty acres of said
lands, if there be that number of acres within the permit. The area*to be selected
by the permittee shall be in compact form and, if surveyed, to be described by
the legal subdivisions of the public-land surveys; if unsurvcyed, to be surveyed
by the Government at the e x c u s e of the applicant for lease in accordance with
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the
lands leased shall l>e conformed to and taken in accordance with the legal subdivisions of such surveys; deposits made to cover expense of surveys .shall be
deemed appropriated for that purpose, and any excess deposits may be repaid
to the person or jH*rsons making such deposit or their legal representatives.
Such leases shall be for a term of twenty years upon a royalty of 5 |>cr centum in
amount or value of the production and the annual payment in advance of a rental
of $1 i>er acre, the rental paid for any one year to be credited against the royalties
as they accrue for that year, with the preferential right in the lessee to renew the
same for successive periods of ten years upon such reasonable terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of "the Interior. The permittee
shall also be entitled to a preference right to a lease for the remainder of the land
in his prospecting permit at a royalty of not less than 12H P** centum in amount
or value of the production, the royalty to be determined by competitive bidding
or fixed by such other method as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe:
Provided, That the Secretary shall have the right to reject any or all bids.

DEPARTMENT or THE INTERIOR,

Washington, March 10, 1926.
Hon.

J. W.

HARRELD,

Chairman Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate.
Mr DEAR SENATOR HARRELD: On January 2S, 1926, upon request for an
opinion on S. 1722, I submitted a report. I now desire to submit this supplemental report because some question has been raised as to the scope or meaning
of the words "In lieu of taxes to the State" as used in section 2, line 4, of the typewritten draft of a bill which accompanied my report of January 28, 1926.
As construed and understood by this department at the time the report of
January 28, 1926, was made, this language *'in lieu of taxes to the State" means
that 37}^ per cent of the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas
leases upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be paid to the State, for designated purposes, in lieu of any and all taxes
against the Indians, but does not include taxes against others. This being the
meaning placed upon the language by the department in order to remove any
doubt about this language I suggest and recommend that the words "in lieu of
taxes," appearing in line 4, of section 2, of the typewritten bill accompanying
my report of January 28, 1926, be eliminated, and that after the word "located,
in line 5, of section 2, of the typewritten bill the following language, followed by
a comma, be inserted, "in lieu of any and all taxes against Indians to whose
credit 62^6 per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States
as is in this section hereinafter provided."
I also suggest that this amendment above set out be made to S. 3159 by striking
out of S. 3159, in section 2, page 2, line 1, of the printed bill the words "in lieu of
taxes " and that after the word " located," in section 2, page 2, line 2, of the printed
bill, the following be inserted "in lieu of any and all taxes against the Indians to
whose credit 62i^ per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United
States as is in this section hereinafter provided/ 1
Very truly yours,
HUBERT WORK.

The enactment of this legislation will accomplish the following
purposes:
1. Permit tho exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order
Indian reservations. 1 !1
11
-

^~
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4. Extend relief to permittees and applicants who in good faith
expended money in development looking to the discovery of oil and
gas under the general leasing act of February 25, 1920, upon Executive-order Indian reservations, at a time when such lands were held
to come within the terms of the said act.
The first section of the bill establishes a uniform policy for the
leasing of all Indian reservation lands for oil and gas mining purposes,
under the supervision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it simply
applies existing law relating to treaty reservations to Kxecutive-order
reservations. The law of May 29, 1924, applicable to treaty reservations and herein extended to Executive-order reservations, is as
follows:
That unallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of the Five
Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject to lease for mining purposes
for a period of 10 years under the proviso to section 3 of the act of February 28,
1891 (26 Stat. L. 795), may be leased at public auction by the Secretary of the
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for such Indians, for oil and gas
mining purposes for a period of not to exceed 10 years, and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending the
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in paving quantities. (43
Stat. 244.)

The proviso to section 3 of the act of February 2S, 1891, is as
follows:
That where lands are occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the
same, and which lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, and
are not desired for individual allotments, the same may be leased by authority
of the council speaking for such Indians, for a period not to exceed five years for
grazing or farming or 10 years for mining purposes, in such quantities and upon
such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of such reservation may recommend, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.

The first section of the bill as amended also provides that the
money received from oil and gas mining leases shall be deposited in
the Treasury to the credit of the Indian tribes the same as tne income
derived from leases on treaty reservations, and authorizes the State
in which the leased lands are located to levy a production tax on
all the oil produced within the State, including that of the lessee or
oil operator.
These provisions are in line with similar action by Congress in other
instances. Section 24 of the Indian appropriation act of May 18,
1916 (39 Stat. L. 123-155) authorized the leasing for mining purposes of unallotted lands on the diminished Spokane Indian Reservation in Washington and provided that the proceeds arising therefrom
should be paid into the Spokane tribal fund.
Section 26 of the act of June 30, 1919 (41 Stat. L. 3-31) authorized
the leasing of unallotted lands on Indian reservations within the
States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming for purpose of mining metalliferous mineral and provided that the money arising tnerefrom
11
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit
of the Indians belonging and having tribal rights on the reservation
where the leased land is located. 19 This applied to all reservation
lands within the States named.
Section 7 of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. L. 855-857). ^ V P tn

6

OIL AND GAS LEASES UPON INDIAN RESERVATIONS

Congress has repeatedly provided that the proceeds from the sale
of surplus lands on Executive-order reservations within the States of
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada. North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington shall be crediteci to the Indians.
The bill reported on by the Interior Department provided that
3 7 ^ per cent of the royalty income should be paid to the Stato within
which the leased lands are located, but limited the State in the
expenditure of such money to roads within or tributary to the respective reservations or for the support of schools attended by Indian
children. It would ho relatively of no value to a State to pay it
money and then renuiro the expenditure of the same for such limited
purposes. It has been deemed advisable to pay all the royalty
income to the credit of the Indians and to permit the State to levy
taxes on the entire production within its borders the same as upon
unrestricted lands. This policy is the same as that of the act of
May 29, 1024, applicable to treatv reservations, and it also enables
the States to have the unrestricted use of the money so collected.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that
such taxation is permissible only when directlv authorized by the
Congress. (Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240
U. S. 522: Howard v. Gvpsv Oil Cp., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil Co. v.
Howard, 248 U . S . 540.)'
The Congress has already adopted the policy of permitting State
taxation of oil, gas, and other minerals produced on Indian lands in
the case of the Osages (41 Stat. 1250), the Quapaws (41 Stat. 1249),
and upon treaty reservations generally (act May 29, 1924, 43 Stat.
244).
Since Congress has by the act of June 30, 1919 (41 Stat. 3-34),
forbidden the further creation of Executive-order reservations, except
by act of Congress, section 2 of the proposed bill provides that no
changes shall be made in the boundaries of existing Executive reservations except by act of Congress.
In general, ttio congressional policy toward the disposal of the
wealth of Indian Executive-order reservations has been a uniform
one for 50 years, the proceeds from the natural resources as well as the
use of the surface having been allowed to the tribes or credited to
them, and this policy, continued in the bill now reported, is in evident
accord with equitv and with the historical fact that the greater part
of all the existing Indian reservation area has been created since 1871,
the date when the treaty-making power with the Indians was ended.
The last section of the bill is necessary to afford equitable relief
to those who in good faith expended money in prospecting for oil and
gas in accordance with the general leasing act of February 25, 1920
(49 Stat. 437). On June 9, 1922, the Secretary of the Interior
promulgated a written opinion holding that lands covered by the provisions of the proposed bill came within the terms of the said general
leasing act, and granted 16 permits to prospect for oil and gas in
Utah and 4 in Arizona. Tne permittees, 20 in number, immediately proceeded in the work of exploration and development of the
lands covered by their permits, and in so doing expended very substantial sums of money, totaling in the aggregate between three and
four hundred thousand dollars.
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A number of other persons made applications for oil and gas
prospecting permits, but these permits were not granted for the
reason that on May 27, 1924, the Attorney General of the United
States gave an opinion that the general leasing act did not apply to
Executive order Indian reservation lands. \ u r \ limited number of
these persons, whose applications were not granted for the reason
above stated, had already joined with the permittees in the said work
of exploration and development ami li.ul t out i tbtit* d in llie money so
expended.
The said permits reouired thai the work ol exploration and development should be diligently prosecuted and the opinion of the
Attorney General was nol renduul iinnll neail\ (no u"ii aftu the
said work had been first undertaken.
The lands covered by these permits ,n barren practically without
water holes and without stock wells, and hence only incompletely
occupied even by Indians Tin Am\ of I he hardships endured in
fulfilling the said obligations is graphically told in the record of the
case of lTnited States v. Harrison, ICquitv S2SS, United States District
Court of I hull
Based upon the opinion of the Attorney General, the United States
brought suits in the United States district court of Utah to cancel
the permits already issued. The court in United States v. Harrison,
just cited, refused to sustain the conUnlion i f ilu Ciovernment and
dismissed the case, and the following language ib touml in the court's
decision, viz:
The equities are all m lavor oi the dcioiuiunl
1 lie right of the
Government to insist upon and enforce what, tin effect, is n forfeiture is too
doubtful in my mind for the court to adopt that view and deprive the defendants
of possible benefits to be derived from the large expenditures which they have
made upon this ground in t^ootl faith

The Government promptly appealed the case to the Circuit Court
of Appeals at Denver, which court certified certain questions to the
Supreme Court of the United States, where a decision can not be
expected for probably two years
From the foregoing it is evident that the permittees and applicants,
who have made these expenditures and have done this work in good
faith, have substantial equities uhnli icqnire recognition, and the
last section of the bill gives them the n^ht to proceed with their work,
and if discoveries are made to obtain leases in the manner provided
by the said act of February 25, 1920, under which their applications
were originally made. This section is principally a reenactment of
the applicable provisions of the said act of February 25, 1920, so
that (development may proceed under the supervision of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and leases be granted under the provisions and
regulations of the general leasing law h\ \ irt \tv of w Inch these equities
were created. Those applicants who did not make expenditures in
such work of exploration and development are not included in the
relief provided for bv this bill.
The departmental order under which the\ proceeded was subsequently reversed, and in the absence either of a vested right or an
equity gained through investment made for the actual development
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The disadvantage to the Indians if the several hundred noninvesting applicants are each given the privilege of developing a square
mile of oil land with a royalty of only 5 per cent, as compared to a
royalty of 1 2 ^ per cent ana upward wnich they must pay under
the Indian oil leasing law, is evident, and tho granting of such privilege to such noninvesting applicants would merely he a gift made to
them, out of the Indian wealth, of sums which might run into millions of dollars.
The bill as reported back to the Senate is fair and equitable to the
Indians, to the States where the Indian reservations are located
and to those who desire to prospect for oil and gas.

o
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9133]

Ti te Committee oi i Indian Ai lairs, to whom was referred the bill
(H. R. 9133) to authorize oil and gas mining leases upon allotted
lands within Executive order Indian IVM nations, Inning considered
the same, report thereon with a l-emmim iidnhon that il do pass with
the following amendments:
Page 1, line 11, after the word liwithdrawals" strikeout all.dowH.
to arid including the word " centumfT in line 10, page 2,
Page 2, line 16, strike out the words 4*the expense of administration and for the use and benefit of such Indians" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "expenses in connection with the supervision
of the development and operation of the oil and gas industry and for
the use and benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or
their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure
of such money, but no per capita paym<vnt shall be made except by
act of Congress."
Page 2, after line 17, insert a new section, as follows:
SEC. 3. That taxes may he levied and collected In the State or local authorit\
upon improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells or other rights, property,
or assets of any lessee upon hinds within Executive order Indian reservations
in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such
taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals,
and royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed
to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided,
That such taxes shall not become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or
other property of such Indians.

P a g e 2 , line 18, c h a n g e t h e M-iini'i
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Page 4, line 17, add the following:
And provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior in his discretion, is
authorized to reinstate, in the order of their original filing, all applications of
qualified applicants filed prior to May 27, 1924, for permits to prosj>ect for
oil and gas under the said, act of February 25, 1920, upon any lands covered
by the provisions of this act, and which applications were not granted, upon
the following conditions: Written rccjucst for such action shall l>e filed by the
original applicant or his heirs in the land office of the appropriate land district
within ninety days from the date of the approval of this act, and the reinstatement
of any such applications shall confer the right of prospecting and to secure a
lease or leases as in this section provided, upon the lands described in such
application.

The reports of the Secretary of the Interior on the bill are as
follows:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

Washington, February 16, 1926.
Hon.

SCOTT LF.AVITT,

Chairman Committee on Indian A flairs,
Hou.se of Ilcprcscnlativcs, Washington, D. C.
MY DEAR MR. LEAVITT: Further reference is made to your letter of February
10t 192G, submitting for a report thereon a copy of II. It. 0133, to authorize oil
and gas mining louses upon unallotted lands within Executive-order Indian
reservations.
Should H. It. 9133 be enacted, unallotted Executive-order Indian reservations
would be subject to leasing for oil and gas mining purposes as other tribal reservations are. Prior to May 27, 1924, a number of permits to prospect for oil and
gas on Executive-order Indian reservations were issued by this department to
applicants under the general leasing act of February 25, 1920. (41 Stat. 437.)
The Attorney General by opinion of May 27, 1924, held that the act of February
25, 1920, does not apply to such reservations. Following that holding this department has not granted any leases covering such lands. Permits had been
"issued to 16 persons covering hinds within the Navajo Indian Reservation in
Utah and four in Arizona. It is understood that some of the permittees have
expended considerable sums of moneys in attempting to develop the lands.
The bill under consideration, if enacted, will allow such permittees to continue
pros|>ecting for oil and gas on the land covered by their )>ermits, and provides
that they shall be entitled to leases in the event valuable oil or gas deposits are
found, covering one-fourth of the acreage embraced by their prospecting permits,
provided that a permittee may be given a lease or as much as 160 acres if his
permit covers that much.
In addition to the applications upon which permits were granted, there were
filed approximately 400 for which no ])crmits were issued. Undoubtedly many
of these applications were purely speculative and nothing expended by the
applicants in attempted development, and it is not believed that they should be
recognized or given any preference right for leases covering the lands for which
they applied.
Provision is made that 37H per cent of the rentals, royalties, and bonuses
received will be turned over to the State wherein the land is located, to l>e expended
for construction and maintenance of public roads within (he respective reservations where the leased lands are located and public roads contributory thereto
and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the support of public
schools attended by Indian children, the remainder of the money to l>c used for
the expenses of administration and for the l>cncfit of the Indians. The provision as to roads will be of advantage not only to the Indians and the leasees but
to the public generally. The requirement that any of the money used for educational purposes be expended for support of public schools or other educational
institutions attended by Indian children is believed to be fair and just, alike to
the State and the Indians.
A part at least of any funds which may he deposited in the Treasury to the
credit of the Indians will be available for appropriation by Congress for payment
of cost of administration of their affairs and thus avoid the appropriation of
**
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development of water on their grazing ranges or other <
incurring the appropriation of public money
Early and favorable consideration of II. R
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Very truly yours,

D K il A t .T M R N r t > !• I ! i E I: : r i; u i < > u,

Washington, March 10, 1926.
Hon. SCOTT LKAVITT,

Chairman Committee on Indiin Affairs,
Ilowsc of Representatives.
MY DEAR MR. LEAVITT: Responsive to \ our request of V v\n u; \r\ 10, li)2(),
under date of February 1<>, I submitted a report on I!. R. 913"., entitled "A bill to
authorize oil and gas mining leases upon unallotted lands within Executive
order Indian reservations."
Some question has since been raised as to the scope or meaning of the words
"in lieu of taxes to the State" as used in section 2, line 2, page 2, of this bill.
As construed and understood by this department, the language found in .section 2
of this bill simply means that the 37V£ per cent of the royalty therein referred
to is to be paid to the State for certain designated purposes, in lieu of any and all
taxes against the Indians, but does not include taxes against the white man,
lessees or otherwise. This being the true intent in tins respect, in order to remove
any further doubt about that feature of the bill, it is respectfully suggested
that the words "in lieu of taxes," line 2, page 2, of the bill, be eliminated and after
the word "located," lincvJ, page 2, the following be inserted: "in lieu of any and
all taxes against the Indians to whose credit 62}^ per centum shall be deposited
in the Treasury of the United States as is in this section inM-iM».*n,»r ?^-vided "
Very truly yours,
s
The enactment
accomplish the following
purposes;
1. Permit exploration
and gas on Executive order Indian
reservations.
2. Give to^the Indians i . „i me oil and gas royalties.
3- Authorize the States to tax the production of oil
a
such reservations.
4. Extend relief to permittees and applicants who have in good
faith sought to discover oil and gas under the general leasing act <if
February 25, 1920.
5. Remove the necessity for further litigation in the courts.
The first section of the bill provides for a uniform method of
making oil and gas leases on Indian reservations under the supervision of the Indian Bureau. The law now in effect on lands "occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the same/' otherwise
Known as "treaty reservations/' which would be by this act extended
over Indian reservations created by Executive order is as follows:

That unallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of the F ivc
Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject to lease for mining purposes
for a period of 10 years under the proviso to sect ion 3 of the act of February 2Sf
1891 (26 Stat. L. 795), may be leased at public auction by the Secretary of the
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for such Indians, for oil and gas
mining purposes for a period of not to exceed 10 years, and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities, and the terms of any existing oil and gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending the
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in paving quantities. ( 13
Stat. 244)

The proviso to section 3 of the act of February 28, ISO I, reads:
That where lands arc occupied by Indians who have bought ami paid for* the
same, and which lands arc not needed for farming oi agricultural pui poses a »d
are not desired for inHivMn. >i «n ,*.«-. * **
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of the council speaking for such Indians, for a period not to exceed five years fo
grazing or farming or ten years for mining purposes, in such quantities and upo:
such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of such reservation may recoro
mend, subject to the approval of the Secretary o( the Interior.
The second section of the hill as amended provides that the mone;
received from oil and g.-ts lenses on Kxeeiilive order Indian rescrvn
tions shall he deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the Indian
in the same manner JUS such ineome is now credited to the triha
funds of Indians who reside on treaty reservations.
That such action h\ Congress is not unprecedented is shown b\
the following extract from a letter, dated December (i, 1023. fror
lion. Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior, to the chairman of th
Cominitttcc on Indian Affairs:
Congress has heretofore recognized the ritfht of the Indians occupying Excel:
live order Indian reservations to money*; arising from the leasing of their land:
.Section 21 of the Indian apprnprnprialinii act of May IS, 11)10 (3!) Stat. L. 123
l.r>5), authorized the leasing for mining purposes of unallotted lands on th
diminished Spokane Indian lteserv:ition f in Washington, and provided that th
proceeds arising therefrom should l>e pnid into the Spokane tribal fund.
Section 20 of the a d of June :'*<>, \<)\\) (II Stat. L. 3-31), authorized the lcasin
of unallotted lauds on Indian reservations within the Slates of Arizona, Call
forma, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico. Oregon, Washington, and Wye
ming for the pur|>ose of mining metalliferous minerals and provided that th
money arising therefrom 'shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United State
to the credit of the Indians belonging and having tribal rights on the rcservatio
where the leased laud is located." Many of the reservations affected by thi
act were created by Incentive order.
By section 7 of the act of June 2a. MHO (30 Stat. L. X55-S57), Congress recog
nized the right of the Indians of a reservation to the proceeds of timber cu
from their unallotted lands, no distinction being made between reservation
created by treaty or by Kxecutive order.
Congress has repeatedly recognized the right of Indians living on Exccutiv
order Indian reservation* to the proceeds of the sale of surplus land of sue
reservations. Such legislation has been enacted affecting Indian reservations i
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utat
and Washington.

The bill as introduced provided for a division of the proceeds re
ceived from rentals, royalties or bonuses so (hat 02]4 per cent \roul<
he credited to the Indians and .'#7J"j per cent paid to the State wher
the leased hinds are located. Payments to the State, however, wcr
to he conditional upon the expenditure of the money so obtained upoi
roads within or contributory to the respective reservations or for th
support of schools attended by Indian children. The practical efTec
of this limitation was to require the expenditure of all of the incom
from oil and gas leases either directly or indirectly for the benefit o
the Indians.
To pay money to a State and then require the State to expend i
for Indian purposes seems to be unnecessary and of no advantage t
the State. Your committee recommends that the bill be amended b;
providing that the entire proceeds from oil am! gas leases be depositee
in the Treasury, where the same shall be subject to appropriation b;
Congress for tne use and benefit of the Indians.
In order to clarify the meaning of the term "the expense of ad
ministration/' your committee* recommends that ''expenses in con
nection with the supervision of the development and operation o
the oil and gas industry" be substituted therefor.
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of the council speaking for such Indians." If it is proper to ascertain
the wishes of the Indians before the leases are made, then the Indians
should certainly be consulted as to the disposition of tin ITM nc. * di
rived from such leases prior to the time when appropriations of [he
same are made by Congress for their benefit. The proven t • sret i<m
2 will require the Bureau of Indian Alfuirs to state the drsnv of In
Indians in submitting estimates of a] >pi oprintions fi om • .ILK'"In 11 d i a l
funds to Congress through the Budget.
It is the opinion of your committer1 that inn: i; ti nrd dole- in ihc
form of per capita | myments ai e a: ; demoralizing to Indian- a > like
payments would be to i m c f|iial n u m b e r o f whiter p e o p l e , i n t u n c t)f great drought or other severe and gei »eral h a r d s h i p it i>»a\ bo desirable to make such payments, but the Bun au of Indian Affairs
should not have authority to do so without the consent i Congress
Since the legal title to all lands reserved for fndians is in the
United States, none of such lands are subject to State or local taxation. The Supreme Court has repeatedh d e e i d e d t h a t ti e m i n e r a l s
taken from Indian lands are likewise tax exempt unless Con^ivss
specifically consents thereto. (Indian 'lYrritory IHuminalmi: Oil
Co. v. Oklahoma, 240' IT. S. 522: Howard v. <1\ psx ( hi Co : M""; 1 S.
503; Large Oil C<», t Howard, 24 N U. S. 5li).)
Congress has adopted the policy of permit ting the State and local
authorities to tax the minerals produced on Indian lands in flu , ;l r
of thcOsages (41 Stat. 1250), the Quapau s t t-H S t a t 12 1!)) a n d nj • n
treaty reservations generally (43 Stat. 2 4 0 . The terms relating to
taxation used in the new section 3 of the hill are taken from* the
>roviso to section 32 of the general leasing i u "t ( 11 Stat. 450) w Inch
las been construed l>\ the Supreme Com t in flic c a s e o f M i d - X o r l h e r n
Oil Co. v. Walker, Treasurer of the «: ^ta!< i of Montana a: ;; J ollows:

{

We think that the proviso plainly discloses I he intention of ( <»iiy,ivss Ihal
persons and corporations contracting with the United States under the Igeneral
leasing] act should not for that reason be exempt from any form *»f Slate taxation.

In the latter part of section 3 a distinction is made between the
State taxes which may be levied upon the property of leasees and
upon the share obtained for the Indians b\ providing thai : "Jlnli JY
local taxes may only be levied upon the rentals, royalties or bonuses
received by the Indians. The effect of this section is to permit the
State to collect directly from the oil producer on Indian lands any
and every kind of tax that may be assessed against others engaged
in like operations elsewhere in the Slate. The Slate is not authorized,
however, to collect such taxes directly from the Indians but the same
are to be paid for them by the Secretary of t h e I n ! CM i< w am 1 a pin >viso
is added which exempts the lands or other property of the Indians
from any tax lien. The final result of this legislation will be that the
entire output of oil and .gas will be (axed by the Slates, tin • pi odnecr
paying upon his share and the Indians ii( >on the share blaiiu • J 1 »r
them.
The last section c >f tin : bill is necessary in oi dei t< > afl'oi d e q u i t a b l e
relief to those who in go< ul faith ha\ t expended money in prospecting
for oil and gas in accordance with the general leasing act of Februarv
25, 1920. (41 Stat. 437.) On June o! 1022. Albert* B. Fall, the then
Secretary of the Interior, decided that lands withdraw n froi n tlie
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public domain by Executive order for the use of Indians are lands
''owned by the United States" within the purview of that term as
used in the act of February 25, 1920, and therefore subject to lease
under that act. A number of applications were received of which 20
ripened into prospecting permits.
On May 27, 1924, Attorney General Harlan F. Stone rendered an
opinion to the effect that if Congress had intended the act of February
25, 1920, to apply to Executive order Indian reservations that act
would have so stated in specific terms. For this and other reasons
the Attorney (Jeneral ruled that " t h e leasing act of 1920 does not
apply to Mxcculive order Indian reservations."
Following this opinion the Attorney General caused a suit to ho
filed in the United States District Court in Utah to rane.el the 20
oil and jjas prospecting permits granted by Secretary Fall. The
decision of the Federal judge on April 27, 1023,,is JUS follows:
United States District Court, District of Utah. United States of America,
plaintiff, v. JOd McMahon Harrison, defendant. No. S2SS, E
(At the conclusion of the testimony arid argument the court said:)
This ease, gentlemen, as indicated a moment ago, seems U> have been brought
by the Attorney General to cancel permits granted by the Secretary of the
Interior pursuant to the leasing act, on the ground not tlint the Secretary of the
Interior did not have authority to issue permits under the act but that he had
no authority to issue permits upon this particular piece of land. The land it is
claimed was set apart by Executive order for Indian purposes, but it does not
appear that any Indian rights have attached. It is as much in I he future, so
far as the Indians are concerned, as it was on the 17th day of May, 1SS4, the day
the order was made. The title both legal and equitable continued and was in the
Government at the tune this permit was issued. That being true, the Executive
order could have been set aside at any time, could be set aside yet by the Executive.
My impression is, gentlemen, that the Seerelnry of the Interior could have set
it aside under the authorities; and especially >o in view of the leasing act wherein
he is specifically given authority under certain rules and regulations to issue
permits upon Government land.
The equities arc all in favor of the defendant. The claim of the Government
is, as I view it, highly technical in that no substantial rights with respect to the
Government or anyone else are alleged or ehuuied. Thc.c is no question of
fraud here; no claim that these lands have been occupied by Indians or can
possibly be occupied by Indians in any practical way. It is a desert, unfit for
occupancy by anv human being.
The right of the Government to insist upon and enforce what in effect is 8
forfeiture is too doubtful in my mind for the court to adopt that view and deprive
the defendants of possible benefits to be derived from the large expenditure?
which they have made upon this ground in good faith. I shall hold against the
contention of the Government, and I will add also in all these other cases a.
well, if the facts arc the same.
I can see no advantage to anyone for the court to take this matter unde
advisement and write an elaborate opinion upon it or an opinion of any sort, fo
that matter, especially in view of the fact that counsel for the Government, an<
also for the defendants in part, arc nonresidents. Being here, gentlemen, an<
knowing what the decision is, you can jx»rhaps arrange for a speedy appeal o
the case and review by the appellate court.
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mav I consider that a decree entered in this case dismiisin
the bill?
The COURT. That will be the end of this case, yes; decree will be entered dis
missing the bill; that will be the decree.
Ordered filed and made a part of the record.
TILLMAN D. JOHNSON, District Judge.
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The case was promptly appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals
in Denver and on December 10, 1925, was certified to the Supremo
Court in the following manner:
In Supreme Court of the United States, No. N72, OCIMIMM trim WI » Che
United States of America v. Ed McMahan Harrison Mitlucsf < ill i'u uni (IK
Southwest Oil Co., certificate
QUESTIONS CERTIFIED

1. Was there authority in the Secretary of the hit i ioi to i - uc , nml< i (he
provisions of the leasing act of February 25, 1020 (-11 SU\\. I,. IX" , -l II, <\unp.
Stat. 1923 Supp. sec. 4640!^ss) the permit which the Unit < MI State. i ,i >\v s< M :ks u »
have canceled in this suit?
If this question be answered in the negative then we ask:
2. Can this suit be maintained by the United States in equiti to cancel the
permit, it having been issued upon formal hearing by the Se cretarv of the Interior, no claim of fraud or bad faith being made, and the Government having
brought no a c t i o n to cancel the same for 1 y e a r . 10 months and 9 days after its
issuance, appellees Midwest Oil Co. and Southwest Oil Co. in t h a t time having
expended over $200,000 in developing the property for oil, which to them is a
total loss if the permit is canceled?
These questions of law arc by the UniU d States Circuit Court c >f \ppeals I or
the Eighth Circuit hereby certified to the Supreme Coin t in uccorc Linn! , -;111 the
frovisjons of section 239 United States Judicial Code.
Judges who sat in the Circuit Court of Appeals on the hearing < I lite ease:
U O B T . E.

LEWIS,

United States Circuit , htdtje.
W I L L I A M S. K E N VON,

United States Circuit J udge.
T H O S . C.

MUNGER,

United States District Judge

From the foregoing it is evident that the 20 permittees have substantial equities-which are worthy of recognition, and the last section
of the bill provides that they may proceed to prospect under their
permits as originally issued and upon the discovery of valuable deposits of oil and gas to obtain leases in the manner provided by the
act of February 25, 1920, under which their applications weie made.
This section consists principally of a reenactment of the applicable
provisions of that act, so that development may proceed on the lands
embraced within the 20 permits under the supervision of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs instead of the General Land Office.
The committee amendment at the end of section 4 is designed to
afford relief to the qualified applicants who filed their applications
for oil and gas leases on Executive order Indian reservations during
the time when the act of February 25, 1920, was held to be applicable
to such reservations. The amendment does not grant to these applicants any rights other than those which they possessed upon the
date when Attorney General Stone rendered Jiis oninion. Your committee has been unable to ascertain the exact number of such applications, but the Commissioner of the General Land Office estimates
that they do not exceed 400. It is known that 225 applications were
filed in New Mexico, where the principal oil discoveries In i • c been
made.
The enactment of the bill will undoubtedly result in (In dismissal
of the suit now pending before the Supreme Court of the United
States to test the validity of Secretary Fall's ruling that the leasing
act of 1920 applies to Executive order Indian reservations. That
15,1111 W A.S fi 1 A# 1 K V

1.1 "II » A I*. t" n r 110 V

CI P11 n r "i 11 «> I f

t 1 'i •» v i\ J 11J»• : I

-f

t 1i '

11i1 T i i»in 1 1

8

OTL AND CAS MINING LEASES UP'W UNALLOTTED LANDS

of Indian Affairs because under the terms of that net none of the oil
and gas royalties would be paid to the Indians. Hon. Charles H.
Burke, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, has always insisted that
the Indians are justly entitled to receive ail of the income from oil
and gas lenses and has never agreed to any legislation the effect of
which would deprive them of the benefits thereof. Since the most
favorable outcome of the pending litigation could not possibly secure
for the Indians any tiling more than is granted them nv this bill the
suit should be dismissed as soon as it becomes a law.
The bill as amended places the permittees and applicants in the
same situation as they were when the suits were filed against them.
While there are able lawyers who contend that the Supreme Court
of the United States will sustain Secretary Fail's ruling, yet those
who desire to secure leases under their present applications would
certainly prefer to procccnl in accordance with the terms of this bill
rather than wait until that court has rendered a decision.
With the rights of both the Indians and the oil operators recognized
as provided in the bill there can be no reason why the Supreme Court
should decide the pending suit, unless it is deemed desirable for that
court to use it as means of passing upon the question of whether the
Indians who occupy Executive order Indian reservations have title
thereto. The court could ignore that issue in deciding the case, but
if every contention in favor of the Indians were approved it would
still be necessary for Congress to pass an act authorizing oil and gas
leases on Executive order Indian reservations, disposing of the rentals,
royalties, or bonuses and permitting the States to levy taxes.
With the general leasing act of 1920 declared to be inapplicable,
Congress would then be compelled to do the very tilings proposed to
be done by this bill.
Nothing in this bill is intended to in any manner change or alter
the ownership or legal and equitable title to the lands described by
its terms. The question of what rights the Indians may have in
and to Executive order reservations will not be affected by its passage
and the courts can squarely decide that issue without reference to
this legislation.
Under the Constitution, Congress has complete authority to disosc of the public domain and to control the uses of the lands of
ndian tribes. It is therefore no disrespect to the Supreme Court
for Congress to pass laws relating to such matters while they are
the subject of legal controversy. Many instances can be cited
where that has been done, but the following should be sufficient:
On April 11, 1921, in the case of United States v. Northern Pacific
Railway Co. (256 U. S. 51), the Supreme Court rendered a decision
remanding the case for further hearing, or if the parlies did not
avail themselves of that privilege, with direction to the lower cour
to enter a decree, without prejudice to have certain -questions deter
mined by the land department. While the matter was still pending
and unadjudicated by the court or by the department, Congres.
June 5, 1924 (43 Stat. 401), passed a joint resolution directing
withholding of action in the matter pending a congressional investi
gation, which investigation is now in progress, and which will UD
rloubtedlv eventuate in further legislation.
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Coog r e s s o n j^ai-ch 4, 1923 (42 Stat. 1448), passed an act disposing
of certain oil claims in the bed of Red River, Okla., although the
lands were at that time included in pending proceedings before the
United States Supreme Court, and remained in possession of a
receiver appointed by the court for a year or more alter the passage
of the act. In each of these cases property valued at millions of
dollars was involved, yet Congress did not hesitate to enact legislation vitally affecting its ownership.
The bill as introduced was an attempt to compromise conflicting
opinions as to how to develop the oil and gas resources to be found on
about 22,250,000 acres of land which has been withdrawn from the
public domain by Executive order at various times and under varying conditions for the use and occupancy of Indians. The bill as
reported back to the House is fair and equitable to the Indians, to
the States where the reserved lands are located, and to those who
desire to prospect for oil and gas. As amended, the bill reads as
follows
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rejrrescntatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That unallotted lands within the limits of any
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order for Indian purposes or
for the use or occupancy of any Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and pas
mining purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in the act of May 29,
1924 (Forty-third Statutes, page 244).
SEC. 2. That the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses ot oil and gas
leases upon lands within Executive-order Indian reservations or withdrawals
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe
of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was created or who
are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate of 4 per
centum per-annum-and be available for appropriation by Congress for expenses
in connection with the supervision of the development and operation of the oil
and gas industry and for the use and benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said
Indians, or their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure
of such money, but no per capita payment shall be made except by act of Congress.
S E C 3. That taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority
upon improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells or other rights, property,
or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive-order Indian reservations
in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such
taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses,
rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized
and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a lien m charge of nn 1 iml
against the land or other property of such Indians.
S E C 4. That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to allow any applicant to whom a
permit to prospect for oil and gas under lands within an Indian reservation or
withdrawal created by Executive order has heretofore been issued in accordance
with the provisions of the act of February 25, 1920 (Forty-first Statutes, page
437), or the holder thereof, to prospect for a period of two years from the date
this act takes effect, or for such further time as the Secretary of the Interior may
deem reasonable or necessary for the full exploration of the land described in
his permit, under the terms and conditions therein set out, and a substantial
contribution toward the drilling of the geologic structure by the holder of a
permit therein may be considered as prospecting under the provisions hereof;
and upon establishing to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that
valuable deposits of oil and gas have been discovered within the limits of the
land embraced in any permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease for onefourth of the land embraced in the prospecting permit: Provided, That the
permittee shall be granted a lease for as much as one hundred and sixty acres of
said lands if there be that number of acres within the permit. The area to be
selected bv the permittee shall be in mninnff form find if surveyed to be de-
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accordance with rules and legulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of th«
Interior, and the lands leased shall be conformed to and taken in accordance
with the legal subdivisions of such surveys; deposits made to cover expense of
surveys shall be deemed appropriated for"that purpose, and any excess deposits
may be repaid to the person or ]>crsons making such deposit or their legal representatives. Such leases shall be for a term of twenty years upon a royalty of
5 per centum in amount or value of the production and the annual payment in
advance of a rental of $1 per acre, the rental paid for any one year to be credited
against the royalties as they may accrue for that year, with the preferential
right in the lessee to renew the same for successive periods of ten years upon
such reasonable terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
the Interior. The permittee shall also be entitled to a preference right to a
lease for the remainder of the land in his prospecting permit at a royalty of not
less than 1 2 ^ P<*r centum in amount or value of the production, the royalty to
be determined by competitive bidding or fixed by such other method as the
Secretary may by regulations prescribe: Provided further, That the Secretary
shall have the right to reject any or all bids: And provided further, That the
Secretary of the Interior in his discretion is authorized to reinstate, in the order
of their original filing, all applications of qualified applicants filed prior to May
27, 1924, for permits to prospect for oil and gas under the said act of February
25, 1920, upon any lands covered by the provisions of this act, and which applications were not granted, upon the following conditions: Written request for
such action shall be filed by the original applicant, or his heirs in the land office
of the appropriate land district within ninety days from the date of the approval
of this act, and the reinstatement of any such applications shall confer the right
of prospecting and to secure a lease or leases as in this section provided, upon
the lands described in such application.

MINORlT'i

Vir.WS

Regretting our innhility to concur in the majority rep
9133, which provides for the leasing of public lands, knov
tive order Indian reservations for oil and mining privilcir.
submit our minority views:
I, he; i i , ,s i 1 M M

t
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H. R. 9133, reported out by the Committee on Ii idian AfFairs,
authorizes the leasing of what is known as Executive order Indian
reservations for oil and mining development, but the act is especially
applicable to what is known as Navajo Executive order Indian
Reservations.
The President lias at different times in the past by so-called
Executive orders designated certain portions of the Government
public lands for temporary use of different Indian tribes. On other
occasions, by similar Executive orders, the President has restored to
the public lands domain certain portions of the Executive order
Indian reservations.
The President at no time has been given authority by Congress to
transfer title in the public lands by Executive orders setting aside
portions of the public domain for the use of the Indians. The legal
title, therefore, to this so-called Executive order Indian reservations
is at all times in the Government. For an illustration of the nature
and character of the Executive order setting aside certain portions
of the public lands for the use of the Indians, a copy of an order made
by President Cleveland, April 2S, 1886, is hereby given, us follows,
to wit:
APRIL 24,

1886.

It is hereby ordered that the following described tract of country in the Territory of New Mexico, viz, all those portions of townships 29 north, ranges 14, 15,
and 16 west of the New Mexico principal meridian, south of the San Juan River,
be, and the same is hereby, withdrawn from sale an<1 settlement and set apart as
an addition to the Navajo Indian reservations.
GROVER CLEVELAND.

An illustration of an Executive order of the President restoring to
the public land domain certain portions of Executive order Indian
reservations is herowith shown by Executive order of President Harrison, made November 19, 1892:
It is hereby ordered that the Executive order of May 17, 1884, by President
Chester A. Arthur, withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting apart as a
reservation for Indian purposes certain lands in the Territories of Ttalt and Arizona, be, and the same hereby is, modified so that all the lands described in said
order which lie west of the one hundred and tenth degree of west longitude and
within the Territory of Utah, be, and the same hereby are, restored to the public
domain, freed from reservation made by said order.
BENJ. IIAHIUSON.

Had thero been a transfer vesting of the title in the Indian tribe
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The legal effect of and moaning of Executive ordor Indian reservataions is that the Indians may temporarily have the surfaco of the
land for use in hunting, fishing, grazing, etc., the land at all times
being subject to restoration to the general public domain.
.SECRETARY FALL AUTHORIZES LEASING OF GOVERNMENT LAND AND
MINERAL RESERVES

While Senator Fall was Secretary of the Interior he authorized
tin? leasing of certain portions of the Government mineral reserves
and lands. Some of them went to Mr. Doheny, others went to Mr.
Sinclair, and others, those involved in this bill, went to Ed. McMahon
Harrison et al.
It seems that the Government has employed special counsel to
prosecute suits for the cancellation of the Doheny leases and other
suits for the cancellation of the Sinclair leases, and still another suit
restraining operation on the Executive order, Navajo Reservation.
The last-named suit is to he especially affected by this bill. In other
words, this bill (II. U. 9133), if enacted into law, will virtually rob
and tako from the Supreme Court its jurisdiction of the subject matter
involved in the suit. In nroof of this statement reference is here made
to the statement made i>y Commissioner Burke, of Indian Affairs,
before the committee which especially considered the bill. See top
of page 28 of hearings, where Mr. Burke says:
This suit (referring to the suit pending in the Supreme Court) is to be dismissed on the passage of this bill. That will lie the end of the litigation.

Congress should not undertake to legislate a determination of
suits in equity. The suit pending in the Supreme Court, which is to
be dismissed upon the passage of this bill, is an equity suit, in which
the court is not only to determine the legal status and title to the land
involved but also to determine the equities and rights of the parties
to the suit, as based upon facts proved by testimony and under
oath.
The Doheny and the Sinclair suits arc also pending before the
Supreme Court. They, too, nre the result of the attitude of Secretary
Fall toward the Federal Government ami its public lands and oil
reserves. Is it wise for the Congress to supersede and intercede in
behalf of either party or both parties to either of the suits now pending before the Supreme Court, in which Secretary Fall is so conspicuously involved? If so in one, then why not in the others? It
is our opinion that the Congress would be setting an unwarranted
and unjustified precedent in interfering with litigation pending before the Supreme Court in the manner that this bill would interfere.
TO WHOM DORS THE OIL AND GAS AND OTHER MINERALS IN AND UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER INDIAN RESERVATIONS BELONG

In law, the Indians have only a temporary and permissive use of
the surface of the land, and this through the gracious goodness anil
paternalistic attitude of the Government toward the Indians.
r
n»A i l i m i j l f t S i n a sense only been loaned for surface use to the
*• —- *~ i\xt, .mhlip drunaii
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the land has at all times belonged to and now is
Government.
The whole of the Navajo Indian Reservation counti \ , fi < >i i i a
report of the Geological Survey, appears to he from a prospective
viewpoint good oil territory. The last paragraph of that report
reads as follows:
In conclusion it may be said that a review of all data at hand shows that nearly
all of the Navajo Reservation is occupied by rocks which rithcr do or may produce oil, but that it will take a great deal of d< M ailed geologic work lit • < milinc the
most promising areas.

There does not appear from the hearings or any other source any
special reason why wiiat may be one of the Government's richest oil
reserves should be given to one tribe of the Government Indian wards.
The urgency of this bill from a Government standpoint has not
appeared in the hearings or from any other source. Then* is no present scarcity of oil to supply the needs of the* general public
While
there doubtless will be a time when the demand for oil will he much
greater than now, those who arc interested in securing the leases and
who are to be given a preference l>\ I his bill are t lie ones to be especially benefited at this time.
THE GOVERNMENT T H E GUARDIAN I: ( lit I! s b l A V T R I B A L IMM >PEKT\
D E P E N D E N T A NI ) HES 1 Mi T E D I N D I A N S

A c c o r d i n g to the JISSIIII icd a u t h o r i t y < >f the G o v c n u . n •

AND

.-.:•<•-

sions of the Supreme Court and the acts of Congress, the (
;t
sustains a guardianship relation to the Indian tribes and their property
and the restricted dependent membership thereof. There are many
)Oor tribes without property of any eonsequt TIC *c\ This bill provides
or transferring rich mineral rights, which now belong to the Federal
Government, to the Navajos, who already have a large reservation
said to be rich in oil and coal mineral rights. There would not seem
to be any equity or fairness on the part of the Great While Father to
lavishly give to his wards who already have plenty when there are
many other wards.of the same relationship to the guardian who do
not have plenty
We, therefore, dissent from the majority report for three reasons:
First. The enactment of this legislation would in substance be
ratifying and validating what is claimed to be the unauthorized and
illegal official acts of Secretary Fall and would be legislating subject
matter away from the Supreme Court, which would be a bad
precedent
Second. The oil and other mineral rights in the lands involved in
this bill are the property of the Federal Government and do not belong
to the Navajo Indians and should not be virtually transferred in this
way to any Indians.
Third. If the Government, in expressing a paternalistic spirit and
relationship towsird any of its Indian wards, wishes to give away its
mineral reserves, then we submit that those Indian wards most needy
shoidd be first remembered or at least- should be ti c a ted equally iveD
with the more wealthy Indian wards.
Respectfully submitted.
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MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FREAR
The Hayden Tndian oil leasing hill (H. R. 0133) as originally introduced this session, on which hearings were held, provides for a 37J^
per cent Indian oil royalty tax to he paid to the State. Ostensibly
this tax is to he used for Indian highways or schools directly or
indirectly, to be expended in the discretion of the State. The
remaining 02 J^ per cent of the oil royalty is to be paid directly to the
Interior Department to be held for the benefit of the Indian tribe
owning or occupying the Executive order reservations.
These Executive order reservations arc located in 10 different
States and comprise over 22,000,000 acres of land occupied by about
85,000 of the 225,000 restricted Indians. The position of those
opposed to the inequitable 37 K» P o r c o n t oil tax proposal is to be found
in the fact that all unallotted treaty reservations ?iow held by Indians
pay the same rate of oil lax to the State in which the land is located
as is paid by the white people and other residents of the State. No
favor and no injustice is extended to the Indians who occupy these
reservations. It was contended by Secretary Fall and others tnat the
Executive order lands were only "used" by the Indians and differ
in title from the treaty reservations, and it is now contended that a
3 7 ^ per cent oil tax should be paid by the Indians to the State primarily because of their doubtful title. The determination of the title
of the Indians in Executive order lands briefly will be referred to hereafter.
In the Sixty-eighth Congress an oil-leasing bill was introduced by
Representative Havden to cover these same Executive order lands.
The copy of that bill is not before me, but is understood to have
contained a proposal that Indian oil royalties should be taxed by
the State the same as all other royalties and in the same manner as
oil royalties from treaty reservations are now taxed. That tax, for
illustration, in Oklahoma under that State's law is only 3 per cent
on the Indian royalties, whereas H. R. 9133 as Introduced provides
a 37H per cent tax or twelve times as much.
The iia}'den bill last session went to the Senate and was there
amended or an independent proposition was inserted in the Senate
bill covering the same Indian oil proposition. The Indian oil royalty
tax provided for in the Senate bill was 37H per cent, or over twelve
times the amount that would have been paid under the Hayden bill
that passed the House that session.
The House and Senate bill, with the conference rcr>ort, came back
to the House on March 3, 1925. Mr. Snyder and Mr. Hayden were
managers on the part of the House. The report is found in volume
G6 of part 5, Sixty-eighth Congress, second session, page 5433. A
oint of order made b}r Mr. Dalhngcr against the report was sustained
y the Chair and the bill failed in its passage. The point of order
was based on the fact that the conferees had agreed without submitting the 37>£ per cent Senate amendment to the House for its
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Bill H . R. 9133, introduced at this session, i is app< M in s 1 rom page 1
of the hearings, provides I he same Indian tax ;i ate c»f 37J4 per cent
contained in the Senate amendment, thai was j>la< i <1 in the House bill
last session, and similarly leaves the while producer I ix exempt. A
similar Indian oil leasing bill to II. K. 5U;{.'! is before the Senate
committee at this time
Il • contains tin : :anu rale of -ST1 j pet < r nt
Indian royalty oil tax to be paid the Stat<\ as appears from that- bill
That bill,or an amendment with that rate of M} \ per cent, will be sent
back to the House. The n i xu il confei v < s appointed on f IK Senate and
House Indian oil leasing bill presumably will be largely the same as
those who recommended the 3 7 ^ per cent Indian royalty oil tax It si
session.
The Indian oil leasing bill (H. R. 9133) wiis referred this session I*i
a subcommittee. Only one hearing was held on the bill, which covers
22,000,000 acres of Indian reservation land, as stated. At that
hearing of not to exec *cd t\\ o hour? % \\ ith about Ill pi igc ls of :K :tual testimony, the only witnesses who appeared were those acting I oi oil
interests, claiming equities under the Fall order no> \ beinj ;; /' jni \ ue .1
by the Government in the Federal courts.
Also there appeared the Indian Commissioner, w ho appro\ ed the
3 7 H p e r c e n t tax or gift to tlie States contained in the bill, and testimony was offered by Representative Hayden in behalf of his bill.
Against the bill appeared John Collier, ex< Tittive sec ret i i \ \ i i i<: i i
can Indian Defense Association. "Not one member of tlie S5,000
Indians who occupied 22,000,000 acres of land, nor any authorized
representative of such Indians, was present I -o testify
The hearings
will show the brief character of that OIK l day s t estimony which %is
accompanied by documents and dat a necrssa i \ t .o m under? l a n d i n g
of the measure.
After the hearing on February 1! >, 1! )2G. I y the subcommitt< t , the
next meeting occurred on March 24, when bill II. K. 9133 was again
taken up for consideration. An amendment offered by Kepresentative Hayden to his own bill abandoning the 3 7 ^ per cent Indian
royalty tax and substantially embodying the tax pi ovisions of his
bill of last session, was then adopted.
I t was stated that while no objection was had to tl u s n i lendmc nt
which would tax Indian oil royalties the same as those MI ti <: Mit \
reservations, nevertheless acceptance of the bill in that form would
mean its passage through tlie House to the Senate, where, as before,
tlie 3 7 ^ per cent tax amendment would be reinserted, unci without
any opportunity to consider the tax proposal on its merits the House
would oe confronted with a brief discussion and proposed conference
report with tlie time entirely controlled by tlie proponents of the
373^ per cent tax proposal, and for that re nson, especially in view
of the experience 01 last session, no argunu Mil: could safely !>c had in
the House to the bill when amended.
The subcommittee report was presented u > the general c .unmittee
and adopted substantially in the same form, excepting that instead of
22 applicants under the old Fall order the bill was amended to include
any number of the 475 applicants that the Secretary may determine.
Over 1,000,000, acres possibly may be so «; -i \ < MI t .> those applicants
whose claims w< 5 re < > v e r r 1 11 ec 1 b y A t t o r 11 e \" ( i < 111 e r a 1 S tc,> 11< >""s c » j > 11111 »1:1
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The bill finally was approved by the Indian Committee on March
27, by a vote of 8 for and 5 opnosed out of the 13 members present.
The opposition will be overwhelming if the facts can be understood.
The objection readied in committee to the bill's present form arc
herewith briefly stated:
If the llayden Indian oil leasing bill, II. It. 0133, as now reported
could pass Congress in the form now presented by the committee
with all parties equally taxed, it. would still be objectionable because,
of the -I7f> Fall applicants and 1,200,000 acres that mnv be given to
these favored applicants under the illegal Fall order. A royalty rate
of only 5 per cent to the Indians on one-quarter of these lands,
300,000 acres, is without justification. The Senate amendment of
37^2 pur <*-nt royalty tax was placed in the Senate bill bust session
and as stated it was accepted by the conferees of the House without
any action permitted by the. House and was thrown out on the point
of order.
The present bill was introduced containing the 37J'.j per cent
Indian royally oil tax contained in both Senate1 and House bills,
and that rate has been separately considered by the Senate and
House committees. The bill is practically certain to have the Senate
amendment added to its provisions if it passes the House at this
time, and will then conn* back without reasonable opportunity by
the House to consider the amendment, just as it occurred last session. The further important fuct is noted that the Senate 37]/£
per cent Indian royalty tax was approved by the Indian Bureau
last session, and the same rate, according to Commissioner Burke
in both House and Senate bearings, has been approved by the Indian
Bureau this session. No measure, based on past experience, will
pass Congress without the approval of the Indian Bureau.
The bill as. reported by the committee without the 371^ per cent
Indian oil royalty tax does not meet the conditions heretofore approved by the Indian Bureau. It may be further stated that the
only way to fairly present the question before the House will be to
await receipt of the Senate bill and such action then had upon the
Senate bill as may be deemed necessary. By that means alone will
fair discussion be afforded in the House on the 373£ per cent oil
tax amendment.
CLAIMS AFFECTING INDIAN' TITLKS IN CONTROVERSY

Briefly staled, it is claimed by oil interests that these Executive
order reservations ought to be thrown open to the public lands leasing
privileges. On June 9, 1922, Secretary of the Interior Fall ordered
these Indian lands thrown open to oil prospectors on the same terms
that public land oil leases were then made, under an act of February
25, 1920.
These terms, briefly, included a 5 per cent r e a l t y for the first
G40 acres, and on three contiguous sections lessees were given preference on roj'ally bids of at least Yiy^ per cent. Thirty-seven and onehalf per cent of the royalty so paid on public land leases is given to
the State in which the Government lands were located, and 52>£ per
ceut is deposited in the reclamation fund, with 10 per cent for tho
Treasury. The** oil permits were given by Secretary Kail by order,
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and about 475 applications were filed according to Commissioner
Burke, page 35, subcommittee hearings.
Based on protects from various Indian welfare organizations, the
President thereafter asked for a legal opinion from the Attorney
General affecting the status of Executive order reservations.
In that opinion, containing about -1,000 words, pages 77 (o X2 of
printed hearings, the Attorney General upheld I lie content inn of the
Indian Rights Association as follows:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
The important matter here, however, is tliat neither tlie* euurU nor Congress
have made any distinction as to the character or extent of Indian rights a;
between Executive order reservations and reservations established by treaty
or act of Congress. So that if the general leasing act applies to one class there
seems to !>c no ground for holding that it does not apply to others. You are
therefore advised that the leasing act of 1020 duos not apply to Executive order
Indian reservations.
Respectfully,
HAHI.AN F. STONB, Attorney General.

No uncertainty exists in that judgment, based on a long li.st of
authorities quoted and a thorough discussion of the subject, ttused
on that opinion the Fall order was set aside and no applications
recognized, on the theory that Indian rights prevented such applications being considered.
A suit was brought by one Harrison, a Fall oil permittee. The
local Federal judge sustained his right without taking the matter
under advisement (hearings, p. S3), and two questions were thereafter certified by the court of appeals to the Supreme Court. Supporting the opinion of Attorney General Stone is the opinion of tne
solicitor of the Interior Department, who rendered an opinion several
days ago to the same effect as that found by the Attorney General.
Based on such opinions, the United States owns all reservations,
including treaty reservations. Executive order reservations were
substituted for treaty reservations since 1S71 with slight exceptions.
No difference exists in these titles, and Congress has power to take
from any of these Indian reservations whatever tribal lands it sees
fit to transfer, although no such action can be defended nor luis
any been undertaken for ninny years. On the other hand, the
public oil leasing act does not appl}' to any of the Indian reservations, and according to the Attorney General and solicitor of the
Interior Department the same rights to title exist on the 22,000,000
acres of Executive order reservations affected by the llayden bill
that exist with all other reservations.
An enabling act should be passed in order that oil development may
be had upon the Indian hums and the income derived for the benefit
of the Indians. I t is here contended, however, that production and
Indian oil royalties should be taxed the same as, but no higher than,
all other oil royalties. Oklahoma unallotted treaty reservation
Indians and Indians on trcatv reservations in all the remaining oil
producing States now pay to the State oil royalty tax rates averaging
about 3 per cent,, the amount fixed by the laws of the several States
for production and royalties anywhere in these States.
The 373^ per cent tax rate originally in the Ilaydcn bill was carried
through conference last session without any vote by the House. It
is a tax 12 times the rate of taxes paid from treaty reservations
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without any justification therefor except to claim it is a compromise
of suits now pending. For illustration, on a total oil production of
$1,000,000 under the hill, with a 37>£ per cent oil royalty tax the
Indian trihe would receive from the 475 or loss number of Fall applicants, on the hasis of a 5 per cent royalty, $.">()yQ0(). Of this $50,000
royalty on $1,000,000 production the State with its 37}4 per cent
Indian oil tax would got SIS,750 and the Indian trihe would have
placed to its credit the remaining (Y2lt per cent or $31,250, which is
ahout 3 per cent net royaltv for Indians on those lenses. The oil
driller and producer would, however, get $950,000 of the $1,000,000
for his share and would he exempted from taxation. On a 3 per cent
tax, if the State exacted that from him, he would still receive over
90 per cent net of the total oil production.
If the oil royalties reach 12*^ per cent, or one-eighth, as in ordinary eases, the Indian trihos' share would ine.roaso two and one-half
times the 5 per cent royalty, hut in all eases subjected to the 37J/£
per cent State tax, with proportionate decreases in the oil producer's
share. Many tribes will he affected hy this oil leasing hill on which
none of the Indians affected have yet expressed an opinion so far as the
hearings show. The hill says the .St ale will expend this 37^£ per cent
for the Indians. That provision is heyond any reasonable explanation or expectation of relief to the Indians.
In other words, the Navajo Trihes land is the reservation on which
Fall gave his permits and received the other applications. If the oil
production on the Navajo Tribe's reservation reach $1,000,000, according to the illustration, the Xavajo Indians will receive $31,250
from that amount of oil production, or an average of less than $1 per
capita to members of the trihe. This might not be so important
ordinarily as between individuals, but apart from the fact that this
bill is intended primarilv to reach prospective Navajo oil fields, it is
further stated that nearly $900,000 reimbursable charges are pending
against this tribe that must eventually be paid.
One-third of the Navajo Tribe is suffering from trachoma, 7,000
children were recently reported without schools, ni\d generally speaking the tribe was stated to be three generations backward compared
with other northern tribes.
This suggestion is only offered to show the injustice of permitting
the House or the Senate, to enact a 37 x/1 per cent royalty oil tax to bo
collected against the Indians.
In conclusion it is submitted:
First. That the House bill originally contained the 3 7 ^ per cent
Indian tax.
That tax was stricken out in committee before the bill was reported.
The Senate will amend the bill if passed and substitute the 3714
per cent tax.
The bill will thon come back in conference.
That was precisely the situation last session excepting that no
vote on the Senate amendment was then had in the House.
This plan removes the 37j^ per cent discussion from the House
until it comes in under pressure of a conference report.
Second. The allowance of upward of 475 applicants under the
T7.il — j — „
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MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. HOWARD
I find myself unable to indorse the majority report in approval of
this bill.
.
, ,. r n m n r p i i c r u | all the conclusions reached
Because of mab>l,w of u ^ o m p r e h m
j
by my colleague, lion, t»amcs> A .
,
withhold my signature.
nassa^c of this bill in its present
I respectfully P ™ * f ^ ^ ™ ^
proposed is
form, having reached the c o i c u on twai
,
^ legislation
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Supreme Court of the United States.
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ADDENDUM H
H.R. REP. NO. 1883, 72D CONG., 2ND SESS. (1933)

72D CONGRESS

£d Session

) HOUSE OF BEFBESENTASSVES (
f
(

EEPOET

No. 1883

PERMANENTLY SET ASIDE CERTAIN LANDS IN UTAH AS AN
ADDITION TO THE NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATION

JANTJABT 19, 1933.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

ctate of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr.

LEAVTTT,

from the Committee on Indian Affaire, submitted the
following

EEPOBT
[To accompany H. R. 117351
The Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the bill
(E. R. 11735) to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an
addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report it favorably to the House with
the recommendation that it do pass with the following amendments:
Pn«re 3, line 1, strike out the period after the wora "Utah" and
add the following: "nor shall further Indian homesteads be made in
said countT under the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. 96; U. S. C , title
43, sec. 190)."
Page 3, line 19, strike out the period, insert a comma in lieu thereof
and add "except as to the payment of fees or commissions which are
hereby waived."
This bill refers to certain lands now temporarily withdrawn from
all forms of entry by an order of the Department of the Interior
dated February 19, 1929, and would permanently withdraw the
area for use of the Navajo Indians; it also includes a smaller tract of
land withdrawn by departmental order of July 27,1932, and provides
that the State of Utah may exchange school tracts within the area for
other tracts of public land elsewhere within that State.
This land has been used by the Indians since early history. The
first mentioned part was originally set aside by Executive order (1884)
for reservation purposes; in 1892 it was restored to the public domain
by another Executive order. In 1908 the department withdrew the
land for the use of the Indians and, finally, in 1922 it was restored
to the public domain in the belief that it might prove more useful if
made available for entry. Through all this time the Indians have
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used the land to some extent; during the last 10 years the livestock
industry has grown by leaps and bounds among the members of the
tribe and it is apparent that, if this business is to continue to thrive,
and the friends of the Indians hope it will, additional grazing land
must be provided. It appears that only three white families have
attempted to reside within the area.
No new policy is established and no outlay of money by the Federal
Government is involved. Provision is made for disposition of any
revenue arising from any ofl and gas which might be discovered
within the area and the State of Utah is permitted to select unreserved
and nonmineral tracts elsewhere in lieu of school sections within the
area. It appears that the rights of all persons involved are adequately
protected in the measure.
The Secretary of the Interior reports favorably in the following
language:
DEPARTMENT or THE INTERIOR,

Washington, January If, 1055.
HOD. EDGAR HOWARD,

Chairman Committee an Indian Affair*,
House of Representatives.
Mr DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: ID further response to your request of December 29,
1932, for a report OD H. R. 11735, which is a bill "To permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other
purposes," there is transmitted herewith a memorandum on the subject that has
been submitted by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
After a review of the proposed measure, I agree with the commissioner.
Very truly yours,
RAT LTMAK WILBUR, Secretary.
DEPARTMENT OP THE INTERIOR,
OPPICE OP INDIAN AFT AIRS,

Washington, January 7, 1933.
Memorandum for the Secretary.
Reference is made to the letter of December 29,1932, from the clerk of the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, requesting information for the committee on H. R.
11735, a bill to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the
Navajo IndiaD Reservation, and for other purposes.
The bill proposes to return to the Navajo Indians a strip of country in southern
Utah commonly referred to as the Paiute strip, and also add an additional small
tract adjacent to the reservation in Utah lying between Montezuma Creek and
the Utah-Colorado State line.
The so-called Paiute strip area covering approximately 500,000 acres, was
originally set aside as a reservation for Indian purposes by Executive order of
May 17, 1884. Later by Executive order of November 19*, 1892, the tract was
restored to the public domain and by departmental order of May 28,1908, it was
again withdrawn for Indian purposes. Subsequently by departmental order of
July 17, 1922, the tract was once more restored to its former status as public
land, as it was then reported that the Indians were not utilizing the land sufficiently to warrant its retention as an Indian reservation.
Since the last restoration in 1922, conditions have greatly changed with respect
to the need of this area for Indian purposes and as the existing reservation does
not afford sufficient grazing area for the livestock of the Indians, the so-called
strip was by departmental order of February 19, 1929, temporarily withdrawn
from all forms of entry or disposal in aid of proposed legislation.
The lands within the strip have always been occupied by Indians, only three
white families,
"squatters," nave been found living within the entire area. These
"squatters19 have settled close to the present reservation northern boundary for
the purpose of trading with the Indians, and not being on the reservation they
— ~~* ^ntiirpH to ooerate in accordance with the regulations governing trade
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The smaller area -covered by the bill located between Montezuma Creek on
the west and the State boundary line on the east covers approximately 52,000
acres and is used by Indians. All vacant land within tliis area was temporarily
withdrawn by departmental order of July 27,1932.
The Navajo Tribal Council during its annual meeting at Fort Wingate, July
7 and 8, 1932, expressed itaelf as favoring enactment of the bill, and during its
previous meeting of 1931, the council also favored the bill and further requested
that the Paiute strip be obtained for the Navajo Indians under the best terms
possible to negotiate.
During the past few years objection developed on the part of the local citizens
to the addition of these lands to the Navajo Reservation, and accordingly a
meeting was arranged which took place at Blinding, Utah, on July 15, 1932, by
myself and others with a representative gathering of citizens of San Juan County,
Utah. This meeting culminated in the appointment of a committee of nine
citizens to represent the local people ana a written agreement was reached
whereby the citizens as represented by the committee went on record as favoring
the bill H. R. 11735 with certain specified qualifications. Three copies of the
written agreement are inclosed.
In accordance with item 1 of the agreement, it is necessary to amend the bill
slightly BO as to preclude the making of any further Indian homesteads. The
other items enumerated in the agreement are administrative in their nature and
can be worked out in the future should the bill be enacted.
Section 2 of the bill will grant the State of Utah the right to relinquish such
tracts of school land within the areas as it may see fit in favor of the Indians, and
also the right to make lieu selections of public land within the State equal in area
to that relinquished, said lieu selections to be made &s is provided for in the Utah
enabling act. As the proposed addition of these areas to the reservation benefits
the Government in its administration of the affairs of the Indians, it is believed
desirable to further amend the bill so as to preclude the payment of fees or commissions by the State should it make lieu selections.
It is therefore recommended that the bill be amended as follows:
Page 3, line 1, after the word "Utah" add the following: "Nor shall further
Indian homesteads be made in said county under the act of July 4. 1SS4 (23
Stat. 96)/'
Page 3, line 19, immediately after the statute reference, add the following:
"Except as to the payment of fees or commissions which arc hereby waived."
Should the bill H. i t 11735 be amended'as suggested, it is recommended that
it be enacted.
C. J. RHOAOS, Commissioner.
BLAKDIKG, UTAH,

July 15, 193!

MEMORANDUM or AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN A COMMITTEE or NINE, REPRESENTING THE CITIZENS OF BLANDINQ, UTAH, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, REGARDING THE PIUTE STRIP

1. It was agreed, after full discussion, that the lines described in H. R. 11735,
Seventv-second Congress, first session, should constitute the northern boundary
of the Kavajo Reservation.
2. In consideration of the proposed addition to the reservation contemplated
by the above bill, it was agreed that no more fourth-section Indian allotments or
Indian homesteads under the 1S84 act should be made in San Juan County,
Utah, outside of said boundary lines.
3. The north, line of the proposed reservation addition, east of Montezuma
Creek, is to be fenced by the Indian Service.
4. The 37H royalty clause in the above bill is to remain, but the State of Utah
is free to change to the usual form.
5. The clause in the bill relative to granting the State the right to exchange
its school lands within the area involved is satisfactory to the committee.
6. It is agreed that the scenic tracts are to be developed by the National Park
Service, with the cooperation of the Indian Sen-ice.
7. Control of the killing of game outside the proposed reservation Hn« ;• •b e i n *u*f»nr<4or»**A W-J4V * u ~ C?A-A
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* T Jj-:...-f>»#.ir cattle or sheep across non-Indian land, the
9. In the event I n d i " - - ^ $ 'SJckunder inch conditions shall applv
^ e d ^ b f f i T l h f S K t S T S Nine and the Commiss,oner of Indian
Affairs:

^
A Adams. Monticello, Utah; Charles Redd,
mAA
t^mtMm
Committee: ^ ^ . ^ J ^ w Perkins, Blanding, Utah; Dr John
Blandmg. U ^ G e o r g e J ^ ^ S ^ Blanding. Utah; Marion
B^gers, 31andmg, Ujan.
* " " £ £ Verdure, Utah; H. C. PerHunt. Bluff, W ^ . p g 1 g fiSck? Blinding Utah by Charles
kin. Blanding, Utah, B. D. g ^ ^ j ft. Stewart, section
S ^ l S ^ f f l h A S 3 5 £ « behaU of the ConnnU•ioncr of Indian Affair**
Approved.
C. J. RHOADS.

